Some Thoughts About the Cosmological Argument

From guest blogger, Shao.

I think the biggest controversy about the cosmological argument is: Do we have to have an explanation for everything that exists? This question can lead to many small questions, such as do we need an independent being to create all the dependent beings? Or, can all the dependent beings just exist as a group without an independent being? First of all, I think there is nothing wrong to assume that all the things that we know (water bottle, cars, planets and stars.etc) came to existence by the cause of some other things (which I think we can scientifically prove how the water bottle, cars, planets and stars came into existence). I think the problem here is not the causal relationship, but our lack of ability to conceive something that is infinite. Sure, we understand that when we say something is infinite, it means such thing (pi for instance) will go on forever. Then the point is, what is forever? Since we already have proven scientifically that the universe had a beginning and it was the big bang. Then the problem is: what's before the big bang? Is big bang the start? And if it is, then it means the universe has a beginning and thus it is not infinite. So although we can easily understand that every physical thing around us is dependent, which it does not create itself, we cannot perceive that such casual relationship goes on infinitely. I therefore disagree with the argument that "if we've explained the existence of every member of a collection we've explained the existence of the collection-there's nothing left over to be explained." In other words, I think the problem with this argument is that it assumes that all dependent beings can exist as a collection without a first cause. Well, first, we only know that dependent things do not exist in a loop, which means that the grandson does not cause the existence of the grandfather. Therefore, it seems that we can never use logic to find an explanation for the series because this series goes on infinitely. Furthermore, even if things do miraculously cause each other's existence in a loop, do they also require a spark to start the loop? And even if such a loop does not need a start,then is this loop itself an independent being? It seems that our logic does not work perfectly once we arrive at the problem of the first cause, which I think we always need to make exceptions to our premises. Whether we think there is an independent being or not, we just can't make a valid argument. 

Kant's Reply to Anselm's Ontological Argument

I'm teaching a philosophy of religion course this term and we're beginning with a discussion of Anselm's ontological argument. The IEP entry has a pretty clear statement of this argument:

1. It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak, true by definition) that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible being that can be imagined).
2. God exists as an idea in the mind.
3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.
4. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (that is, a greatest possible being that does exist).
5. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)
6. Therefore, God exists.

Kant famously objected to premise (3) and claimed that existence is not a "real or defining predicate." On his view, the concept of God cannot include existence. The upshot here seems to be that existence is not a "great-making property" because it's not really a property at all. According to Kant, what we do when we say something like "God exists" is to simply affirm that the entity described by the various properties belonging to the concept (omnipotence, moral perfection, creator of the universe, etc.) is actual or real. It's not as if we're ascribing to God some further property--i.e., the property of existence--on Kant's view.

Here's how Kant's main point is spelled out in the IEP entry:

"The idea here is that existence is very different from, say, the property of lovingness. A being that is loving is, other things being equal, better or greater than a being that is not. But it seems very strange to think that a loving being that exists is, other things being equal, better or greater than a loving being that doesn't exist. But to the extent that existence doesn't add to the greatness of a thing, the classic version of the ontological argument fails."

But is it true that existence doesn't add to the greatness of a thing? Consider two possible loving beings, one exists and the other does not. The real loving being could express its love and bring about various positive things in the world whereas the non-existent loving being is not able to do such things. It could be argued that the former is better--in some sense--than the latter precisely because it can do such things and this is due to the fact that it exists. It might then seem that existence is a great-making property after all.

I can think of a few objections to this move. Perhaps Kant might reply that it's not the property of existence which makes the former better, but rather it's the fact that the being engages in certain activities and that these activities have certain results. So it's not as if the former (qua loving being) is better than the latter (qua loving being). They're both the same on the "loving-being-front."

But I don't find this reply persuasive. With respect to lovingness we might say that the two beings are on par--they're both loving. But it still seems that when we compare the two beings and all of their properties taken together, the one which is actual is, in some sense, better than the one who isn't. I'd rather have the former as a friend. Imaginary friends, however loving, aren't as good to have as real, loving friends.

Of course, there's a lot to say about what we might mean by "better" here, but I'll save that for another day. For now, I wonder what you think about whether (a) existence is a property and (b) whether it's the sort of property which "adds to the greatness" of a thing or is a "great-making property."