Showing posts with label morality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label morality. Show all posts

Sunday, July 31, 2016

The Dilemma of Nuclear Power

From guest blogger, Bethany.

In this world of environmental awareness, people are becoming increasingly concerned with efficient, clean energy. Wind and solar power are renewable and clean, but they are far less reliable than fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas. Despite the controversy surrounding it, nuclear power is a promising and reliable source of clean energy. However, do the risks of nuclear meltdown and contamination outweigh the benefits? Do the supposed environmental risks make the employment of nuclear power plants immoral?

There are several ways in which we can view this problem.  Interestingly, if we look at the issue of nuclear power from a hard-core environmentalist perspective, we may come to different conclusions. On the one hand, an environmentalist may argue that we can best protect the environment by replacing coal-burning plants with nuclear power plants. Nuclear energy does not pollute the environment, and it is extremely safe; the only meltdowns that have occurred were due to human error. On the other hand, some environmentalists may insist that it is immoral to install nuclear power plants because the highly toxic waste from nuclear reactor cores have half-lives of tens to hundreds of thousands of years. Basically, this means that nuclear waste remains radioactive for a very long time and is detrimental to the environment if it is not stored properly. Additionally, there is always the risk of a meltdown, which would cause extreme damage to the environment.

From a Libertarian perspective, nuclear power should be completely moral because it does not infringe on anybody’s personal property rights. In contrast to popular belief, very little radiation is produced from nuclear power plants, so people who live near new plants would not have to relocate.

It is not obvious whether or not Block—who argues that there should be a personal property rights theory for environmental protection—would endorse nuclear power. When we look at the issue empirically, we see that nuclear waste is generally confined without a problem and that meltdowns are almost impossible when a plant is maintained correctly. However, if one believes that nuclear power is a terrible thing, then he or she must consider the effects of both coal and nuclear plants and ask the question, Which is the lesser of the two evils? After the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima, many German nuclear power plants were shut down out of fear and replaced with coal-burning plants. Was this the moral decision? Should we be afraid of the chance of something going horribly wrong with a nuclear power plant? Or should we be more fearful of the widespread toll that coal-burning power plants take on environmental aspects such as air quality (which is ruined by burning fossil fuels and which has undoubtedly caused widespread medical issues such as lung disease).

I believe that, in this case, nuclear power plants are a far better option because they do not infringe on our collective personal property rights to breathe clean air, drink clean water, etc. Perhaps there are better options, but until science catches up, nuclear power should be more widely embraced.

Is Cloning Moral?

From guest blogger, Michael.

A case against the moral permissibility of cloning, when the clones face significantly reduced lifespans, can be made on the basis that procreation through natural means will create offspring with a longer lifespan, and thus a higher quality of life.  Both sides can agree that if cloning could be done in a way that did not significantly lower the lifespan of the clones, it would be morally permissible. 

Well, a study recently released recently shows that a new set of 13 sheep clones are doing just fine.  They have yet to show any signs of premature aging, and are all around in great physical health.  So, assuming that we can now expect to someday live in a world where we can create healthy clones of ourselves, is cloning morally permissible?

Personally, I think it is, but for the sake of this blog post I will provide an argument against it.  Humans have been brought into this world in the same fashion for countless generations.  A man and woman engaging in passionate intimacy to bring new life into the world has some kind of natural value to it.  Humans are the byproduct of love, and that is how it ought to be.  To change this would be to change too fundamental a part of humanity, and cloning does just that.  It takes the grace out of the conception and makes the creation of a person no more significant the manufacturing of material goods.

My opponent may bring up the point that test tube babies have been produced in a somewhat-similar fashion for many years now.  None of the people created through such means seem to live any less dignified kind of life. But the babies conceived in test tubes are still an intimate combination of two beings.  Being nothing more than an identical copy of your parent may make your life seem less significant in some way.  The clone does not have its own sense of self.  It just a second copy.

Thursday, July 28, 2016

Principle Q and Reproduction

From guest blogger, Kara.

Principle Q can be viewed in a consequentialist paradigm with dangerous implications. If the only morally permissible option is the one with the best consequences, then Michael Phelps and Michelle Obama could be morally obligated to have the best superhuman swimmer, amazing armed babies. Assuming one is morally obligated to mate with the best gene option tiptoes the line of eugenics too close for comfort. However, the defense of Q wherein parents are only obligated to produce the best children that they are able to produce solves this issue.


