Showing posts with label absolutism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label absolutism. Show all posts

Friday, July 15, 2016

Why Ethical Objectivism Alone does not Answer our Dilemmas

From guest blogger, Rei.

Ethical Objectivism is the concept that there are some objective moral truths that are universal and independent of culture or belief.  Of the 11 arguments against objectivism we studied in class, the argument from absolutism resonated in my mind. The argument is as follows:

1.)     If moral claims are objectively true, then moral rules are absolute.
2.)     No moral rule is absolute.
3.)     Therefore, moral claims are not objectively true.

First, by testing for validity it can be found that this argument is not valid, as it follows the structure of: if p then q, q, therefore p. However, the argument can be changed to be valid as done below:

1.)     If moral rules are absolute, then moral claims are objectively true.
2.)     No moral rule is absolute.
3.)     Therefore, moral claims are not objectively true.

The argument is now valid. Now let us test for soundness. Consider the following thought experiment: you have a loaded gun and have the option to shoot a stranger. Would you shoot a stranger? Probably not. Do not shoot strangers seems like a viable moral rule. If shooting the stranger will end world hunger? Maybe the rule should have an escape clause to address such a situation; i.e. If world hunger doesn’t end as a result, do not shoot strangers. This thought experiment shows us that extenuating circumstances, such as the shot ending world hunger, make absolute moral rules unfeasible. This is because moral rules will not be able to account for all of these extenuating circumstances. Thus, premise 2 is true. Premise 1 on the other hand is not. Why? The previous thought experiment showed us that moral claims can be viable in spite of absolutism via the addition of escape clauses. So the argument is not sound.

The argument is not sound, but it does highlight that escape clauses are needed for the viability of ethical objectivism. This brings into question the value of ethical objectivism alone as a determinant of reasoning. If moral rules are not absolute, why have them? They can tell us how to act, usually. They can tell us what’s right and wrong, usually. They can tell us what is the morally correct thing to do given a bunch of circumstances. So can sane human beings who can empathize and consider the consequences of their actions. Most everyone can figure out if it’s wrong to shoot a stranger. Philosophical thought is in the harder decisions such as is it morally righteous to kill for the sake of a larger beneficial cause.

An objectivist criticism of my claims may be that I may be over exaggerating the significance of extenuating circumstances. My response to such a criticism would be that the widespan contemporary issues of now are all subject to said circumstances. For example, the black lives matter movement is affected by the fact that black people were enslaved 170 years ago, and black people did not have equal rights until the 1960s. Anti-abortion movements are influenced by religious practices that originated thousands of years ago.

Monday, March 7, 2016

Different Accounts of 'Omnipotence'

From guest blogger, Nic. 

Absolutism is the idea that an omnipotent being is able to to do anything including things that are logically impossible. This means that the omnipotent being would be able to make a squared circle and create an immovable rock. This is an interesting view because God is commonly described as being an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient being. This means God can do anything, is perfectly good, and knows everything respectively.

The common way for philosophers to reject absolutism is to appeal to the counterexamples of the squared circle and immovable rock. In the example of the squared circle, it seems impossible to create an object that has both the necessary and sufficient properties of a square while at the same time having the necessary and sufficient properties of a circle. An absolutist would need to maintain that God can make a squared circle, but this is logically impossible so the absolutist seems to be wrong in this case. God also would need to be able to create a rock that God is to able to lift, but if God can do anything God should certainly be able to lift the rock. This now creates a problem because either God cannot lift the rock or God cannot create the rock; in both cases God would no longer be omnipotent.

There are non-absolutist ways to maintain that God is omnipotent, including this definition: God can do anything that is logically possible. This formulation still falls prey to the immoveable rock problem and therefore doesn’t get God’s omnipotence out of jeopardy. 

Another formulation of God’s omnipotence is stated: God can do anything that is possible for that being to do. This means that God could do anything that an omnipotent being could logically do therefore creating the squared circle or immoveable rock are both not things that God could do. The interesting part here is that God now cannot do something that non omnipotent beings can do, that is create an immoveable rock. Its actually quite easy for human to create an immoveable rock just by chiseling out a large boulder from a mountain side.

