From Guest Blogger, Danny W.
Before I tried to come up with a
refutation to the core absolutist tenet (i.e., God can do anything), I needed
to understand why our class had such a hard time wrestling with a counterargument.
It’s tricky to refute absolutism, but why? The nature of the absolutist
“argument” reaches the conclusion that God can do everything. A necessary
outcropping of such a conclusion leads the absolutist to contend that God is
not constrained by logical possibility; God can bring about conditions that
yield a logical contradiction (i.e., the square-circle). Despite the attempts
to pose logical arguments against the absolutist, many philosophers fail to say
anything that damages the absolutist’s view about God’s absolute omnipotence.
The following general exchange is common: (1) the anti-absolutist lays out a
deductive argument which identifies a logical
contradiction in the metaphysical reality hypothesized by the existence of
the absolutely omnipotent God; (2) the absolutist concedes that such logical
contradictions can indeed exist if brought about by an absolutely powerful God;
(3) the absolutist argument seems to remain completely intact and the
anti-absolutist seems to be out of rational ammunition.
Originally, I felt an inkling of despair
when it seemed that the absolutist had effectively torpedoed the logical
techniques that philosophers cling to as the only viable methodology for
argumentation. The absolutist conception of God’s omnipotence—namely, that he
can bring about every (il)logically conceivable state of affairs—creates a
metaphysical space which houses both logical proceedings and those which
contradict logic (e.g., three is greater than seven). We’re not used to having
this “illogical realm” have any significant metaphysical value—and in everyday
life it seems that it obviously does not (e.g., we have always experienced the
fact that 3 marbles is necessarily less than 7 marbles)—however, it is
undeniably “in existence” for the absolutist insofar as God has the luxury of
bringing about logical contradictions. Fine, it reeks of ivory-towerism, but
you have to play the absolutists game and concede (for the time being) that God
has the power to do the logically impossible. For this very reason, we cannot
attempt to sway the absolutist by highlighting logical contradictions after we
grant the assumption that God can do what is logically possible and impossible;
the absolutist’s theorized metaphysical space permits all of that!
Once we accept this fact, we can start
to think about the best method for refuting the absolutist claim. Have no fear,
logical reasoning hasn’t been invalidated in any way; the critic of absolutism
simply needs to resist the conditioned tendency to strive for a logical
inconsistency in the absolutist’s metaphysical account—such tactics, as we have
seen, will not win over the absolutist.
The optimal refutation—which holds
traction despite the absolutist’s willingness to permit logical inconsistencies—seems
to first grant the assumption that God can do anything (the logical and
illogical) and then follows such an assumption with an argument that doesn’t
have a logical contradiction. It would seem that the best maneuver to counter
the absolutist claim is to show why a God operating “only within logic” is
supremely powerful, and specifically why such a God is more powerful than the
God that can do “anything”—having the power to do both logical and illogical
actions.
And this is exactly the route that Louis
Groarke takes in his paper, Reconsidering
Absolute Omnipotence. Groarke’s thesis is identical to that put forth by
Aquinas—among other philosophers. The thesis goes: if God is omnipotent (i.e.,
possesses most possible power), He
must possess logical omnipotence rather than absolute omnipotence. Groarke
makes his argument with three subsidiary arguments:
Argument I. “Power means being able to
act”
Argument II. “Power is a function of
will”
Argument III. “God’s will cannot be
separated from his nature”
Argument I suggests that action—what I assume means the ability
or potential to act—is a necessary condition for an agent possessing power. Consequently, Groarke seems to
suggest that degree of action (or the potential to act) is directly correlated
to amount of power. Thus, Groarke is making the implicit argument that one
should not measure power in terms of bare possibility; we should peg power to
action only. From the absolutist conception of God, He can act and not act. Thus, the absolutist God exhibits
inaction and lacks power whenever He does not act.
I might not be capturing the nuanced
shades of Groarke’s argument I, but it seems like the absolutist would easily
dismiss the assumption that power is necessarily defined by action. I can
imagine the absolutist would hold to their repetitive mantra that God’s power
is absolute, and that having the potential to both act and not act (and even
execute both options simultaneously) is the ultimate expression of power.
Additionally, I would assume that the logically constrained God, who can act or
not act (just not simultaneously) still has moments of inaction when He is not
demonstrating power. There does not seem to be any discrepancy between the possibility of acting and the respective
power exercised by our logical and absolute God. The absolutist appears to
remain unscathed.
Arguments II and III focus on God’s will
necessarily being constrained only by his nature—if there was an external
constraint on God’s will, He would not be omnipotent. So, Groarke now
characterizes power as a function of will—namely, an agent is more powerful if
they act in perfect accordance with their own will. For example, if God wants
to act logically but fails to act in such a manner (e.g., he makes squircles),
then he is not being powerful in any sense of Groarke’s new definition. Thus,
the argument is that the absolutely omnipotent God is defying his natural
will—specifically, He is not always acting according to reason and logical
parameters—and consequently lacks power.
This argument seems to be more
convincing at first blush, but serious limitations exist for arguments II and
III. Groarke’s argument heavily relies on the assumption that God’s will is
constrained only by something within God’s nature; it also relies on the
assumption that rationality is a necessary attribute of God’s nature which
controls will. However, is God necessarily a rational being, as Groarke claims?
Under the context of the Anselmian (Perfect Being) theology, is it fair to say
that God must be rational? On one hand, it would seem that we could allow our
evaluation of what is perfect to necessarily
include rationality. Is rational art better than irrational art, which seems to
lack a coherent message? Is a rational person more desirable than an irrational
person? I’m not sure, how do we make evaluative claims about beings based
purely on embodied or exercised rationality. Things seem to get muddy quickly;
isn’t our ability to judge what is better or best based on some social context
or anthropocentric justification? It seems like attributing rationality to
God’s nature or essence is a derivative of our observations about our
reality—which seems to be logically constructed. But, must God be rational to
be perfect? Thus, securing the assumption that God is necessarily logical (or
at least that His will is contained by logic) is the major area of the argument
that needs to be fleshed out before any serious consideration can be given to
Groarke’s attempt at refuting absolutism.
My aim with this post is to provide a
dialectic which focuses on methods for refuting the claim that God is absolutely
omnipotent. It is clear that finding logical contradictions in the metaphysical
reality permitted by the absolutist seems a useless direction to travel. I like
where Groarke is headed; he turns his attention towards connections between
God’s nature, will, actions, and how these variables connect to an agent’s
power. He wrestles with definitions and relationships (e.g., the relationship
between God’s will and nature). I’m not sure if these tactics fall prey to the
absolutist’s acceptance of logical contradictions; that might be a good spot to
start the discussion. If any of this interests you, it might help to read over
the latter portion of Groarke’s paper (link posted by Jesse Steinberg on blog)
and see if I adequately captured the intentions of each argument. What are some
other limitations to Groarke’s argument that need to be fleshed out or
fortified? Can we work with elements of Groarke’s argument, and is he using a
better method for refuting absolute divine omnipotence? Feel free to join the
discussion; getting multiple perspectives is always a great way to better
digest these complex ideas!