Showing posts with label god. Show all posts
Showing posts with label god. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 4, 2016

Time and Being

From guest blogger, Shao.

What is the definition of timelessness? How can something be out of time? It seems that when we talk about God, we assume that God is out of time because God always has to exist and seems not under the influence of time. But Abrahamic religion seems to suggest that God was also in time. 

I think in order to determine if God is in time or outside of time, we need to understand what is time. Is time a matter? A property? Truly we understand the temporal relationship between things. Like I did my homework yesterday and I go to school today, and I will do certain things tomorrow. But when I really  think about time it seems that time is not a particular thing, although it influences everything in the physical world. 

The only way that we know that time exists, is that we developed a way to measure it. We look at clocks and recognize that time is moving forward, and such deduction is based on days and nights on earth. Also, we can see that things grow old and die or break and become something else and we deduce that there are temporal relationship between things. However, are we right about that? I mean first of all, if all matters are never created or destroyed, but simply become something else, then how can we say that because a creature is getting old, it is because of time? Or how can we say that because there are days and nights on earth, then we have experienced time? Could it be the case that time is simply the measure of change in the universe? In other words, we develop the concept of time because we observe changes, and we use time to measure the sequences of such changes. And besides that, there is actually no such thing as time. So for God, because he does not change at all, he is not measurable by time. 

Also, people may argue that we can certainly understand that there are past and present and future. And we cannot go back to ancient Greece because it was in the past. However, as we might also know that time is not absolute in the universe, that if things travel fast enough, as close to light speed, time becomes slower. Could there be a case that when an entity travels fast enough, maybe millions or billions time faster than light, then time becomes infinitely slow and eventually such entity is out of time? So a thousand years for such entity is less than a billionth of a second. And if this could be the case, time seems does not matter to such entity. Whether is future, or present or past, no matter how long the time is, it is shrink to the point that the variation of time just does not matter. If that is the case, then it seems that God could be such an entity. 

Overall, I think that maybe time is purely a delusion of human beings that we only understand it because we can see such representation from natural world without actually see what is "time". And if under the scope of universe or even beyond, time is not as absolute as we think it is on earth. And it might be the case that an entity arrives at a point that time just does not apply to it. 

Life After Death

From guest blogger, Maham. 

One worry I encountered after reading Davis’s paper on death ending it all is one I have frequently on the subject of an afterlife. I am not denying the weight of the philosophical arguments made against a life after death, however I am merely questioning how those of us who are alive can be so sure of a state we have never experienced.


If we were asked to describe the state of what we were or what was (or even wasn’t) before we were born, all accounts would be rejected on the basis that we simply can not know. We did not exist; science proves that better and above anyone else. And so we will cease to exist after dying as well and will never know of it just we did not know of the period before our birth. But how can alive and mortal beings truly and irrevocably know of states that we have yet to experience and know of no mortal being who has experienced such a thing that can be shared with us.


Isn’t much of the debate as to God’s existence inspired by a lack of empirical evidence for his existence and the fact that no one has truly experienced God. No mortal and alive being around
us at least. Why can the time after death not possibly be given the same treatment where we simply are ill equipped to empirically define something that it outside the grasp of mortal human beings, since the prerequisite for it is death and we can not speak beyond death.

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Petitionary Prayer

From guest blogger, Maham.

What is used as an argument against the effectiveness of petitionary prayer is that God just isn’t listening to them, if he was then why aren’t all our prayers being answered? Such an argument is not too different from the one about there being less evil in the world. We seem to demand about acquiescence of God and from God, or we believe him to be either in effective or simply uninterested in mortal life and its woes.


We refuse to consider that God may be accepting prayers based on the balance of natural and moral evil that he must keep with the good in the world. Most prayer is against the existence of some kind of evil and the misery it causes, is it not? Thus the same arguments that apply and argue for the existence of evil would apply here as well. It is not that prayer is ineffective, God isn’t listening or a few unanswered prayers are a reason to reject the premise of prayer. We have to allow that sometimes many prayers will be rejected in lieu of a greater utilitarian good that God can view for the world but we simply cannot.

