Undergrad Conference at EMU

Eastern Michigan Undegraduate Philosophy Conference

Date: April 5-7, 2013

Keynote: TBD

Keynote will be on Friday, the 5th

Paper length: 2000 to 3000 words

Submission deadline: Feb 25, 2013

Submissions should be sent to: emuphilclub@hotmail.com

Submissions require a 250 word abstract

EMU is also beginning an undergraduate journal to accompany the conference!  Several of the papers submitted will be included in the inaugural run of the journal.

Questions should be sent to the same address as the submissions.

University of Iowa Grad Conference

University of Iowa Graduate Philosophy Conference

Date: April 5-6, 2013

Keynote: Alva Noë (UC Berkeley)

Keynote will be on Friday, the 5th

Graduate presentations will be on Saturday, the 6th

Paper length: 3000 words

Submission deadline: Jan 21, 2013

Submissions should be sent to: uigps.spring@gmail.com

Submissions should be prepared for blind review, should include an abstract, and must be formatted as .doc, .docx, or .pdf.  Also, a second document with the paper's title and the author's name, email, abstract, and institutional affiliation should be included.  

UT Grad Conference

The 2013 UT Philosophy Graduate Conference will be held on April 5 and 6, 2013 at the University of Texas at Austin. Keynote Speakers:

Tim Crane (Cambridge)

Richard Feldman (Rochester)

We are now accepting submissions from graduate students. The submission deadline for papers is January 5, 2013. Papers should not exceed 4,000 words in length (excluding notes and bibliography). We welcome papers on any topic in analytic philosophy. Submission guidelines are below.

Please the following two documents to UT.Philosophy.Conference@gmail.com:

1. Your paper, including title and abstract, prepared for blind review.
   1. Please use your paper title as the name of your document.
2. A cover page, including the following:
   1. Paper title
   2. Author’s name
   3. Author’s institutional affiliation
   4. Author’s email address
   5. Word count
   6. Abstract (not exceeding 250 words 

9th Annual Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop

UW-Madison is hosting yet another Metaethics Workshop this weekend. The schedule and other information can be found here:  https://sites.google.com/site/wiscmew/

The keynote address will be given by Jonathan Dancy (Reading and Texas) on Saturday, 9/29, from 3:20 until 4:50.  His talk is entitled "From Thought to Action." There are a number of other great philosophers giving talks. If you're in the area, I encourage you to come.

If you can't make it, consider coming to next year's workshop. If you're interested in presenting a paper, abstracts will likely be due in June for the workshop in September 2013.

WMU Graduate Philosophy Conference

Call for Papers

6^th Annual Western Michigan Graduate Philosophy Conference

Date: December 7, 8, and 9, 2012

We invite work by current graduate students in any broadly analytic area of philosophy. Papers should be approximately 3000 words in length and should be prepared for blind review. A 250-word abstract should precede the paper. Presentations will be twenty-five minutes, with a ten minute commentary to follow.  Response will be five minutes, followed by twenty minutes of discussion.

Keynote speakers this year will be Geoffrey Sayre-McCord from the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and Hilary Kornblith from the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Pleases send submissions to wmich.philosophy@gmail.com by Wednesday, October 10, 2012.

Acceptances will be announced on Friday, October 26, 2012.

See http://homepages.wmich.edu/~krk0977/WMU_Grad_Conf_CFP.pdf for more information.

Undergraduate Journal - Arete

Arete, The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Rutgers University, is now accepting paper submissions for publication in its Spring 2013 issue. On the order of 3 papers will be published, digitally and in print (limited run).

Traditionally only work from college upperclassmen is encouraged. Analytic rigor is prerequisite for publication. Papers from any field of philosophy are welcome.

Submissions should not exceed 8,000 words, with a cover page, abstract, and citations in APA format. Do not include information in the text of your paper that identifies the author or the institution you attend. Submit papers by attachment, (from an email address we can use to correspond with you) in Word document or PDF format, to rundergrad.philo.journal@gmail.com by October 15th, 2012. 

We will email you on or shortly after that date to confirm our receipt of your paper. Based on the number of submissions we have received in the past, it will take us some time to read all the papers submitted for this issue. Consequently the authors of papers accepted for publication will be notified in December.

Biology, "Legitimate" Rape, and the Morality of Abortion

As you've probably heard, the GOP has officially taken a strong stance against the moral permissibility of abortion.  The party's position is that a woman should not be able to abort a fetus, even if the fetus is the product of rape or incest. 

Representative Akin's comments have received quite a bit of attention recently.  In discussing pregnancy resulting from rape, he remarked: “It seems to me, from what I understand from doctors, that’s really rare. If it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down.”  

The majority of the controversy over Akin's comments revolve around: (a) biology and whether a raped woman is more or less likely to get pregnant than a woman that engages in "normal" intercourse; and (b) his use of the phrase 'legitimate'.  I don't think either of these is where oppenents should really direct their ire.

