**This is from guest blogger, David C.**
Robert Nozick seems to be making two points with his thought
experiment of the experience machine. The first point is to negatively refute
Hedonism. The second is a positive point, which argues that people put intrinsic
value on “really doing”, “really being” and to “live ourselves, in contact with
reality”. I think that Nozick’s first point relies on an invalid argument,
while his second point has a lot of ambiguity, which raises more problems then
it actually solves.
Nozick’s first point of refuting Hedonism would rely on an
argument somewhat along these lines:
1.
If Hedonism is true then the only thing that
people should care about is maximize happiness (pleasure).
2.
Defined by the set up of the thought experiment,
entering the experience machine would maximize one’s happiness (pleasure).
3.
If one only cares about maximizing one’s happiness
(pleasure) one would enter the experience machine.
4.
Plenty of people choice not to enter the
experience machine.
5.
For plenty of people, it is not the case that
they only care about maximizing their happiness (pleasure).
6.
Hedonism is false.
There are several problems with this argument.
This first problem is that the conclusion (6.) “Hedonism is
false” does not validly follow from the premises. Although it seems that
premise (1.) and premise (5.) would lead to (6.), but this is logically
invalid. The reason is that the key claim in premise (1.), the Hedonism claim
that “the only thing that people should care about is maximize happiness
(pleasure)”, is a prescriptive claim, not a descriptive claim. It is a claim
that suggests what people “should” care about, not a claim that purports to
accurately describe what people “actually” care about. What people “actually”
care about cannot prove or disprove the prescriptive claim. It is totally consistent
that “I actually care about A”, but “I should care about B”, for maybe I’m just
being irrational. Thus, premise (5.), which describes what people actually care
about, cannot be sufficient to falsify Hedonism. In order to refute this
prescriptive claim of Hedonism, we would need an argument that proves: one
should not only care about maximizing happiness (pleasure).
Maybe Nozick’s second point, which is positive, does try to
argument for why people “should not” enter the experience machine. If Nozick’s
second point does prove this point, then he would have a good argument of
refuting Hedonism. I will address his second point later. But nonetheless, if
my argument in the above paragraph is correct, Nozick’s argument would, at
least, loss some power. Much of Nozick’s power of proof comes from people’s intuitive
approval of premise (4.), which states: “Plenty of people choice not to enter
the experience machine”. But if I am right in pointing out the invalidness of
the argument, then I have prove premise (4.) does not contribute to refuting
Hedonism. Hence, the most powerful premise in this argument would be useless.
Of course, some may think that Hedonism is not just a
prescriptive claim, and that Nozick’s argument has successfully proven that the
descriptive claims of Hedonism is false. Surely, if we change the key claim in
premise (1.) into a descriptive claim, which would be something like: “If
Hedonism is true then the only thing that people would care about is maximize
happiness (pleasure)”, the argument above would become a valid argument. But
does that mean this argument has successfully proven the descriptive claims of
Hedonism to be false? No, because there are still other problems in this
argument.
Another problem for this argument is that premise (3.) does
not follow from premise (2.). This may seem counter-intuitive at first, but it
is perfectly constant that one may only care about maximizing one’s happiness
(pleasure) but choices not to enter the experience machine. How can this be?
Since the experience machine is, by definition, a happiness (pleasure) maximizer.
It can be possible and consistent because the experience
machine can only promise to be a happiness (pleasure) maximizer after you enter the machine in the future. But
you are making the choice of whether to enter the machine at the present moment. This can make a huge difference because
since you are making the choice at the present moment, you are making judgment
based on the happiness (pleasure) maximizing calculation at the present moment,
not after you enter the machine in the future (or the two combined). A machine
that promise to maximize your happiness (pleasure) in the future does not
promise to maximize your happiness (pleasure) at this present moment (or the
two combined). And if it does not maximize your happiness (pleasure) at this
present moment (or the two combined), it is perfectly consistent that you
choice not to enter it.
What I just said would probably sound quite confusing. So
let me clarify two points:
1. How could the machine be a happiness (pleasure) maximizer
after you enter the machine in the future, but not so at the present moment?
The answer is that one might put a huge amount of happiness (pleasure) in
knowing and believing he is living in the “real world”. Therefore, this would
make a huge difference for him, because after
he enters the machine he will not know he is in it, and thus the huge
amount of happiness (pleasure) in knowing and believing he is living in the
“real world” is satisfied. But at the
present moment, while he has not yet entered the machine, he knows the
world will be a “fake world”, and thus the huge amount of happiness (pleasure)
in knowing and believing he is living in the “real world” is not satisfied.
2. Wouldn’t the dissatisfaction of “knowing the ugly truth”
only last for a very short time, and therefore would bond to be overweighed by
the “happiness (pleasure) maximized” rest of your life in the machine? There
are two ways of replying to this doubt. One is by arguing that people just put
much more weight on the present happiness (pleasure) than the future happiness
(pleasure) when making decisions. The other is by arguing that people just put
a really huge amount of happiness (pleasure) in knowing and believing he is
living in the “real world”. So much that even a tinny time of dissatisfaction
caused by its truth would overweight a whole lifetime of ignorant happiness.
I think Nozick would actually agree with the second way of
replying. For his positive point is just to argue that people value “really
doing”, “really being” and living in the “real world” so much that there are
actually intrinsic value in them. But I think this positive point of his has a
lot of ambiguity, and raises more problems then it actually solves. I will talk
about it later in the post.
