Why do we disregard irrationality and irrational actors?

From guest blogger, Charlie.

From my brief exposure to philosophy, the rational actor seems to be the sole subject of discourse. Irrationality is treated at best as a footnote or at worst as a some sort of Lovecraftian horror. It is definitely pervasive, I doubt that any individual would convincingly contend that he has attained a level of cognition rivaling Spock. Irrationality isn’t simply a consequence of human nature but a required aspect of it.

First off let’s visit the definition doldrums and hammer out what exactly rationality and creativity are. Dictionary.com, such an illustrious source, has seven definitions for rationality; most of which involve the terms ‘reason’ and ‘reasonable’. I want to go a bit further and say that a process is rational if it is a finite sequence of steps that are valid according to some consistent logic. An irrational process is then one that is not rational. Creativity is defined as, “The ability to transcend traditional ideas, rules, patterns, relationships, or the like, and to create meaningful new ideas, forms, methods, interpretations, etc.” (www.dictionary.com, accessed 7/14/2016).

I would like to present the following argument that irrationality is a required aspect of human nature:

1) No creative process is rational.

2) Creative processes are a required aspect of human nature.

3) Therefore, irrational processes are a required aspect of human nature.

Defense of 1:

If a creative process is rational, then there exists a consistent logic and a finite sequence of steps in that logic that derives this creative process from an existing process. This then requires that this creative process is equivalent to that process (according to the logic whose existence was asserted). But, if this creative process is equivalent to a previous process, it is by definition not new and not creative.

Defense of 2:

This one is pretty easy to defend, humanity without creativity is without the arts and sciences.

If the above argument is correct there is a lot of previous theories that have to be reexamined. Can Virtue Ethics withstand scrutiny if its virtuosic individuals need to be irrational? Surely a virtuosic individual needs to be creative. Given the necessity of irrationality doesn’t this directly conflict with The Kantian Perspective? How does an Objectivist evaluate the actions of an irrational actor?

Rationality and Thinking Fast vs. Slow

I just listened to an interview with Daniel Kahneman, the author of Thinking Fast and Thinking Slow.  He made a remark about an interesting case.  Suppose that a person is informed that a loved one needs immediate surgery in order to save her life, and that this surgery has a 99% success rate (i.e., only 1% of patients do not survive the surgery).  Kahneman suggests that this is one of many cases in which people behave irrationally.  Most people, he suggests, would be very nervous and fearful that the person they love would die.  He points out that this is irrational because there is but a very small percentage of people that do not survive the surgery.  This verdict doesn't seem right to me.  To call such people irrational or to say that such emotions aren't apt for the situation strikes me as a mistake.  It seems to me that because the stakes or so high (a person's life is on the line) the 1% chance is rather significant.  If the situation involved something with lower stakes, then I'd be prepared to say of such a person that she were irrational or not appreciating the statistical facts in forming her beliefs, emotions, etc.  Consider a different case:  Suppose that I have a cold and my physician says that such-and-such a treatment has a 99% chance of substantially reducing my symptoms and a 1% chance of exacerbating them. In this sort of case, it seems right to say that I would be irrational in believing that my condition would get worse upon taking the medication.  It would be strange for me to feel afraid of taking it.  It seems to me that the statistics matter and must inform our beliefs, guide our emotions, etc.  But it also seems understandable that the stakes/severity of the possible consequences matter and can help explain why a person might think or feel certain things; indeed, such considerations might even justify what would otherwise be a bad inference/ill-formed reaction. 

What do you think of all this? 

(I should confess that I haven't read his book yet.  Maybe he offers some replies to my worry.  It's on my list for summer reading and hope to get to it soon.)