Intuitions, Reasons, and Compatibilism

In class yesterday, we discussed the role of intuitions in philosophy. It came up because John Martin Fischer has a chapter in the book we're reading in which he seems to rely on a kind of epistemic principle involving intuitions. We had trouble articulating the principle in class. Perhaps the entry on intuitions in the SEP will be helpful in clearing up some of the questions that arose in my class and will help us spell out the principle that Fischer seems to have in mind.

Here's a principle like one we considered in class (and which is not that far from one mentioned in the SEP entry). I'll call it principle "P"

P = If a theory (generalization, etc.) contravenes the content of an intuition, then that intuition should be treated as (defeasible) evidence against the theory.  

Fischer doesn't explicitly endorse this principle, but he does seem to think that, all else being equal, our theories (beliefs, views, etc.) should be in keeping with our intuitions. That is, he seems to think that if a theory is not in keeping with an intuition, then this is a reason (albeit a defeasible one) for thinking that the theory is false.

The majority of students in my class didn't take issue with this sort of principle, but a number of them were skeptical of the reliability of intuitions in providing reasons to endorse a theory (have a belief, etc.). I was surprised, in fact, by the level of skepticism about principles like P.

A related issue that we discussed involved how we ought to unpack Fischer's argument at the beginning of the chapter (and whether he was intending to really offer an argument).

We might read Fischer as having put forward the following argument:

(1) We have the intuition that we're sometimes free and morally responsible for what we do, and we would have this intuition even if determinism turned out to be true.
(2) We thus have the intuition that compatibilism is true.
(3) Incompatiblism contravenes the content of this intuition (i.e., the intuition that compatibilism is true).
(4) Principle P.
(5) Therefore, the intuition that compatibilism is true provides (defeasible) evidence against incompatibilism.  

Is this an accurate way to unpack Fischer's argument? Even if it's not, what do you make of the argument and what do you think about Principle P?

The Consequence Argument and Begging the Question

We've begun reading Four Views on Free Will and are working our way through the first chapter by Bob Kane in which he argues for Libertarianism.

Kane there considers the Consequence Argument:

(1) There is nothing we can now do to change the past.
(2) There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature.
(3) There is nothing we now do to change the past and the laws of nature.
(4) If determinism is true, our present actions are necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature.
(5) Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the fact that our present actions occur (i.e., we cannot do otherwise than we actually do).

As he notes, many critics of this argument object to the move from the premises to (5).  The underlying (implicit) principle here is something like:

Transfer of Powerlessness Principle or TP: If there is nothing anyone can do to change X, and if Y is a necessary consequence of X (if it must be that, if X occurs, Y occurs), then there is nothing anyone can do to change Y.  

The objections often come down to the analysis of what it means to say that an agent "can" or "has the power" to do something. As Kane points out, one might opt for a notion of ability or power that is hypothetical or conditional. On this approach, to have an ability simply means something like "if one wanted (or tried) to do X, then she would do X." So, to say that I could have (had the ability, power, etc.) to eat shrimp for dinner last night is just to say that, had I wanted to eat shrimp for dinner, I would have.

As Kane points out, this critic (let's call her the hypothetical compatiblist) will insist that the Consequence Argument is invalid--because the premises could be true while the conclusion is false. The conclusion is false, on this view, because there is a sense in which we can do otherwise than we actually do. It's the hypothetical or conditional sense--had we wanted to do otherwise, we would have. The fact that what we do is determined (by the laws and past) does nothing to undermine our freedom. In other words, determinism doesn't rule free will. So we can admit that we can't change the past, that we can't change the laws, that our present actions are the necessary consequences of the past and laws, all while denying we cannot do otherwise. Of course, this is all just to say that compatbilism is true.   

Kane is a bit quick in discussing replies to this maneuver. He notes that some incompatiblists will respond by charging the hypothetical compatibilist with begging the question--since the hypothetical analysis was rigged from the beginning to make freedom compatible with determinism. Kane rightly explains that the compatiblist can offer a similar retort and charge the incompatibilist with begging the question--since the notion of ability that she has in mind is rigged from the beginning to make freedom incompatible with determinism.

What do you make of this seeming impasse? Is there a way out? What should we make of the hypothetical analysis of ability? Surely we can assess its merits independently of the Consequence Argument. Can you think of any arguments for/against it that seem compelling? What do you think about TP? Is it true? Can you think of any arguments for/against it that seem compelling?