Regarding (a), it appears that Akin is incorrect about his biological claim.  A number of professional medical associations have disputed his remarks.  But, even if he's right, I don't see why this is relevant to the discussion.  Suppose that it is extremely unlikely that a woman becomes pregnant after rape.  Imagine that merely 1% of cases of rape result in pregnancy and the chances of getting pregnant from "normal" intercourse is significantly greater than this.  What's the argument that gets one from this (dubious) biological point to the conclusion that it is wrong for a woman to abort a fetus after being raped?  I don't see why the probabilities matter here.  

Regarding (b), I can certainly see why people think that Akin is implying that some (many?) cases of purported rape are not legitimate (where this is read:  actual cases of rape).  If this is Akin's position, there may be cause to be upset.  And we can have a very interesting discussion about what counts as rape and what exactly it is to give consent.  But, again, I don't see anything in what Akin says that has anything to do with whether women that have been raped and become pregnant ought to be allowed to have abortions.  And that's the issue at hand.  That's a major part of the official platform of the GOP.   A quick look at the GOP website and interviews with the major players in the Republican Party yields little by way of actual arguments for this controversial position. 

We need to engage in a debate about the issue and this requires wrestling with premises that are actually relevant.  Unfortunately, it seems the bulk of politicians (on both sides of the aisle) and members of the media (liberal and conservative alike) are guilty of failing to do this. This, I think, is deserving of our ire.  

Grad Conference Announcement

We invite graduate students to submit papers to the Sixth Annual Graduate
Conference in Philosophy co-hosted by Arché, Philosophical Research Centre
for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology, and CSMN, Centre for the
Study of Mind in Nature. Papers should be no longer than 4,200 words, and
should include an abstract of no more than 200 words. Papers that make a
contribution to contemporary debates in philosophy and that focus on the
research interests of Arché and CSMN are particularly welcome.

Keynote speakers: John Hawthorne, Delia Graff Fara

Deadline for submissions: September 1st, 2012.

Notification of acceptance by 1st October.

The conference will be held November 17th/18th 2012 at the, University of Oslo, Norway.

ACCOMMODATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ALL SPEAKERS WILL BE COVERED, and all
talks will have a respondent from an Arche or CSMN faculty member.

Please visit the conference websight: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/acgc/

Conference for Grad Students

Virginia Tech is now accepting submissions for the 9th annual Virginia Tech Graduate Philosophy Conference. This year’s conference will be on Topics in Philosophy of Science and will be held on November 2-3, 2012. The keynote address will be given by Anjan Chakravartty (Notre Dame) and the faculty address will be given by Benjamin Jantzen (Virginia Tech). 

Submissions must be a maximum of 3500 words and suitable for a 25-minute presentation. Papers must be prepared for blind review and sent as PDF or DOC attachments with no identification of authors or affiliations. Please include a separate cover sheet with title, author name(s), 150-200 word abstract, institutional affiliation, e-mail address, and phone number. All submissions must be sent to vt.gradphilclub@gmail.com by September 6, 2012. 

Getting Settled

I'm now beginning to get settled into Madison and am having fun exploring the area.  My son, Samuel, is two-months-old and has been keeping me quite busy (and entertained).  So it will be another few weeks before I'm able to devote some attention to this blog.  Thanks for your patience!

Rationality and Thinking Fast vs. Slow

I just listened to an interview with Daniel Kahneman, the author of Thinking Fast and Thinking Slow.  He made a remark about an interesting case.  Suppose that a person is informed that a loved one needs immediate surgery in order to save her life, and that this surgery has a 99% success rate (i.e., only 1% of patients do not survive the surgery).  Kahneman suggests that this is one of many cases in which people behave irrationally.  Most people, he suggests, would be very nervous and fearful that the person they love would die.  He points out that this is irrational because there is but a very small percentage of people that do not survive the surgery.  This verdict doesn't seem right to me.  To call such people irrational or to say that such emotions aren't apt for the situation strikes me as a mistake.  It seems to me that because the stakes or so high (a person's life is on the line) the 1% chance is rather significant.  If the situation involved something with lower stakes, then I'd be prepared to say of such a person that she were irrational or not appreciating the statistical facts in forming her beliefs, emotions, etc.  Consider a different case:  Suppose that I have a cold and my physician says that such-and-such a treatment has a 99% chance of substantially reducing my symptoms and a 1% chance of exacerbating them. In this sort of case, it seems right to say that I would be irrational in believing that my condition would get worse upon taking the medication.  It would be strange for me to feel afraid of taking it.  It seems to me that the statistics matter and must inform our beliefs, guide our emotions, etc.  But it also seems understandable that the stakes/severity of the possible consequences matter and can help explain why a person might think or feel certain things; indeed, such considerations might even justify what would otherwise be a bad inference/ill-formed reaction. 

What do you think of all this? 

(I should confess that I haven't read his book yet.  Maybe he offers some replies to my worry.  It's on my list for summer reading and hope to get to it soon.)

Resources?

I'm slowly adding links with resources for students (both undergraduate and graduate) to the side-bars of this blog.  If you know of any particularly good pages, please let me know.