But, what does “that they are able to produce” mean? That’s entirely subjective. Does it mean that the couple is able to produce? What about those looking for a sperm donor? Is one morally obligated to find the fittest sperm donor with the least gene imperfections? Is picking a sperm donor with known gene abnormalities morally impermissible? Where is the line to draw on obligation vs. ability?


Additionally, I think Q can be contrasted with the anti-abortion argument of a Future-Like-Ours. The Future-Like-Ours argument dictates that abortion is wrong because you are unjustly taking away the future of the fetus that would have entailed playing on a swingset, going for a run, eating a donut, and various other pleasures. Is cloning wrong with a Future-Like-Ours mindset because the clone will have significantly less future than a non-clone? Or-is denying the clone a life worse than giving them an opportunity for a future? 

Some Thoughts On Voting

From guest blogger, Tim.

In class we discussed two arguments related to voting. One was that voting should be mandatory, perhaps even with punishments in place for failing to vote. The other was that it is immoral to make an “uninformed” or “bad” vote.

I personally do not believe that voting should be mandatory. It is certainly possible that there is some sort of “market failure” situation where elections do not actually reflect the beliefs and desires of the public. However, I think this is more likely a result of the inherent nature of the current political system rather than a result of apathy towards voting. When citizens only have at most two viable candidates to choose from, many people’s wishes will not be adequately represented by either choice.  Additionally, a lot of votes are not cast for a candidate – they are cast against the one that is worse. As a result, I don’t see how the election structure as it is will ever not be a failure – even if participation increases, the election results won’t capture public opinion accurately. While I don’t believe mandatory voting would solve any problems, I also don’t support it because fining or imprisoning someone for failing to do something so trivial (to them at least, since they’re not voting) would be wrong.

The argument that it would be wrong to make an uninformed or bad vote wasn’t very appealing to me. I suppose that it might be possible to be doing something wrong by supporting a candidate who will do bad things, but I don’t think there is any sort of way for objectively determining what constitutes a bad candidate. The claim that it would be wrong to make an uninformed vote is stronger, though I’m still unsure what level of information a voter should have before making a decision. Some people are single-issue voters, and if they are extremely informed on that issue but not others, are they making an uninformed vote by voting? Perhaps with respect to the candidates in general, but with respect to what they care about, they are quite informed. It is also often difficult to get information. Candidates talk more about end results than particular plans. For example, we hear that Trump is going to deliver the biggest tax cut in history, create millions more jobs, fix all the bad schools, build a border wall, destroy ISIS everywhere, deport 11 million people, magically make manufacturing jobs reappear and wages increase, increase the size of the “depleted” military, and “help” students with their educational debts. These are essentially all talking points. Anyone interested in the specific policies (the “how” rather than the “what”) or how they will be funded is left hanging. I suppose proponents of this theory that uninformed voting is immoral could just tell us to “do the best we can”, but at this point in the election season, I don’t know with certainty what either of the candidates would do. Ultimately, I find the question “is it immoral to vote badly or with little information?” to be a rather useless one. If no one is going to be prohibited from voting, we should spend our energy on talking to others and informing them, rather than deciding if they are doing something wrong that we’re not willing to stop.

Laissez-Faire Economic Policy

From guest blogger, Liam.

Laissez-faire economic policy fails to address a business's damage/cost to the environment. In a free-market economy, production is determined from where marginal cost maximizes long-run profits. Almost all business's do not take environmental cost into consideration when determining marginal cost. Laissez-faire policy asserts that once the problem becomes relevant enough and costly enough then businesses will react and adjust accordingly. This policy works very well for "normal-goods" but environmental damage is not in the realm of normal goods, it is more than a good (bad) to be considered in a economic problem. Every day we do marginally more damage to the environment but these costs add up over time. If we continued this practice then nobody would have to pay until it was too late. Because of this, the government must intervene to ensure that the economy fairly determines how business production/pollution damages the environment.
     
Determining a per-unit cost on different pollutants over time is a difficult cost to measure but it provides the necessary incentive for businesses to minimize their environmental damage.
     