How Pascal Continues to Lead Us Wrong

From guest blogger, Maham. 

The largest worry we usually associate with Pascal’s wager is one of cynical faith. It seems unlikely and presumptuous to think God is simply playing a numbers game where he wants us all on a subscription list for the free reward associated with signing on. It is much more plausible that God instead is looking for genuine faith in his existence, and everything associated with it. This genuine faith then also calls in order to follow God’s set of doctrine and rules, to live life as he deems it fit for us, thus not ending the story at simply giving a stamp of agreement to his existence as Pascal would have us believe. In such a scenario, we’re much more likely to have lost even more than Pascal would predict. We lose the pleasure of living life through our own set of rules, and we also end up garnering God’s displeasure (if he ends up existing) for a false belief in him that buys us an eternity in hell.

These are worries commonly addressed in response to Pascal’s wager. What I want here is to draw attention to another moral worry that we, as responsible philosophers especially, should hold in high regard as well.


As philosophers and researchers, we have an epistemological responsibility towards fostering ideas, choices, knowledge and beliefs founded in reason, logic and the very least a justification based on truth. What Pascal is asking of us is to compromise our intellect, when he asks us to disregard a lack of evidence or genuine belief in lieu of pragmatic reasons for believing in God’s existence. How can we look ourselves in the eye and still call ourselves responsible philosophers and researchers if we abandon our believes simply on the basis of a wager that promises us a respite from suffering in hell IF god exists? I for one would find it very troubling to wager on my intellect and my identity as a epistemologically responsible philosopher.

God and Time

From guest blogger, Adam.

Would God lose his perfection if he was under the constraint of time? If God could not control time then it seems that God is not all powerful. However, if God is outside of time then he could not actively help humans, because to do so would require one to be within time. Some suggest that God has the ability to be both in and out of time at the same time? This is something that simply cannot be explained. I would argue that it would be more powerful of God if he were able to act in this universe and affect things within time. If God were not in time then he could not act or perceive humans in time which would make him less powerful. By being outside of time God would not be able to talk to Moses in the desert because time is passing during their conversation and if time passes, God could not be a part of it if he was not in time. Can God then travel throughout time? It seems that a metaphysical all powerful being would be able to move freely throughout time but I am unable to describe how this would be possible. If God were able to go to the past he would be able to change the future. If he were able to constantly change the future then it would be impossible for the future to exist. Paradoxes plague the arguments of time. It is difficult to describe what God would be able to do and even more difficult if not impossible to describe how God would be able to do it. One stance that may work is that of an absolutist that says God can do anything even the logically inconsistent. If one agrees with this view than it would be nearly impossible to argue what God cannot do. If one believes God can do anything logically consistent, then this is when paradoxes of time arise.

Thursday, April 7, 2016

Some Thoughts on the Problem of Evil

From guest blogger, Shani.

The existence of evil in the world becomes problematic to theists since most theological texts claim that god is an all-powerful, all knowing and all good being (PKG). This assertion is problematic since if god is in fact PKG, then why would he ever allow gratuitous evils to occur? It seems to go completely against his nature. I would like to argue that the only way to remove the problem of evil is for theists to give up an absolutist approach to god’s capabilities. God cannot be PKG and be an omnipotent being who can do anything whether it be logically possible or not at the same time. Theists may not like the idea of giving up absolutism since they may think doing so undermines the idea that god is omnipotent and all-powerful. In my opinion it does no such thing. By removing the idea of absolutism we are not bringing gods capabilities down to a human level rather, we are simply purifying the definition of his being. If we take a non-absolutist approach and say that god can only do things which is possible for him to do, his possibilities and powers being beyond our comprehension, than we are still able to assert that god is PKG. Not only is he PKG but he is now also in his purest and most benevolent form. We can now take all gratuitous evils and place the blame on another entity that has the capability to create chaos and cause beings to suffer mercilessly. The blame can either be placed on humans or on Satan but either way god has not lost power. God has not lost power or authority since if god were PKG he would not be committing these horrific acts anyways, such gratuitous evils would be logically incoherent for him to commit. Therefore we have simply purified the definition of his being to one that is even more benevolent and merciful. In my opinion, giving up absolutism actually makes for a stronger and more praise worthy god than a god who can do anything but is not necessarily PKG. 