Does eating a healthy diet cost more?

A number of studies about the cost of food and nutrition have been conducted recently.  A recent article in the Huffington Post discussed some interesting results:

"The government says it all depends on how you measure the price. If you compare the price per calorie – as some previous researchers have done – then higher-calorie pastries and processed snacks might seem like a bargain compared with fruits and vegetables. 

But comparing the cost of foods by weight or portion size shows that grains, vegetables, fruit and dairy foods are less expensive than most meats or foods high in saturated fat, added sugars or salt."

Frequency of posts

As you might imagine, the frequency at which I'll be posting will likely taper a bit over the summer.  I'm in the midst of preparing for a move to Wisconsin and my wife will be having our first child any week now.  I will post as often as I'm able and will likely start posting more regularly in August when I get settled in Madison. 

Training in Causal Reasoning

I'm working on a paper with my father and one of his colleagues.  Here's an abstract of the paper:

Recent calls for competency-based training and credentialing of mental health professionals focus heavily on instilling knowledge and skills needed for conducting evidence-based assessment and treatment. We propose the content of a companion training curriculum in clinical decision-making that reflects the pervasive and indispensable role of causal reasoning in clinical practice. Module contents of the proposed curriculum include review and discussion of: (1) domains in which practitioners are routinely required to make and evaluate causal inferences; (2) definitions of key concepts related to causality; (3) common errors in causal reasoning; (4) guidelines for evaluating the generalizability and applicability of causal findings in empirical studies to specific clients; (5) guidelines for formulating and evaluating working theories of the origin and/or maintenance of client presenting problems, especially as these pertain to the need for further assessment and treatment planning; and (6) methods for planning, targeting, and evaluating interventions. These modules are designed to help mental health practitioners employ causal modeling to enhance case conceptualization, develop intervention objectives, and prioritize and target foci of interventions that utilize evidence-based treatments or practice elements. Practitioners who use causal modeling diagrams to guide clinical practice are in effect deliberately generating causal hypotheses, implementing causal experiments, and evaluating outcomes as they monitor client responses to intervention. Causal reasoning competencies may be enhanced through the use of causal modeling diagrams, application of causal modeling diagrams to clinical case examples, problem-based learning strategies, and the Socratic method of systematic questioning.

I'm not aware of much work by philosophers having to do with training folks in causal reasoning (other than in the form of logic textbooks).  If anyone is aware of work by philosophers having to do with the above, I'd be keen on reading it.  Please send me references via email or post a comment on this post.

Thanks!

Do you need a doctorate to create art?

This is an interesting piece on whether an advanced degree is necessary for artists.

An interesting set of questions are raised in the article...

"Meanwhile, critics of arts doctorates raise economic, philosophical, and ethical concerns about the degree. Many of the concerns are similar to those raised in other academic fields: Is it acceptable to enroll students in graduate programs with uncertain futures and employment prospects? What is the real value of a doctorate? What is the nature of advanced study in a practical discipline? And how wise is it for American universities to duplicate the programs of foreign universities, which operate under different economic models?" 

What do you think about this discussion?

Abortion and killing living things

I'm in the midst of grading papers and final exams.  A number of essays I've read over the last few days have had to do with abortion.  A surprising number of my students advanced something like the following argument:

(1) A fetus is a living thing.
(2) It is wrong to kill a living thing.
(3) If one has an abortion, then one has killed a living thing.
(4) Therefore, it's wrong to have an abortion.

In class, we discussed a number of reasons for thinking that this kind of argument is unsound.  I thought we had reached a consensus that this challenge to abortion is unsound.  Alas...

I think (2) is obviously false  Bacteria, mice, oregano, and the fungus that causes athlete's foot are all alive, but it's easy to come up with reasons why it can be moral to kill such things.  Further, there are some cases of killing human beings that are deemed morally permissible (e.g., in self-defense).  My point is that one cannot simply rely on the premise that a thing is alive to conclude that it's wrong to kill it.  We do not afford all living things a right to life.  But if this is such an obvious flaw in the argument, why is it that so many people put it forward as if it's a stellar piece of reasoning?  Why do fairly smart people advance it?  Why do some of my students rely on it in their exams/papers even after we've discussed various objections to it?  I'm befuddled.

I think that there are some fascinating arguments against abortion and I admire some of the philosophers that have spent countless hours developing them. It's a shame that the above kind of argument passes as powerful/convincing in many circles.

Comic Relief

Many of you Bradfordians have probably already seen this.  I've been reading a bit about mixed emotions and feeling conflicted.  This is a good example of finding something hilarious and depressing at the same time. (Favorite line:  "Olean NY greedily sucked literally tens of dollars away each week.")             

West and Smiley on Colbert

This is an interesting interview on a new book having to do with wealth distribution.

The Colbert Report	Mon - Thurs 11:30pm / 10:30c
Tavis Smiley & Cornel West
www.colbertnation.com
Colbert Report Full Episodes Political Humor & Satire Blog Video Archive

Note the line of argument Colbert pursues having to do with class warfare.