I don't think we can blame businesses for their past transgressions, however. In the free-market, businesses are encouraged to compete with others in their same industry. In order to succeed, most businesses neglected environmental cost. If they had considered economic cost, then their competitors would have bankrupted them by offering lower prices, or higher quality for the same price. So, we must accept that great environmental damage has already been done, and laissez-faire is the economic policy that allowed businesses to produce so carelessly.

Cloning's Implications for Genetics

From guest blogger, Hannah. 

I think it is interesting to look at the cloning case and examine its ethical implications regarding testing for genetic disorders. When discussing Allhoff's argument against current cloning cases he discovers that due to the shortening of telomerase from replications, creating a clone would be deliberately allowing that clone to live a shorter life and be subject to many of the degenerative diseases that come from old age such as various cancers, Alzheimer's disease, and others. In the case of Dolly the sheep clone, she lived for half the life of an average sheep because her cells were taken from a 7-year old sheep. Therefore, Allhoff believes that cloning is immoral and unjustified right now because of its effects on the clone.

I believe that according to these guidelines, it is immoral for parents to avoid genetic testing for diseases such as Huntington's disease, because if they abstain they did not take any preventative measures to keep that child from the pain that may come from a genetic disease. Although Allhoff disagrees with Principle Q, if you have the choice between having two children (at different times, with different people) you ought to choose the time or partner that will provide the child that is better off, he thinks that reproduction is not only aimed to maximize the child's welfare, but instead to create the best child they are able to. However, there are many tests now along with genetic engineering that would allow parents to craft the best child they are able to and therefore they may be morally required to take such genetic tests in order to create the best child that they can and ensure they will not face extreme hardships such as Huntington's disease. This may be difficult for some parents to face because it is not definite that a child will get these diseases, yet sometimes the chance is as high as 50%. If a couple discovered that their child was at higher risk for a genetic disease, the only moral choice would be to abstain from having a child. However, many parents do not want to make this discovery because they want to raise a child and many would take the risk.

Do you think it is moral for a parent to have a child when they have a risk of a genetic disease? Along those lines, do you think parents need to participate in genetic testing before they are allowed to have a child?

Wednesday, July 27, 2016

Brennan's Viewpoint on Voting in Our Society

From guest blogger, Rei.

Brennan argues that the power to choose the politicians in power is reserved for those who are well-educated regarding public policy and socio-economics who can make a well-informed decision. This is clearly an elitist position, but I feel it is the only way that democracy can coincide with a free market economy. For example, in the United States political system, Private funding of campaigns has allowed large corporations to influence which candidates can compete in the presidential election. While us non-CEOs may have the option to choose between candidates, the candidates who have a shot are those with enough money to campaign and craft their message. Who we choose between is ultimately decided by those CEOs and decision makers of large corporations. When there is unequal distribution of resources, it is without doubt that those with more resources have greater power. In a command economy, this is far less viable because there would be much lower disparities in wealth and education.
I feel that this view is morally permissible because it is necessary in order to have a democratic system in place, while still maintaining a free market. Command economies have a track record of failure and dysfunction, so I feel that this pseudo-democracy is a minor side-effect that we must endure for the benefits of a free market economy.

Friday, July 22, 2016

Moral Status of Eating Meat

From guest blogger, Julie.

After discussing animal ethics, and whether or not we have an obligation to regard animals with the same moral standard we do humans, I couldn’t envision eating meat without struggling through an internal moral conflict. Singer’s “speciesism” resonated most with me. I find it slightly foreign to place the same moral significance on animals as humans, but logically following the concept of speciesism, I can actually place some reasoning behind it.

Our intuitions guide us to believe discrimination against a being based on non-moral components is wrong. And I think we could all agree this intuition makes sense. As Singer pointed out, we consider racism and sexism as immoral, why not include speciesism in that group. If at one point, one human thought they were “better” than another because of something as remedial as skin color or gender, than it seems as though belonging to a certain species is just as insignificant. 