Even this loosest of all the definition of omnipotence has a problem. God is an omnipotent being God should at least be able to to perform all of the tasks that a non omnipotent being can perform. God cannot create an immoveable rock but humans (non omnipotent beings) can create an immoveable rock. Therefore, God does not achieve the necessary conditions for omnipotence. 

It seems that all of the definitions of omnipotence have problems that undermine the desired power of Gods ability. In the strictest definition of omnipotence God’s power creates logical impossibilities but in the loosened definition God doesn’t seem to have enough power. I think this is sufficient evidence to reject the claim that God is an omnipotent being. This certainly create a different picture of God but I don’t see a reason that God must be omnipotent. God can still be very powerful and in fact be the most powerful of all beings without having the condition of omnipotence.

Sunday, September 15, 2013

How to undermine Absolutism—A Focus on Methodology and Potential Pitfalls

From Guest Blogger, Danny W.

Before I tried to come up with a refutation to the core absolutist tenet (i.e., God can do anything), I needed to understand why our class had such a hard time wrestling with a counterargument. It’s tricky to refute absolutism, but why? The nature of the absolutist “argument” reaches the conclusion that God can do everything. A necessary outcropping of such a conclusion leads the absolutist to contend that God is not constrained by logical possibility; God can bring about conditions that yield a logical contradiction (i.e., the square-circle). Despite the attempts to pose logical arguments against the absolutist, many philosophers fail to say anything that damages the absolutist’s view about God’s absolute omnipotence. The following general exchange is common: (1) the anti-absolutist lays out a deductive argument which identifies a logical contradiction in the metaphysical reality hypothesized by the existence of the absolutely omnipotent God; (2) the absolutist concedes that such logical contradictions can indeed exist if brought about by an absolutely powerful God; (3) the absolutist argument seems to remain completely intact and the anti-absolutist seems to be out of rational ammunition.

Originally, I felt an inkling of despair when it seemed that the absolutist had effectively torpedoed the logical techniques that philosophers cling to as the only viable methodology for argumentation. The absolutist conception of God’s omnipotence—namely, that he can bring about every (il)logically conceivable state of affairs—creates a metaphysical space which houses both logical proceedings and those which contradict logic (e.g., three is greater than seven). We’re not used to having this “illogical realm” have any significant metaphysical value—and in everyday life it seems that it obviously does not (e.g., we have always experienced the fact that 3 marbles is necessarily less than 7 marbles)—however, it is undeniably “in existence” for the absolutist insofar as God has the luxury of bringing about logical contradictions. Fine, it reeks of ivory-towerism, but you have to play the absolutists game and concede (for the time being) that God has the power to do the logically impossible. For this very reason, we cannot attempt to sway the absolutist by highlighting logical contradictions after we grant the assumption that God can do what is logically possible and impossible; the absolutist’s theorized metaphysical space permits all of that!

Once we accept this fact, we can start to think about the best method for refuting the absolutist claim. Have no fear, logical reasoning hasn’t been invalidated in any way; the critic of absolutism simply needs to resist the conditioned tendency to strive for a logical inconsistency in the absolutist’s metaphysical account—such tactics, as we have seen, will not win over the absolutist. 

The optimal refutation—which holds traction despite the absolutist’s willingness to permit logical inconsistencies—seems to first grant the assumption that God can do anything (the logical and illogical) and then follows such an assumption with an argument that doesn’t have a logical contradiction. It would seem that the best maneuver to counter the absolutist claim is to show why a God operating “only within logic” is supremely powerful, and specifically why such a God is more powerful than the God that can do “anything”—having the power to do both logical and illogical actions.

And this is exactly the route that Louis Groarke takes in his paper, Reconsidering Absolute Omnipotence. Groarke’s thesis is identical to that put forth by Aquinas—among other philosophers. The thesis goes: if God is omnipotent (i.e., possesses most possible power), He must possess logical omnipotence rather than absolute omnipotence. Groarke makes his argument with three subsidiary arguments:

Argument I. “Power means being able to act”
Argument II. “Power is a function of will”
Argument III. “God’s will cannot be separated from his nature”

Argument I suggests that action—what I assume means the ability or potential to act—is a necessary condition for an agent possessing power. Consequently, Groarke seems to suggest that degree of action (or the potential to act) is directly correlated to amount of power. Thus, Groarke is making the implicit argument that one should not measure power in terms of bare possibility; we should peg power to action only. From the absolutist conception of God, He can act and not act. Thus, the absolutist God exhibits inaction and lacks power whenever He does not act.