Philosophers get death threats for considering arguments for infanticide

The latest issue of Philosophers Magazine has a disturbing article in it. Here it is:

THE PHILOSOPHERS Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva have been subject to racist abuse and death threats, following the electronic publication of a paper about abortion and newborns in the online version of The Journal of Medical Ethics. Their paper, “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?” discusses arguments in favour of infanticide. In the abstract, they say, “By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.”

The editor of the journal, Julian Savulescu, defended publication of the article. In a blog post, he said, “The Journal does not specifically support substantive moral views, ideologies, theories, dogmas or moral outlooks, over others. It supports sound rational argument. Moreover, it supports freedom of ethical expression.” Savulescu concluded: “what is disturbing is not the arguments in this paper nor its publication in an ethics journal. It is the hostile, abusive, threatening responses that it has elicited. More than ever, proper academic discussion and freedom are under threat from fanatics opposed to the very values of a liberal society.”

Philosophical puzzles in ten minutes

The Northern Institute of Philosophy has a great series of discussions of philosophical puzzles. Each "episode" is fewer than ten minutes and involves a clear presentation of the puzzle and a discussion of some of the more popular attempts at solving it.

Those of you in my Metaphysics and Epistemology course should check out the one on skepticism (toward the bottom of the page). Below each episode are a few links to research related to the topic. A friend of mine from graduate school, Dylan Dodd, has some of his work linked under the skepticism episode. He's a careful philosopher and you might enjoy reading some of his work.

God and Neuroscience

This is from the blog Think: Just Do It! It's fascinating issue...


"Research shows that people can be made to have a "religious experience"--or "God experience"--by stimulating their brain using transcranial magnetic stimulation.

One might think that this research goes against arguments for the existence of God that appeal to religious experience. In other words, one could argue as follows:

1. Religious experience counts as strong evidence for the existence of God only if the sensed-presence experience cannot be produced on demand.
2. The sensed-presence experience can be produced on demand.
3. Therefore, religious experience is not strong evidence for the existence of God.

What do you make of this argument? Is it sound?"

New Book Chapter

Michael Stuckart (an anthropoligist at Pitt-Bradford) and I wrote a chapter for this new book. Our chapter is on happiness, what Aristotle had to say about living the "good life," and how sailing is an activity that exemplifies many of the things that make one truly happy. If you're interested in philosophy and/or sailing, you might find this a fascinating summer read.

Identity and Songs

I've been wondering about what makes a song the song that it is. That is, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a particular song. Here's a clip from Ray Charles in 1968. He's performing a song called "Going Down Slow" (it's a pretty famous Blues standard).



And here's a clip from Eric Clapton singing "Going Down Slow." Notice that the titles of the songs are the same. The lyrics are very similar (though not identical) and there's clearly quite a bit in common between the two performances. But, at the same time, they're extremely different.



We might wonder whether Ray and Eric are playing the same song.

A natural answer is that they are playing different versions of the same song. They have their own interpretations of it, but it's just one song--"Going Down Slow." But this suggests that a number of things can be different between two performances and yet the two can be performances of the same song. For example, the chord progression between them can be different, the lyrics can be different, the tempo can be different, the instrumentation can be different, etc. Of course, they can't be too different--because then they wouldn't be performances of the same song. But where does one draw the line? In other words, what makes something a version of "Going Down Slow" as opposed to some other song? Interestingly, I've heard instrumental versions of "Going Down Slow," where there are no lyrics since no one is singing. It still seems right to say that the song performed was "Going Down Slow." So what do you think about these issues? What makes a song the song that it is?

Small Business Tax Cut Act

The House of Representatives will consider a new set of tax cuts to small businesses. Those opposed say that the bill will only make those with a great deal of money even richer. There's an editorial piece in today's NY Times here echoing these sentiments. The upshot of this article is:

"...a bill to let most business owners deduct up to 20 percent of their business income in 2012 — a $46 billion tax cut. Despite the Mom-and-Pop label, it is designed so that nearly half of the tax cut would go to people with annual income over $1 million, and more than four-fifths would go to those making over $200,000, according to the Tax Policy Center."

Of course, a common rejoinder is that such cuts will create jobs. But many experts have serious doubts about whether such a cut will actually create jobs (see, for example, this article and this report from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). Of course, such criticisms are not definitive. What would be nice is if we had some evidence that such a cut would create jobs, but I wasn't able to find anything after a brief search. There are the intuitive sorts of arguments. Here in Bradford we have companies like American Refining Group and Zippo. They employ a large number of residents and greatly contribute to the local economy. But what would a tax cut to such corporations actually do for the economy? Would they hire more workers? Would they reinvest that money in the community? One might have the intuition that tax cuts encourage growth, but it's a difficult thing to predict and measure. And the evidence (at least what I could find) certainly doesn't show that the bill will do what its authors claim.

I wonder what readers of this blog think about the bill and about the strategy of our policy-makers to cut taxes to small businesses.