Defending the consumption of meat as morally permissible because animals aren't moral agents is a common strategy. But what excludes an animal from being part of the moral community? Rationality or cognitive ability? That doesn’t hold because there are some animals that are more rational or are capable of greater cognition than human beings (i.e. coma patients, mentally ill…). So if we obliged by this principle, then we wouldn't have moral obligations to a group of human beings. Is it emotional connections? Pets allow for emotional connections. Being able to feel pain? Animals are able to feel pain. What then allows us to hold ourselves higher on the moral scale than animals?

Cutting meat out of your diet can be easy nowadays with the plethora of meat alternatives, and just as tasty. You don’t have to give up everything if this moral dilemma is causing you to lose sleep, Oreos happen to be vegan.

I couldn’t come up with a defense to allow meat eating as morally permissible, but I’d like to know if anyone else did!

The Morality of Obligated Morality

From guest blogger, Patrick.

My mother has a phrase (probably took it off a bumper sticker somewhere) be nice because it feels good to be nice. While she is extremely clichĂ©d she has a point. It feels good to be nice. I believe part of that swelling of our hearts when we act out of compassion or kindness towards others because it’s not mandatory. It’s easier to do nothing and move on, but we do it anyways for the sake of others. An interesting example that demonstrates my point is paying people to give blood. All my teachers ever will gape when I say this, but I forgot where the study was done but what I do remember was that a study was done and less people gave blood when they were paid to do so in comparison when people volunteered to do so. I don’t hold doors for people or smile to strangers because it’s expected of me, but because it’s not expected of me. The value in kindness is derived from its voluntariness.

                As much as I respect Singer’s bleeding heart and have great admiration for a man that not only preaches morals, but follows them too; I believe obligated morality would be a tragedy. Humans are self-interested and tend to overlook those in dire need for petty gain, but forcing people to change is not truly changing people. The world has many problems, but if people don’t consciously decide to make changes to the world around them on their own but rather are forced to by officials they will feel oppressed. Rightly so I might add. So called oppression is in the name of the greater good, but I feel like we’ve heard that line from dictators before? Ignoring the political debate to return to the original point; morality can’t be forced. If it becomes mandatory it is no longer morality.

Singer and Arthur on Charity

From guest blogger, Aria.

"In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, Singer argues that we are morally obligated to donate much more of our time and resources in helping those suffering from various causes such as famine around the globe. In fact, he is arguing that we need to change our moral scheme and instead of considering such humanitarian acts as supererogatory, we need to think of them as moral obligations we have towards our fellow beings. He gives the following two premises to support his conclusion: Firstly, death and suffering from lack of access to food, shelter, medical care, and such basic human needs is bad. Secondly, if we are able to prevent such suffering from happening without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance then we are morally obligated to do so.

He provides thought experiments (i.e. child drowning in the pond) to capture our natural moral intuition to get his point across. In addition to his theoretically neutral approach, as it was discussed in lecture, what makes his argument really strong is its emphasis on “moral luck”. It is an objective fact that we cannot predetermine the circumstances of our existence. By that, I mean that we can neither explain nor control where and to what kind of a family we are born to. In other words, you cannot explain why you were born into a family that supported you and gave you the opportunities to thrive and another person was born to a poor family struggling for their survival day after day. Such differences between me and you, and those struggling with such unfortunate circumstances, are nothing but byproducts of random chance events.  As a result, we cannot possibly blame others for their suffering in circumstances such as famine and natural disasters. Consequently, it is our moral obligation to prevent such sufferings to the best of our ability until we reach the point of marginal utility; the point where our assistance causes more suffering than the amount of suffering we are intending to prevent.

As discussed in class, Arthur’s objection to Singer’s key principle points out the importance of moral entitlements (our rights and deserts) in determining our moral obligations. Arthur believes that our right to personal property, our own body, and resources, supersedes the right of others against us and our resources. Thus, we bear no obligation to assisting others in cases of famine and other calamities.  

At this point there is a standoff between these two mutually exclusive moral perspectives. What makes our discussion about them challenging is explaining why we should favor one over another. Why should we think that our personal rights supersede the right others have against us to prevent their suffering/or save their lives?  Similarly, what reasons do we have to think that someone’s right to life/ or prevention of suffering is superior to our right to our resources/fruits of our labor?"

Is Obesity Morally Impermissible?

From guest blogger, Allan.