Wednesday, April 6, 2016

Zabzebski's Argument on God and Ethics

From guest blogger, Jace.

Z's Argument
1. We can only rely on our perception, moral intuitions, and reason to acquire moral knowledge. (assumption)
2. If we only rely on our perception, moral intuitions, and reason, there will be a plurality of moral beliefs.
3. If there is a plurality of moral beliefs, then extreme moral skepticism follows.
4. If one is an extreme moral skeptic, then they are also in moral despair.
5. If one is in moral despair, then they are in a contradictory state of being.
6. Therefore, there must be something more than our moral intuitions which allows us to acquire moral knowledge. God serves such a function.

Premise 2 is clearly exemplified anytime two people have mutually exclusive beliefs about the right course of action. Her arguments from premise 2 to premise 3 fail, however. She claims that there exist disagreements which are not rationally decidable since there is no non-question-begging procedure for determining which side is wrong. According to Zagzebski, when disagreements occur they occur on one of the following four levels of moral belief: the broadest level of beliefs being metaethical, followed by fundamental moral values, then general moral principles, and then particular moral judgments. If a disagreement occurs at the level of particular moral judgments, it may be the case that both parties are rationally justified in their opposing views given that their broader level moral beliefs are different. If two individuals disagree on a particular moral judgment but have the same beliefs in all of the broader levels, then we may infer that there is a lack of information, communication, or reason on one or both sides of the argument.

The issue that Zagzebski points out is that there are many different sets of beliefs which are internally consistent. How can one know which internally consistent moral framework the true moral knowledge lies in? I would argue that it is entirely possible that true moral knowledge lies in both. She rejects this theory on the grounds that this sort of answer is "unhelpful in the extreme". To me this seems to be untrue and even if it were true, it would be irrelevant.

In Zagzebski's example, she has a woman contemplating whether or not to get an abortion and someone tells her that her position is rationally justified and that the contrary position is also rationally justified. This is not the full picture, however. To be rationally justified, one must have an internally consistent moral framework. So a more complete response would be to say that her position can be rationally justified and that the contrary position can also be rationally justified. The position which actually is justified depends on her moral intuitions about the relative values of life, bodily autonomy, quality of life, and many other factors. Given these moral intuitions she may use reason to construct an internally consistent moral framework. It is this framework that would be incredibly helpful in determining which choice is the right choice for her. Even if a complete moral framework were unhelpful in determining some particular moral judgment, that would not be a good reason to reject the theory that two opposing positions can both contain true moral knowledge.
                        
She may object that the argument changes what is meant by "true moral knowledge" and so doesn't properly handle the issues that she raises. I actually agree, however, I think that this understanding of true moral knowledge is more rational and helpful and, if adopted, does resolve the issues that she's raised. I realize that this may not be satisfying, but I believe that it does a better job at solving the problem than her solution. On her view, a belief in god allows us to be rationally justified in our moral beliefs. However, this only pushes the issue back further on whether we can have a rational and non-question-begging procedure for determining which god to believe in. Given her criteria for becoming an extreme moral skeptic, it is inconsistent for her not to become an extreme theistic skeptic. Relying on intuitions about god leads to a plurality of theistic beliefs for which there is no objective criteria for determining which theistic belief to hold given that there are multiple internally consistent theistic beliefs. 