Is polygamy morally permissible?

A student in my Philosophy and Public Issues class is writing her research paper on the moral status of polygamy. She and I were chatting yesterday about arguments for the conclusion that it's immoral, but these tend to be utilitarian sorts of reasons about the parties involved experiencing psychological or financial distress. Of course, we can't expect these sorts of consequences in all cases of polygamy. So there are limits to this kind of line against polygamy. There are other less plausible reasons against polygamy like that it undermines "family values."

Interestingly, many of the arguments for same-sex marriage can be applied to debates over polygamy. If one accepts that each of us should be able to marry whomever we see fit, then it's an easy extension to include marrying more than one person whom we see fit. Of course, one can stipulate that marriage is between only two individuals. But this is akin to insisting that marriage is between a man and a woman. And many people  find this sort of "argument" outright ridiculous.

I'm beginning to think that the sorts of arguments that you might have for thinking same-sex marriage is morally permissible can be straightforwardly extended to support polygamy. In addition, the arguments you might have against same-sex marriage can be rephrased in an attempt to undermine polygamy. But, as we discussed in class, the philosophical arguments against same-sex marriage seem to be uniformly unconvincing.

Should we conclude that polygamy is morally permissible?

* If you're interested in reading more on things related to this discussion, the SEP has a nice entry on marriage and domestic partnership.

Euthanasia and the distinction between killing and letting die

Some time ago we discussed the moral status of euthanasia in my Philosophy and Public Issues class. We talked about it a bit again today. As some of you might now, James Rachels has argued that there are two main reasons for accepting the moral permissibility of euthanasia: respect for autonomy and reduction of pain/suffering. He also argues that cases of passive euthanasia (where a patient is allowed to die due to "natural causes" by, for example, allowing him/her to stop eating or unplugging his/her respirator) are at least morally on par with cases of active euthanasia (where a patient is killed by, for example, a doctor that injects him/her with a lethal dose of a drug). In addition, many follow Rachels in thinking that active euthanasia is morally preferable to passive euthanasia. This is because the two aforementioned reasons for accepting euthanasia can be applied to both passive and active. Also, if a patient wants to die and is "better off dead," it seems to many that she should have the option to die as painlessly as possible. Since dying from a morphine overdose is less painful than dying due to starvation or asphyxiation, there's an argument to be made for thinking that active euthanasia is morally preferable to passive euthanasia.

Some challenge this reasoning by suggesting that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die. The idea is that if killing is worse than letting someone die, then passive euthanasia ought to be considered morally preferable to active euthanasia. But is this true? Consider the following two cases:

Killing: I decide that Larry Bird must perish. I go to his house and shoot him with a gun. He dies as a result.

Letting Die: I happen to be sitting next to Larry Bird on an airplane. I notice that he is chocking on a peanut. I consider trying to save his life, but decide not to help him. He dies.

How do these cases compare morally? Rachels argues that there isn't necessarily a moral difference between killing and letting die and that they may sometimes be morally on par. But what do you think?

* You might be tempted to say that, in the first case, I am guilty of first-degree murder but that, in the second case, I am not guilty of any crime. This, of course, is a legal point. I'm not concerned with that. I'm worried about the moral status of these cases.

* It might help to imagine that I've got the same ill-will toward Larry Bird in both cases. Suppose that I despise him with every cell of my body and that I relish his demise. Does this change your assessment of the cases?

Why is it moral to eat meat?

A contest from the NY Times has just been announced. The task is simply to write an essay of no more than 600 words on the topic of why it's ethical to eat meat. More details can be found here.


Rules: This is a very specific contest. Don’t tell us why you like meat, why organic trumps local or why your food is yours to choose. Just tell us why it’s ethical to eat meat.

Guidelines: Send written entries of no more than 600 words to ethicist@nytimes.com. Entries are due by April 8; no late submissions will be considered.

The Prize: The best essay or essays will be published in an upcoming issue of The New York Times.

(Thanks to Brian Leiter's blog for the pointer.)

Protesting Students Get Pepper-Sprayed

I used to live in Los Angeles not too far from Santa Monica City College. As you might have heard, they're going to have a two-tiered tuition system/course structure and this is making many students irate. The cost to enroll in some courses (which happen to be the more desirable ones) offered at SMCC will be about $180. This is much more expensive than classes have been: $35 per unit for in-state tuition. On the one hand, I can understand that taking a college course for less than $200 doesn't sound like that bad of a deal. On the other hand, if you think about the increase in terms of a percentage, this is quite a hike! One might add that many of the people attending SMCC are from low-income families, first-generation college students, etc. Such an increase will prove to be prohibitive to many students.

Protestors gathered during a recent SMCC Board of Trustees meeting--about thirty of them were pepper-sprayed by campus police. This is disturbing and not the first time that protestors have been hurt recently. I wonder what readers think about students gathering at such meetings and what (especially my students in Philosophy and Public Issues) think about the act of protesting and how authorities should handle protestors.