The science behind body composition is simple. Every human being requires a certain number of calories to exist, known as the Basal Metabolic Rate (BMR). BMR is the number of calories a person would burn if they slept all day, and depends on body weight and height, ranging between 1200 to 2400 Calories. In addition, one burns calories with physical activity which is accounted for by the person’s Total Daily Energy Expenditure (TDEE). Consuming your TDEE in food daily will enable you to maintain your body weight, while eating above or below this amount will lead to weight gain and loss respectively. This is based on the fundamental laws of thermodynamics.

There are millions of people around the globe that are unable to meet their calorie needs and go undernourished every day. While there is no shortage of food, it is not evenly distributed. America is often stereotyped for its overweight citizens, which is largely true. Over a third of the American adult population is obese. The only way to reach a state of obesity is through severe over-consumption of food, and therefore energy. Since this energy is not burned, it gets stored as fat, and therefore, is wasted. With that I ask: should it be morally permissible to reach a state of obesity while there are millions who are unable to even achieve basic energy needs to sustain themselves?


This idea can also be extended to bodybuilders, athletes, food challenge competitors and even people suffering from bulimia. Their over-consumption of food does not provide any moral benefit. I have a lot of thoughts about this subject and won’t go too in depth here. This will possibly be my paper two topic. The counterargument here would be that the food suppliers and retailers benefit from this over-consumption, which is good for the economy. Sports such as bodybuilding and food challenges provide entertainment to the masses and increase aggregate happiness as well. I also find this analogous to the wealth distribution in America, where a part of the population holds the majority of resources.

Licensing Parents

From guest blogger, Amanda.

Hugh Lafollette believed that it is completely moral to require people to obtain license in order to have a child. At first, I wanted to agree to this statement, but after weighing the pros and cons, I have realized that there are more cons thus, I am going to have to disagree with this licensing. Lafollette believes that licensing parents will ensure competence in a certain field that requires knowledge. He has examples such as people have to get a license in order to drive, be a doctor, be a lawyer, etc. So why shouldn’t parents have to do the same before they have a baby? By making a mother get a license, we are ensuring that she is competent on child rearing and will keep the baby safe, and provide a proper environment for the baby to develop correctly. By doing this, we are preventing a child from growing up in circumstances such as poverty or neglect. Lafollette even had a system that made it seem like everything should work out just fine, but then in class we discussed the errors in this thinking and I got to thinking about all of the cons.
First off, parenting is a natural learning process. I cannot truly assess that a person will be an awful mother until they are in the situation of motherhood. People who never wanted to have children and hated them have changed their mind once they found out they were pregnant or actually had the baby. While being a mom, one usually changes their habits. For example, a mother will stop smoking, drinking, eating fast foods because they want to make sure their baby develops properly. Not only will they change their habits, but they mature themselves and motherly instincts usually kick in.

Also, this is a violation of autonomy of a person’s body. You cannot tell a person what they can and cannot do with their body. If a woman gets pregnant without a permit, what will happen to her? Will she be forced to abort her baby? Will she have to give away her baby to a couple that has passed the tests? Will she be fined for having a child? I believe Lafollette will not make her give up her baby. Rather he would force her to take the test and if she fails it, maybe he would have some program set up for people in her situation. This program would show them why they failed the tests and basically train them to meet the standards. My opposition to this is what if it is not possible for the couple to meet the standards? What will Lafollette say? Also how do we know that this test is accurate? How do we know if the system is corrupted and disenfranchises people? Lafollette would probably say that this disenfranchisement and infringement of freedom is worth not having babies growing up in unstable situations.  The tests should not dictate someone’s right to do something natural such as childbirth. We cannot properly enforce it and it would not be effective as well. There is no set way on how to raise the perfect child and we cannot assume that there is. There are a lot of loose ends that Lafollette needs to tie up before we can approve of his position.

Wednesday, July 20, 2016

Some Resources For Food Ethics

We discussed ethical issues related to non-human animals yesterday in my class. And we talked a lot about Food Ethics. Here are some resources which might be of interest:

Here are two I mentioned in class:
TED talk by Mark Bittman
Consider the Lobster by David Foster Wallace
Peter Singer on the Colbert Report

And here's one which is a bit more uplifting (check this out if you like to eat fish):
TED talk by Dan Barber


Tuesday, July 19, 2016

Relativism and Moral Progress

From guest blogger, Kendra.

