How (not) to reply to the skeptic II

Michael Huemer argues (in many places--see especially page 129) that an agent that is having a vivid hallucination of a table has the "same kind and same degree of justification for believing in the table as we normally do when we see tables." This is because, "when we have perceptual experiences, external objects seem to us to be present, and there is no evidence in general against this" and, of course, the agent having the hallucination has the same experience as us. So Huemer thinks the agent having the hallucination is in the same justificatory position as we are.

The skeptic will surely insist that the person suffering from a hallucination does not know that there is a table before her. This is partly due to the fact that there is no table--it is a hallucination. And one cannot know something that is false. But it seems, at least to the skeptic, that this is also due to the fact that the sort of justification that she has in not good enough for knowledge. To show this, the skeptic will point out the same sort of justification is had by an agent that perceives a table and yet this agent does not know that there is a table before her because she cannot rule out various possible skeptical scenarios. In this case, the agent has a true belief that there is a table before her, but the skeptic argues that the justification she has for this belief is not enough for this to amount to a case of knowledge. So it's not clear to me how Huemer's point that the agent having the hallucination is in the same justificatory position as real-table-perceivers helps in responding to the skeptic.

Interestingly, Huemer brings all this up (at least on page 129) as a way defending direct realism - which is only part of his response to skepticism. But how does this support direct realism? It seems to me that being in the same "justificatory boat" as a person that is suffering from a vivid hallucination does nothing to show that I am directly aware of the table before me. How does this fact (if it is one) show that my beliefs about external objects are noninferentially justified?

Suggestions, thoughts, etc. are most welcome.