This issue aside..... I want to mention that the administration at Pitt has encouraged students, faculty, and staff to write letters to politicians, attend events in Harrisburg, etc. in response to recent proposed cuts in the state appropriations to the Pitt system. If these cuts get passed, we will have over 100 million dollars in cuts over the last two years! I hope you impress upon your friends and families how important it is to participate in these efforts. And, of course, I hope you write letters and do what you can to counteract this assault on higher education.

How (not) to reply to the skeptic II

Michael Huemer argues (in many places--see especially page 129) that an agent that is having a vivid hallucination of a table has the "same kind and same degree of justification for believing in the table as we normally do when we see tables." This is because, "when we have perceptual experiences, external objects seem to us to be present, and there is no evidence in general against this" and, of course, the agent having the hallucination has the same experience as us. So Huemer thinks the agent having the hallucination is in the same justificatory position as we are.

The skeptic will surely insist that the person suffering from a hallucination does not know that there is a table before her. This is partly due to the fact that there is no table--it is a hallucination. And one cannot know something that is false. But it seems, at least to the skeptic, that this is also due to the fact that the sort of justification that she has in not good enough for knowledge. To show this, the skeptic will point out the same sort of justification is had by an agent that perceives a table and yet this agent does not know that there is a table before her because she cannot rule out various possible skeptical scenarios. In this case, the agent has a true belief that there is a table before her, but the skeptic argues that the justification she has for this belief is not enough for this to amount to a case of knowledge. So it's not clear to me how Huemer's point that the agent having the hallucination is in the same justificatory position as real-table-perceivers helps in responding to the skeptic.

Interestingly, Huemer brings all this up (at least on page 129) as a way defending direct realism - which is only part of his response to skepticism. But how does this support direct realism? It seems to me that being in the same "justificatory boat" as a person that is suffering from a vivid hallucination does nothing to show that I am directly aware of the table before me. How does this fact (if it is one) show that my beliefs about external objects are noninferentially justified?

Suggestions, thoughts, etc. are most welcome.

New Philosophy Blog

Moti Mizrahi has started a blog called Think: Just Do It. He's put up some interesting clips that are worth checking out. The Daily Show clip having to do with whether it's ever okay to play the "Hitler card" in making an argument is especially good.

How (not) to reply to the skeptic

External World Skepticism is the view that we do not have knowledge about the world around us. In reply to this view, some have argued that we should reject the sorts of skeptical challenges (e.g., that we might currently be dreaming, that we might be in the Matrix, etc.) that the skeptic suggests undermines our having knowledge. A principle like the following might be invoked:

Given a conflict between two beliefs, it is rational to reject the less initially plausible one, rather than the more plausible one.

The anti-skeptic can thus argue that my belief that there's a keyboard before me is more plausible than that my belief that I might be merely dreaming the keyboard. As a result, it's rational for me to reject the skeptical scenario (that I'm dreaming) and accept the more plausible explanation of my perceptions (that there's really a keyboard before me).

Michael Huemer suggests that this is G.E. Moore's strategy in replying to the skeptic.

I wonder what readers of this blog think of the principle above. I'm especially interested in the clause 'initial plausibility.' What, for example, entitles one to claim that my belief about there actually is a keyboard before me has more initial plausibility than my beliefs that knowledge requires the ability to rule out skeptical scenarios like that I'm dreaming or that I might be dreaming right now or that this keyboard that I seem to see might be a hallucination?

An ex-missionary might have turned linguistic theory on it's head

Daniel Everett went to live with an Amazonian tribe in the hopes of converting them to Christianity. He eventually learned their complex language, suffered from malaria, lost his faith, and he thought quite a bit about a theory made famous by the esteemed Noam Chomsky: Universal Grammar. Based on what he learned about the language of the Amazonian tribe, Everett has written a book in which he tries to refute this widely-held thesis. It's making some serious waves in philosophy and linguistics departments around the world. An article on Everett and his book can be found here.

Some Bittersweet News

I recently accepted a position at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. I'll be teaching my last class at UPB this summer. It's Ethics and it meets during the first, four-week summer session. I'm working on the syllabus now and it's shaping up to be really interesting (and fun!) class. We'll be reading a great book by Julia Driver called Ethics: The Fundamentals and this will be supplemented by a handful of movies/documentaries. If you're thinking of enrolling in a course this summer, I hope you consider this one. Remember that there's free housing if you enroll in summer courses.

* If I'm your advisor, you should request a new one & talk to another faculty member about your schedule for the fall.

* If you're enrolled in the philosophy program, email me to make an appointment to discuss options for degree completion.

* If you've borrowed a book from me (you know who you are!), please return it by the end of the semester.

As you can imagine, this was a difficult decision. I'm going to miss my colleagues and students at UPB, but I'll have some very fond memories.

Foundational Justification

Michael Huemer argues for the following principle:

Phenomenal Conservativism (PC): If it seems to S as if P, then S thereby has at least prima facie justification for believing that P.