It is evident that there has been moral progress in the world. This makes the argument that relativists pose to be invalid.

Relativists might say to that, that slavery is bad is just the opinion of more people now than it was before or perhaps new technology eliminated the need in today’s society for it. There are still people that believe that one race is better than another, but it is the minority so it is not heard

They may pose the argument that well if I didn’t like milk as a child and now I like milk today that is just a change in opinion. It isn’t moral progress and neither is the change from a historical episode of immorality like slavery.

The objectivist would respond with the fact that we can agree society is more morally civilized now than it did 100 years ago. Woman have rights now and that is more moral. Gay marriage is becoming legalized all over the world. There is a systematic way to deal with criminals now. Etc. Those that have the differing opinion are too closeminded to be defined as rational humans that can be moral.

You cannot account moral progress to change of opinion. Relativists will continue to bite the bullet with their it’s just a matter of opinion account but at what point is that still sufficient? Objectivists have concrete historical evidence to show that humans have made progress on determining moral truths.

Friday, July 15, 2016

Are we capable of being moral if free will is just an illusion?

From guest blogger, Leona.

In Kant’s view of morality, there are two important conditions of humanity that came into play: autonomy and rationality. A way to attack this assumption mentioned by is The Argument against Autonomy that was included in Shafer-Landau’s book. Essentially, it aims to prove that our choices are out of our control. While the argument provide a philosophical prospective, psychologist are also looking into the matter of free will and decision making. There was a proposal made by Dan Wegner and Thalia Wheatley about two decades ago. If proved, it would render free will an illusion as well as the Kantian morality. The proposal suggested that our brain might justify our choices after it was made and gave us the illusion of intention. A paper came out early this year by Adam Bear and Paul Bloom from Yale might gave some solid evidence for this hypothesis. They conducted experiment showing 5 white circles on the screen and one of them will turn red in seconds. The subjects were instructed to guess one that would turn red. The final result showed that the chances the subjects chose the right circle was about 30%, which is much higher than the probability. It should be noted that this is a very simple decision making process and might not illustrate what happens in more complicated decision making. Moreover, even the 30% result is statistically significant, it also shows that choices could be illusions at times, but not always (in that case the subjects would “guess” the right circles all the time). Still, personally speaking, scientific discovery like this would make me leaning towards nihilism. 

Reference: Bear, A. (2016). What Neuroscience Says about Free Will. Scientific American Blog Network. Retrieved 15 July 2016, from http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-neuroscience-says-about-free-will/

Why Ethical Objectivism Alone does not Answer our Dilemmas

From guest blogger, Rei.

Ethical Objectivism is the concept that there are some objective moral truths that are universal and independent of culture or belief.  Of the 11 arguments against objectivism we studied in class, the argument from absolutism resonated in my mind. The argument is as follows:

1.)     If moral claims are objectively true, then moral rules are absolute.
2.)     No moral rule is absolute.
3.)     Therefore, moral claims are not objectively true.

First, by testing for validity it can be found that this argument is not valid, as it follows the structure of: if p then q, q, therefore p. However, the argument can be changed to be valid as done below:

1.)     If moral rules are absolute, then moral claims are objectively true.
2.)     No moral rule is absolute.
3.)     Therefore, moral claims are not objectively true.

The argument is now valid. Now let us test for soundness. Consider the following thought experiment: you have a loaded gun and have the option to shoot a stranger. Would you shoot a stranger? Probably not. Do not shoot strangers seems like a viable moral rule. If shooting the stranger will end world hunger? Maybe the rule should have an escape clause to address such a situation; i.e. If world hunger doesn’t end as a result, do not shoot strangers. This thought experiment shows us that extenuating circumstances, such as the shot ending world hunger, make absolute moral rules unfeasible. This is because moral rules will not be able to account for all of these extenuating circumstances. Thus, premise 2 is true. Premise 1 on the other hand is not. Why? The previous thought experiment showed us that moral claims can be viable in spite of absolutism via the addition of escape clauses. So the argument is not sound.