Thursday, March 10, 2016

Some Thoughts About the Cosmological Argument

From guest blogger, Shanni.

The cosmological argument wants to assert that based on our observations we are able to conclude that there is no thing that moves without an initial mover. By applying this to god and nature we are able to conclude that the universe could not have begun or been “put into motion” without having something start the process (i.e. god). This leads one to the problem of having an infinite regress of movers/creators. If nothing can move without something causing the moving, and by analogy, nothing can therefore be created without a creator than who created god? Not only who created god, but who created gods creator and so on and so forth? I would like to claim that the problem of infinite regress is not a serious problem for a theist for the following two reasons. Firstly, regress is not a problem to the theist since the main objective is to come to the conclusion that there is a god. Meaning, if there is an infinite regress of intelligent designers as long as at some point there was a designer who made the most intelligent being that we now define as god than it doesn’t matter that our god wasn’t the initial being. While this may change some theological arguments for how the universe came to be regress doesn’t undermine the actual argument that there is a god and that he exists. This leads to the second reason regress isn’t a problem. There seems to be a notion that if god’s creators went back infinitely than god would never have been created since he would be the final product. I would like to argue against this because god creators and his creations go on an infinite scale ranging both directions both in the past and the future. If the creators do in fact go back infinitely, like time does, than it would still serve true that all of the things that god has put in motion will go on infinitely in the opposite direction. Therefore, god isn’t the end of the line of infinite progression. Rather, god and everything created after him are simply ticks on the infinite scale of time and creation. 

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Gratuitous Evils

From guest blogger, Adam.

Some people disagree that there is evil in the world, so there would be no argument to oppose God if someone held firm with this belief. I would say that most people agree that there is evil in this world. Evil can be both necessary (ie evil that brings about greater good) and gratuitous (ie innocent fawn suffers in the woods for no human to witness). I argue that for God to be all-PKG he would not allow so much of these gratuitous and natural evils to exist. Either God does not possess the power to change and/or alter the physical laws he is said to have created, or God is not all good. These types of gratuitous evils (fawn) serve no purpose to make humans or the world a better place. It is not part of human free will to chose whether the fawn suffers or not, it is simply natural evil. Some people could object that there is no such thing as gratuitous evil, and the things that we do not cause or did not witness, we could have witnessed had we made other choices in exerting our free will. To this I would say that this amount of natural evil is too much. I agree that some compassion and good may come from evil, but there is no reason for there to be this amount of it, if there exists an all-Powerful, all-Knowing, and especially all-Good God.

God's Omniscience and Free Will

From guest blogger, Christina.

In Nelson Pike’s article "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action" he argues that if we accept that God exists and is omniscient, then we must concede that we do not have free will.  According to Pike, if I went for a run on Saturday God knew 100 years ago that I would go for a run on that particular day. Our definition of God as omniscient means God could not have been mistaken about me going for a run on Saturday and if this is the case, it would appear that maybe I didn’t really have a choice about going for a run, maybe I do not actually have free will in my actions. Although it seems from this argument that I did not have the power to do something other than my run on Saturday, I believe we can add another attribute to God that will allow both his omniscience and our free will.

I would argue that it is possible for God to exist in time and space differently than how we view time and space.  In our minds time is linear and our interaction on Earth are finite. However, it is possible that God is omnipresent, meaning present in all places at all times. If this were the case, God could exist 100 years ago at and simultaneously when I went running. In this view God is viewing me at  and, similarly to me viewing different people in the same room together. I could tell you what each of them is doing at that very moment. Therefore, if it is possible for God to be omnipresent, then I do have free will to choose my actions and God is able to know what actions I am performing at any given time, because he is present at all times simultaneously. 

Tuesday, March 8, 2016

In Defense of Evil

From guest blogger, Maham.