So if it seems to me as if my coffee mug is on my desk in front of me, then I thereby am at least prima facie justified in believing that my mug is on my desk. (The phrase 'prima facie' means something like upon first sight or it initially appears as if.) In other words, I can typically trust my perceptions in rendering my beliefs about my environment justified.

So he thinks that it's legitimate to accept things as they appear. As he put it, "... appearances are presumed true, until proven false."

Do you think he's right about this? Should we be phenomenal conservatives and hold that PC is true?

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The eighth amendment states that, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." But what exactly constitutes cruel and unusual punishment? Is capital punishment a form of cruel and unusual punishment? Are certain methods of killing criminals cruel and unusual (e.g., by firing squad, quartering, etc.)? What distinguishes the punishments that are cruel and unusual from those that are not?

A fascinating case about death benefits...

Is a child born after it's father's death entitled to receive benefits such as life insurance payments? How about if the child was conceived after his death? This issue is currently being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court. Robert Capato froze his sperm and, eighteen months after he died, his wife gave birth to their twins. She, of course, used in vetro fertilization to become pregnant. Ms. Capato has since applied for survivor benefits on behalf of the twins, but the Social Security Administration rejected her claim. The case has since moved up through the courts and is now being heard by the Supreme Court. Obviously a host of fascinating moral and legal implications are lurking here. What do readers of this blog think about all this?

Awareness: Direct vs. Indirect

We're reading Michael Huemer's wonderful book Skepticism and Veil of Perception in my Metaphysics and Epistemology course. I'm not convinced by his response to skepticism, but he does a marvelous job in developing his argument. Yesterday in class we were discussing a distinction he makes between direct awareness and indirect awareness. He notes that, "...you are indirectly aware of x if you are aware of x, but your awareness of x is based on your awareness of something else. You are directly aware of x if you are aware of x, and your awareness is not based on your awareness of anything else." This is pretty clear. But what are some examples of being directly aware? Huemer goes on to claim that perception is a case of direct awareness. He thinks that when I see the pen on my desk, I am directly aware of (some parts or aspects) of the external world. Let's set this issue aside.

What are some cases-besides perception-that are instances of direct awareness? A hackneyed example might be pain. Suppose I experience a throbbing pain in my ankle and I say, "My ankle hurts." How would I justify this claim? What reasons do I have for believing that my ankle hurts? It seems to me that it is the experience of the pain. Now, is my awareness of the pain based on my awareness of something else? In other words, am I directly aware of my pain? A number of my students thought this was not direct, but we couldn't come to any consensus on what this awareness could be based upon. Some said that it was my neurophysiology that my awareness of the pain is based upon. But this is to use "based upon" in a different sense than how we're using it here. Huemer is talking about epistemology, not metaphysics. So, for example, some of my beliefs are based upon other beliefs. I believe that Saul isn't home and this is based on the fact that he didn't answer his door. So what, if anything, do I base my belief that I'm in pain upon? I don't see my neurophysiology as a reason in the relevant sense (i.e., some belief that I have that explains why I come to the conclusion that my ankle hurts). Indeed, it seems to me that this is an example of being directly aware.

I'm hoping that readers of this blog will provide some additional examples of direct awareness. Of course, you're welcome to discuss the pain example I just gave too.

Why has tuition gone up?

Here's an interesting article on why the cost of education has gone up so sharply. One of the reasons considered is the increase in state pension expenses (and, we might add, increased costs of medical care) as baby boomers retire. Unfortunately, the money has to come from somewhere and raising tuition is becoming a favorite tool for politicians.

Anyone have any suggestions for policy changes that would reverse this trend?

Animal Experimentation

A group of students in my Philosophy and Public Issues class just gave a presentation on the moral status of animals, focusing on medical and other forms of testing. There are obviously countless resources available online. Here's a piece worth checking out. Of note, especially given our discussion in class, is the following passage:

"Moreover, it is argued, the lives of all creatures, great and small, have value and are worthy of respect. This right to be treated with respect does not depend on an ability to reason. An insane person has a right to be treated with respect, yet he or she may not be able to act rationally. Nor does a right to be treated with respect rest on being a member of a certain species. Restricting respect for life to a certain species is to perform an injustice similar to racism or sexism. Like the racist who holds that respect for other races does not count as much as respect for his or her own race, those who support painful experimentation on animals assume that respect for other species does not count as much as respect for members of his or her own species. "Speciesism" is as arbitrarily unjust as racism or sexism. The right to be treated with respect rests, rather, on a creature's being a "subject of a life," with certain experiences, preferences, and interests. Animals, like humans, are subjects of a life. Justice demands that the interests of animals be respected, which includes respect for their interest to be spared undeserved pain."

I wonder what readers of this blog think of this argument and how far the conclusion extends. As was brought up in class discussion, it seems that there are some cases of causing suffering that are morally permissible. Indeed, it may be morally obligatory to torture an organism if doing so were to produce a great deal of good or prevent a great deal of bad. So what conclusion should we draw about whether it's morally permissible to engage in animal testing/the sorts of experiments that are morally acceptable?