I might not be capturing the nuanced shades of Groarke’s argument I, but it seems like the absolutist would easily dismiss the assumption that power is necessarily defined by action. I can imagine the absolutist would hold to their repetitive mantra that God’s power is absolute, and that having the potential to both act and not act (and even execute both options simultaneously) is the ultimate expression of power. Additionally, I would assume that the logically constrained God, who can act or not act (just not simultaneously) still has moments of inaction when He is not demonstrating power. There does not seem to be any discrepancy between the possibility of acting and the respective power exercised by our logical and absolute God. The absolutist appears to remain unscathed.

Arguments II and III focus on God’s will necessarily being constrained only by his nature—if there was an external constraint on God’s will, He would not be omnipotent. So, Groarke now characterizes power as a function of will—namely, an agent is more powerful if they act in perfect accordance with their own will. For example, if God wants to act logically but fails to act in such a manner (e.g., he makes squircles), then he is not being powerful in any sense of Groarke’s new definition. Thus, the argument is that the absolutely omnipotent God is defying his natural will—specifically, He is not always acting according to reason and logical parameters—and consequently lacks power.

This argument seems to be more convincing at first blush, but serious limitations exist for arguments II and III. Groarke’s argument heavily relies on the assumption that God’s will is constrained only by something within God’s nature; it also relies on the assumption that rationality is a necessary attribute of God’s nature which controls will. However, is God necessarily a rational being, as Groarke claims? Under the context of the Anselmian (Perfect Being) theology, is it fair to say that God must be rational? On one hand, it would seem that we could allow our evaluation of what is perfect to necessarily include rationality. Is rational art better than irrational art, which seems to lack a coherent message? Is a rational person more desirable than an irrational person? I’m not sure, how do we make evaluative claims about beings based purely on embodied or exercised rationality. Things seem to get muddy quickly; isn’t our ability to judge what is better or best based on some social context or anthropocentric justification? It seems like attributing rationality to God’s nature or essence is a derivative of our observations about our reality—which seems to be logically constructed. But, must God be rational to be perfect? Thus, securing the assumption that God is necessarily logical (or at least that His will is contained by logic) is the major area of the argument that needs to be fleshed out before any serious consideration can be given to Groarke’s attempt at refuting absolutism.

My aim with this post is to provide a dialectic which focuses on methods for refuting the claim that God is absolutely omnipotent. It is clear that finding logical contradictions in the metaphysical reality permitted by the absolutist seems a useless direction to travel. I like where Groarke is headed; he turns his attention towards connections between God’s nature, will, actions, and how these variables connect to an agent’s power. He wrestles with definitions and relationships (e.g., the relationship between God’s will and nature). I’m not sure if these tactics fall prey to the absolutist’s acceptance of logical contradictions; that might be a good spot to start the discussion. If any of this interests you, it might help to read over the latter portion of Groarke’s paper (link posted by Jesse Steinberg on blog) and see if I adequately captured the intentions of each argument. What are some other limitations to Groarke’s argument that need to be fleshed out or fortified? Can we work with elements of Groarke’s argument, and is he using a better method for refuting absolute divine omnipotence? Feel free to join the discussion; getting multiple perspectives is always a great way to better digest these complex ideas!


Tuesday, September 10, 2013

The Absolutist Conception of Omnipotence

According to absolutists like Descartes (and more recently Nick Trakakis), an omnipotent being is able to do anything, including things that are logically impossible. As we discussed in class, most philosophers take this view to be false and dismiss it as implausible.  However, it's difficult to find an argument that is dialectically persuasive.  What I mean by this is that the sorts of criticisms of absolutism that are typically provided rely on certain basic assumptions about the status of logic and argumentation, but these assumptions are not shared by the absolutist.  So there's no way to "get your foot in the door," as it were.  I wonder what readers of this blog think about absolutism and how, if at all, one might go about undermining it.

For an interesting take on this debate, you might find this article by Louis Groarke interesting.