The argument is not sound, but it does highlight that escape clauses are needed for the viability of ethical objectivism. This brings into question the value of ethical objectivism alone as a determinant of reasoning. If moral rules are not absolute, why have them? They can tell us how to act, usually. They can tell us what’s right and wrong, usually. They can tell us what is the morally correct thing to do given a bunch of circumstances. So can sane human beings who can empathize and consider the consequences of their actions. Most everyone can figure out if it’s wrong to shoot a stranger. Philosophical thought is in the harder decisions such as is it morally righteous to kill for the sake of a larger beneficial cause.

An objectivist criticism of my claims may be that I may be over exaggerating the significance of extenuating circumstances. My response to such a criticism would be that the widespan contemporary issues of now are all subject to said circumstances. For example, the black lives matter movement is affected by the fact that black people were enslaved 170 years ago, and black people did not have equal rights until the 1960s. Anti-abortion movements are influenced by religious practices that originated thousands of years ago.

Consequentialism and the "Too Demanding" Objection

From guest blogger, Bryan.

We talked about the consequentialism few days ago in class,  and one of most well-know theories is Mill’s utilitarianism. The theory is defined as an action that is morally correct if and only if, the results of the action produces most net pleasure among all the available actions for everyone who can be effected by the action. My first expression to theory is positive and relevant as it reflects my thoughts while making decisions; however, here are my few objections after thinking the principle deeply.

One of controversial objections for utilitarianism is that it is too demanding.  According to utilitarianism, the right action is to maximize the net overall happiness, then any actions that does not achieve this idea is impermissible action.  For instance, if a doctor can save a person from dying, and the doctor also can use the person’s organs to save ten other people who are waiting for organs if the person dies. If utilitarianism is true, the doctor is moral correct to choose to do nothing and let him dies so the doctor can save more people because the amount of happiness of ten families are much greater than the pain in one family.   Moreover, we can also use donation to charity as an example to demonstrate the refutation.   If people all donate money to charity, then the net happiness will be greater than not doing it.  Does this mean people who do not do this behavior is moral corrupted?

Another objection regarding of utilitarianism is that it is too simple.  Utilitarianism states that happiness is the only intrinsic good of determining correct actions; however, we have no clue about who decides happiness.   Additionally, human is driven by many other traits such as integrity, justice, and kindness for our future generation. The theory to me lacks enough considerations.  

Morality of Capital Punishment: A Kantian Perspective

From guest blogger, Amara,

The morality of capital punishment has always been up for debate among philosophers. There is always controversy when deciding when or when not it is permissible to take someone’s life as their punishment. The perspective I want to analyze is of the philosopher, Kantan. Though there are some drawback to capital punishment, there are more benefits to having a death penalty, such as increased security, decrease in crime rate, proper justice would be served and also, human life will be more valued and respected.

From a Kantian perspective, I believe that Kant would be all for the death penalty because he strongly believes in justice. Kant had a phrase, lex talionis, which translated into “eye for an eye”, which explains how he felt justice should be served. Kant believes that human beings are rational and autonomous creatures. This meaning that we as humans know what is morally acceptable and what is not. We are able to reason, and eventually come to a decision on our own. Since we are able to self-legislate, we ultimately are the ones responsible for the decisions we make and the consequences that they cause. So if we, as rational and autonomous beings, thought everything out, and still decided do something that is immoral towards someone else, according to lex talionis, the victims have a right to do either the same thing back or something equally as bad to you.

Another principle that Kant had was the principle of humanity which states: always treat a human being (yourself included) as an end, and never as a mere means. An “end” being a species that was part of the moral community, so they deserve proper respect and treatment. A “means” is when you use a person or thing to achieve your own personal goals and show no respect towards them. So when we do something immoral to others that are part of this community, we are violating the principle because we are not treating them as an “end”.