Conference at Ohio State

The Ohio State University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

May 11th and May 12th

Papers written by undergraduates on any philosophical topic are welcome. Entries should be roughly 10-20 pages in length. Please remember to include a cover letter containing your name, e-mail, phone number, University/College/Institution, paper title, and short abstract (roughly 100-200 words).

Submit papers via email to osuphilosophyconference@gmail.com

The deadline for submissions is April 1st. All applicants will be notified of the status of their submission by April 15th.

Regulating Our Sugar Habit

Ronda Storms is a state senator in Florida. She recently introduced a bill to prevent people in her state from using food stamps to buy unhealthy food like candy and soda. Here's a link to a piece in the NY Times about the bill. I wonder what folks reading this blog think about her proposal, especially those of you in my Philosophy and Public Issues class.

A tension that comes up often in ethical debates is between paternalism and autonomy. We want to protect other people from harm; but, at the same time, we want to let people have the freedom to do what they want to do. Obviously these goals can come into conflict. Consider laws having to do with wearing seat belts or laws requiring children to attend school. Such infringements on our freedom are often deemed justified--these seem like good laws to have. And this is true even if it means that people then don't have the freedom to refrain from using seat belts or going to school. But paternalism surely has its limits. Is this bill a case of paternalism running amok?

There may be rather strong philosophical arguments for extending things beyond food stamp reform. Foods that are very high in sugar and fat have severe negative health impacts and have very high costs to society (e.g., medical care costs, lower productivity at work, lower life expectancy, environmental deterioration, fewer people are able to serve effectively in the military, etc.)*. It might appear, then, that we ought to ban such products altogether. Surely many people would object to this sort of policy. But if we take paternalism seriously and we really care for members of society, then we've got fairly good reasons for banning such food or, at least, seriously rethinking our policies related to the food we eat.

Comments related to these issues are most welcome...

*These are all things that I've heard in debates about our food policy. You might be surprised to hear about worries regarding our ability to field an effective military, but this is something that's receiving a good deal of attention from the folks in Armed Forces recruiting in the U.S. This is a testament to how far-reaching the negative effects of our diet can be.

Undergraduate Conference in San Diego

The San Diego State University's Philosophy Department is pleased to
announce the very first San Diego State Undergraduate Conference in
Philosophy located right here in San Diego. The focus of this year's
conference will be on Philosophy in Contemporary Life.

Possible questions addressed:
What is the purpose of philosophy in contemporary life?
How is philosophy informed by contemporary culture?
How can philosophy affect contemporary life?
What are some philosophical issues present in the contemporary world?

Keynote Speaker:
Dr. Noël Carroll,
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
CUNY Graduate Center

Paper submissions:
Please prepare your abstract of no more than 150 words for blind
review and submit electronically, along with a cover letter including
name, title and institutional affiliation to sdsuphilconfug@gmail.com
by March 23rd. Applicants will be notified of decisions in early-
April.

Conference Contacts: mark.wheeler@sdsu.edu and paras.nikolas@gmail.com

Statues and Lumps of Clay

We’re going to soon be getting into a really fascinating discussion in my Metaphysics and Epistemology course having to do with material object metaphysics. One fascinating case raises a host of philosophical issues. The “statue and clay” example has been discussed for centuries. Here’s how Carroll and Markosian spell it out in their book An Introduction to Metaphysics.

“Suppose that on Monday you bring home a lump of clay and place it on your workbench. Then on Tuesday morning you carefully fashion the clay into a beautiful statue of a snowy owl, which remains in your workshop for all your friends to admire... But suppose that on Wednesday you wake up in a bad mood and decide that you don’t like the snowy owl after all. So that morning you squash it back into an amorphous lump of clay”

How many objects are there on your workbench on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday? Does the number change over these days? In other words, are the clay and the owl the same thing or are they, alternatively, two distinct objects?

Ted Sider puts one of the problems raised by this case as follows. (This might as well be this week’s paradox. Please suggest a solution to this.)

(1) Before the sculptor's action, a lump of clay exists and after the sculptor's action a statue exists.

(2) The lump of clay continues to exist after the sculptor's actions.

(3) The statue comes into existence when the sculptor makes it.

(4) The lump of clay and the sculpture have different properties after the sculptor's actions: one existed before the sculptor's action, and one did not. (This follows from (1), (2), and (3).)

(5) If x and y have different properties at the same time, then x ≠ y. (This is called Leibniz’s Law - see here for a robust discussion of this principle.)

(6) The statue ≠ the lump of clay. (This follows from (4) and (5).)

(7) The statue and the lump of clay occupy the same location at the same time.

(8) Two distinct objects never occupy the same location at the same time.

(9) The statue = the clay. (This follows from (7) and (8).)

(10) Therefore, The statue = the clay and the statue ≠ the lump of clay. (This follows from (6) and (9).)

Of course, the statue can't be identical to the clay and also not identical to the clay. So what went wrong? Which premise(s) of the argument should we reject?