God’s existence is most often called into question with the problem of evil: “If God exists, and he is good, then how can he allow all the terrible things to happen in the world that happen?” From this it is ultimately concluded that either God does not exist or God is not good. The arguments that we raise in defense of this attack then, all entail some of the following usually:

1. God created the best possible world
2. Evil is not something inherently “bad” but simply the absence of good
3. God does not support the existence of evil, he simply allows it to exist
4. Satan is largely responsible for most evil etc.
All these positions further raise questions about the extent of God’s power, God’s freedom, God’s “sense” in creating Satan, what “grand” plan is God taking us towards that we can not see, etc. Wherein the end of that attack will simply result in someone raising the question of the seven-year-old child drowning or getting cancer and dying; where no explanation from God’s end or any end helps justify the need for such an event to ever happen. Silver linings is not going to suffice for the people who have been directly affected by the evil, attackers will gleefully spout.


In the midst of this, I want to consider perhaps a radically foolish position. One that I feel is necessary for us to be able to have the world that we do have and appreciate it; rather than advocating for better worlds that are well and good in theory but will always be impossible to achieve.

Evil is necessary. For human beings to understand the world as they currently do, with our un-quenching appreciation and hunt for the “good,” evil and suffering is unimaginably necessary. I fail to see how we can simply have or even recognize good, without an intimate knowledge of evil and suffering.


The appreciation of life stemmed from when the first insult to it was struck by it being taken in cold blood; the appreciation for one’s own freedom was realized when human dignity and honor was indelicately attacked. We assume that these things were present inherently within us from day one, which is an unwise assumption to make. Appreciation for the good was realized only when evil came into existence as stark contrast.


My position doesn’t call for evil to be allowed to run rampant, far from it. It is why we also have accountability, justice systems and moral responsibility as well. They are there to curb human evil, progressive technology to help against natural evil and so on. But my position at least explains why evil necessarily exists, must exist, and why we cannot possibly call on God to have made a world without it. For such a world to exist would not be as we see the world today, or even what we wager the many possible worlds will be, but a utopia difficult to live in.

A Reply to the Stone Paradox Using the Free Will Defense

From guest blogger, Joe.

Could an omnipotent being create a stone too heavy to lift? This can be answered in one of two ways.

1.     If the answer is no, then there is something that this being could not do and is therefore not omnipotent.
2.     If the answer is yes, then such a being would no longer be omnipotent as there would be an activity that he or she could not do.

While this obviously seems quite paradoxical, it can be a real concern for the theist as omnipotence is often taken to constitute part of God’s essence. Supposing that omnipotence is part of God’s essence, failure to have this attribute would seem to entail that God, as traditionally conceived, cannot exist. In this blog post I aim to show that the question ought not prevent the theist from sleeping at night. In order to do so, I will appeal to Paul Tidman’s discussion of Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense.

Through Plantinga’s writing, Tidman shows that the existence of evil is compatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God. Tidman is able to do so by spelling out a common assumption which Plantinga calls a Leibniz’ Lapse. Tidman via Plantinga claims that this assumption "is to assume that it follows from the fact that God is omnipotent that He can bring about any possible world He pleases" (303).

This assumption is problematic for the following reason. Suppose that there are worlds, one of which is possible and one of which is actual (Tidman, 303). Further suppose that some individual, Bob, exists in or is roughly located within each world. In each world, Bob finds himself in the same situation and this situation was brought about by an omnipotent being called God. In both cases, Bob is choosing what to eat for breakfast. In the first world, Bob chooses to eat a banana for breakfast. In the second world, Bob chooses to eat a bowl of cereal for breakfast. Both worlds contain roughly the same individual, but in each world a different choice is made. Therefore, the state of affairs that obtains is not ‘up to’ God, rather it is up to Bob. God cannot make it the case that Bob freely chooses to eat the banana because strictly speaking it would not be a free act if it were caused (Tidman, 404). The same holds in the instance where Bob chooses to eat a bowl of cereal for breakfast.

