Wednesday, January 22, 2014

The Consequence Argument and Begging the Question

We've begun reading Four Views on Free Will and are working our way through the first chapter by Bob Kane in which he argues for Libertarianism.

Kane there considers the Consequence Argument:
(1) There is nothing we can now do to change the past.
(2) There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature.
(3) There is nothing we now do to change the past and the laws of nature.
(4) If determinism is true, our present actions are necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature.
(5) Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the fact that our present actions occur (i.e., we cannot do otherwise than we actually do).
As he notes, many critics of this argument object to the move from the premises to (5).  The underlying (implicit) principle here is something like:
Transfer of Powerlessness Principle or TP: If there is nothing anyone can do to change X, and if Y is a necessary consequence of X (if it must be that, if X occurs, Y occurs), then there is nothing anyone can do to change Y.  
The objections often come down to the analysis of what it means to say that an agent "can" or "has the power" to do something. As Kane points out, one might opt for a notion of ability or power that is hypothetical or conditional. On this approach, to have an ability simply means something like "if one wanted (or tried) to do X, then she would do X." So, to say that I could have (had the ability, power, etc.) to eat shrimp for dinner last night is just to say that, had I wanted to eat shrimp for dinner, I would have.

As Kane points out, this critic (let's call her the hypothetical compatiblist) will insist that the Consequence Argument is invalid--because the premises could be true while the conclusion is false. The conclusion is false, on this view, because there is a sense in which we can do otherwise than we actually do. It's the hypothetical or conditional sense--had we wanted to do otherwise, we would have. The fact that what we do is determined (by the laws and past) does nothing to undermine our freedom. In other words, determinism doesn't rule free will. So we can admit that we can't change the past, that we can't change the laws, that our present actions are the necessary consequences of the past and laws, all while denying we cannot do otherwise. Of course, this is all just to say that compatbilism is true.   

Kane is a bit quick in discussing replies to this maneuver. He notes that some incompatiblists will respond by charging the hypothetical compatibilist with begging the question--since the hypothetical analysis was rigged from the beginning to make freedom compatible with determinism. Kane rightly explains that the compatiblist can offer a similar retort and charge the incompatibilist with begging the question--since the notion of ability that she has in mind is rigged from the beginning to make freedom incompatible with determinism.

What do you make of this seeming impasse? Is there a way out? What should we make of the hypothetical analysis of ability? Surely we can assess its merits independently of the Consequence Argument. Can you think of any arguments for/against it that seem compelling? What do you think about TP? Is it true? Can you think of any arguments for/against it that seem compelling?    

7 comments:

Anonymous said...

In short:

1) There is nothing we can do to change the PAST.
(2) There is nothing we can do to change the LAWS OF NATURE (which necessarily govern and determine the transition from the PAST to the PRESENT).
(3) Our PRESENT ACTIONS are necessary consequences of the PAST and the LAWS OF NATURE.
Therefore: (4) There is nothing we can do to change our PRESENT ACTIONS.

This argument appears to be perfectly valid: that is, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. That means that a denial of the conclusion would, in some sense, beg the question, unless, of course, a sense can be provided in which we can change (i.e., have control over) our PRESENT ACTIONS.

Perhaps a different way to attack the argument would be to deny premise (3). What LAWS OF NATURE govern human action? LAWS OF NATURE are typically physical causal laws that govern the evolution of the physical world; laws that govern the motion and behavior of physical bodies. One might try to deny that these types of laws to not apply to human action and behavior. That is to say, there is no science of human action that is analogous to physical science. Do laws of nature govern economics? Do laws of nature govern politics?

Jesse Steinberg said...

Thanks, Anon, for commenting.

I take it that the laws that govern human action might be neuro-physiological laws or psychological laws. If my brain or my psychology are governed by such laws and these are akin to the laws of physics, then arguments like the Consequence Argument seem to get off the ground.

Of course, some deny that human behavior is governed by such laws. This is, of course, an empirical claim. What's the evidence lead us to believe?

Anonymous said...

Jesse, I see your point – and that’s a great question. So, “What does the evidence lead us to believe about whether human behavior is governed by laws that are analogous to the laws of physics?”

Well, human behavior is surely a complicated business. Some behavior is partially a matter of genetics that may be related to such things as personality traits and vulnerability to mental disorders. Also, behavior is related to life experiences and learning that interact with genetics to produce behavior. It’s so complicated that we certainly cannot predict what sort of behavior a person will manifest in any given situation. Of course, difficulty in predicting behavior does not imply that it is not predictable in principle.

In regard to what the evidence leads us to believe, I guess I would have to say that the evidence at this point is highly suggestive that human behavior is determined by a complex array of causal precursors (genes, brain states brought about by experience involving learning and memory) that determine responses to stimulus conditions. This is definitely a complex causal model that does not allow for response options that violate a principle of causality. This, despite the fact that in ordinary language we talk about human action in terms of free will, seems to be highly compelling.

Anonymous said...

Since philosophy is "not on the menu", see Stephen Colbert's interview of Paula Churchland. Stephen, God bless him, asks all the right questions. (g)

Anonymous said...

Will

"Motives do not determine a man's character, but only the phenomenon or appearance of that character, that is, the deeds and actions, the external form of the course of his life, not its inner significance and content. These proceed from the character which is the immediate phenomenon of will, and is therefore groundless. That one man is wicked and another good does not depend on motives and external influences such as teaching and preaching; and in this sense the thing is absolutely inexplicable. But whether a wicked man shows his wickedness in petty injustices, cowardly tricks, and low villainy, practised by him in the narrow sphere of his surroundings, or as a conqueror oppresses nations, throws a world into misery and distress, and sheds the blood of millions, this is the outward form of his phenomenon or appearance, that which is inessential to it, and depends on the circumstances in which fate has placed him, on the surroundings, on external influences, on motives. But his decision on these motives can never be explained from them; it proceeds from the will, whose phenomenon this man is."

Schopenhauer, "The World As Will and Representation", II, 26

Anonymous said...

Transfer of Powerlessness Principle or TP: If there is nothing anyone can do to change X, and if Y is a necessary consequence of X (if it must be that, if X occurs, Y occurs), then there is nothing anyone can do to change Y.

Let’s grant that Y is a necessary consequence of X occurring. This may be diagrammed as follows: X — Y. Now, suppose that the mechanism by which X brings about Y is through a mediator Z (a step in the causal pathway from X to Y). This could be diagrammed as: X — Z — Y. In such a case, even though X occurs, if Z was not present, X would not result in Y. So, the question is, “In what sense is Y a necessary consequence of X occurring?” Is X a NECESSARY CAUSE of Y or is X a SUFFICIENT CAUSE of Y? If X is merely a necessary cause of Y, then TP is false. If X is a sufficient cause of Y, then TP is true.

Jesse Steinberg said...

Anon- Your point about moderators is interesting, but I think it misses the target.

TP is spelled out in terms of an entailment between X and Y--such that X necessitates Y. So there can't be a case in which X occurs but Y does not (because, for example, Z has not occurred). If you say that X only leads to Y if Z occurs, then you are implicitly denying that X entails Y. My point is that TP only applies to cases of entailment--your case wouldn't meet this requirement.