Relating everything back to capital punishment, if a rational and autonomous person decides to kill another rational and autonomous person, then I believe Kant would say that the person who killed them should receive the death penalty, because he broke the principle of humanity, therefore the lex talionis principle comes into play. There are some counter-arguments against this theory, and many think that lex talionis is flawed because of the following:
·         It cannot explain why criminals who intentionally hurt their victims should be punished more than those who inflict the same amount of pain and hurt on people by accident.
·         The punishment given to those who committed the crime is sometimes deeply immoral.
My suggestion to fix the first flaw would be to punish the person based off of their intentions. For example, if someone pushed some off of a building intending to kill them, then they should be killed according to the “eye for an eye” principle. On the other hand, if someone accidently bumped into another person, causing them to fall off the building and die, it was not intentional and therefore should not be punished. If the person is moral, their guilty conscious of accidently killing someone should be enough punishment for them. Another skeptic may ask, how will you find out their intentions? This will be the more difficult part, but I feel like through investigation, our judicial system is able to come to proper conclusions and appropriately serve justice, so we should keep doing just that.

Here is an example for the second flaw: someone burned someone else at the stake, so according to lex talionis, is it morally permissible for someone else to burn the murderer at the stake to serve justice? Many feel like this deeply immoral because it causes someone else, who is an outsider in the situation, to do this immoral act to someone. I believe that though, inflicting death is an immoral action, if a person takes someone else’s life, they deserve to have their life be take from them. On the issue of it being deeply immoral, I feel like the way the murderer dies can be in a less inhumane way, as long as dying is the end result. As for the outsider having to kill someone, I feel like if it is their job to serve justice, and this is the ruling on a case, then the outsider should not be seen as immoral when killing. Or maybe Kant could edit his definition of members in the moral community to when a rational and autonomous person kills another rational and autonomous being, their moral status should be revoked, and they are kicked out of the moral community. Thus, it is morally permissible to kill them. 

Cultural Relativism and Cultural Practices

From guest blogger, Ming.

We talked about Ethical Relativism in class. It has two forms: cultural relativism and individual relativism. I want to talk about Cultural relativism mainly. The theory is that one makes his/her decision depends on cultural commitments. In other words, morality is made by each society and society has final say in ethics.

Before reading Ethical Relativism, I thought it would be a good thing because I believe that majority people would make moral decisions, and the society would make best choice that is beneficial to well-beings.

However, the story of Nuran Halitogullari changed my mind. A 14-year-old girl was killed by his father because she was raped and her father thought she had dishonored their family. Such “honor killings” usually go unpunished in Istanbul because of cultural beliefs that a family’s honor often depends on the “purity” of its women. From my point of view, that girl already suffered a lot, and it takes courage to live her future life. She already lost virginity and that is a huge suffer for her and for her family. However, killed by her father, she was even poorer than being raped. If cultural relativism is correct, then killings in such cultures are moral. But how can killing innocent people be moral?

I did a little research online and found that there are some awkward (at least seen by me) belief in other cultures. For example, Shiite Muslims believe that suffering martyrdom can pay tribute and absolve sin. Therefore, the day of Ashura, an event recognized by many Muslims around the world, select men join a procession and flagellate themselves with daggers to the head. Under Muslim cultures, it is morally right even though doing so causes pain. But how can hurting oneself be moral?

Virtue Ethics and the Definition of Virtue

From guest blogger, Tessa.

For this week’s blog post, I wanted to touch on Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics. When beginning to learn about this topic, everything sounded reasonable to me. For example, we should ask ourselves “what kind of person should I be?” instead of asking ourselves “what should I do?”. Our goal is to do what the ‘virtuous person’ would do. For example, an action is right if it is what would be done by someone of virtue. This sounds like realistic moral reasoning, although how do we define a virtuous person? The readings define a virtuous person as simply someone who sets a fine example and serves as a role model for the rest of us (also called a moral exemplar). Moreover, a virtuous act is between two vicious existences. One virtuous characteristic to have would be bravery, rather than being a coward or foolhardy.

While this seemed like a reasonable idea at first, I now have many more questions. What if people have a different definition of what ‘bravery’ is? What happens when different cultures value different virtues? Do we take cultures into consideration? What about conflicting virtues- someone may act with many virtues, but lack in one area- are they someone we should follow? These are just a few of the immediate concerns that came to mind during class. Believers say that you learn who is virtuous over time. It takes practice and learning from your mistakes to be able to find a real virtuous person.

Lastly, we briefly discussed people who may never have the chance of becoming virtuous. Some people may be doomed, because of their upbringing or their past/current role models. It really rubs me the wrong way that some people have absolutely no chance in becoming virtuous, so I may hone in on this for my paper.