The main point of this is that there are certain states of affairs that even an omnipotent being cannot bring about. This, I believe, shows why the question concerning the stone requires too much. In this case, omnipotence seems to consist in the ability to do a task that is logically impossible. Much like a Leibniz’ Lapse, this demand is problematic. If omnipotence consists in the ability to do what is logically impossible, God could ‘make’ a world in which bachelors were married males. But this seems rather odd from my perspective because it would entail that God could bring about even odder states of affairs, one in which modus ponens was invalid. My overall point is that omnipotence ought to be viewed solely in terms of what is logically possible. Not only is this more parsimonious, it also rules out ‘odd’ states of affairs wherein the rules of logic don’t apply.

Monday, March 7, 2016

Different Accounts of 'Omnipotence'

From guest blogger, Nic. 

Absolutism is the idea that an omnipotent being is able to to do anything including things that are logically impossible. This means that the omnipotent being would be able to make a squared circle and create an immovable rock. This is an interesting view because God is commonly described as being an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient being. This means God can do anything, is perfectly good, and knows everything respectively.

The common way for philosophers to reject absolutism is to appeal to the counterexamples of the squared circle and immovable rock. In the example of the squared circle, it seems impossible to create an object that has both the necessary and sufficient properties of a square while at the same time having the necessary and sufficient properties of a circle. An absolutist would need to maintain that God can make a squared circle, but this is logically impossible so the absolutist seems to be wrong in this case. God also would need to be able to create a rock that God is to able to lift, but if God can do anything God should certainly be able to lift the rock. This now creates a problem because either God cannot lift the rock or God cannot create the rock; in both cases God would no longer be omnipotent.

There are non-absolutist ways to maintain that God is omnipotent, including this definition: God can do anything that is logically possible. This formulation still falls prey to the immoveable rock problem and therefore doesn’t get God’s omnipotence out of jeopardy. 

Another formulation of God’s omnipotence is stated: God can do anything that is possible for that being to do. This means that God could do anything that an omnipotent being could logically do therefore creating the squared circle or immoveable rock are both not things that God could do. The interesting part here is that God now cannot do something that non omnipotent beings can do, that is create an immoveable rock. Its actually quite easy for human to create an immoveable rock just by chiseling out a large boulder from a mountain side.

Even this loosest of all the definition of omnipotence has a problem. God is an omnipotent being God should at least be able to to perform all of the tasks that a non omnipotent being can perform. God cannot create an immoveable rock but humans (non omnipotent beings) can create an immoveable rock. Therefore, God does not achieve the necessary conditions for omnipotence. 

It seems that all of the definitions of omnipotence have problems that undermine the desired power of Gods ability. In the strictest definition of omnipotence God’s power creates logical impossibilities but in the loosened definition God doesn’t seem to have enough power. I think this is sufficient evidence to reject the claim that God is an omnipotent being. This certainly create a different picture of God but I don’t see a reason that God must be omnipotent. God can still be very powerful and in fact be the most powerful of all beings without having the condition of omnipotence.

Sunday, March 6, 2016

Does God Care About Football?

From guest blogger, John.

After almost every football game, you hear the players say something along the lines of, “I just want to thank God for helping me and my team to win the game today.” By most definitions, God is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being. Does God really care about something as inconsequential as a sporting event? The sports culture revolves around the idea that winning is good, while losing is bad.  Therefore, since God does good towards those who do good, the team who has done the most good should win. Many feel God will bless the righteous with victories and reward players like Russell Wilson, a very faithful football player, with a health and successful career. Sometimes however, the good guy doesn’t win. The Patriots are one of the most hated teams in the NFL. They are known for lying and cheating, both considered, by most accounts, “bad” things. God then should punish them, yet they have been one of the most successful teams of the 21st century.  On the other hand, Tim Tebow is never afraid to show his faith. After every touchdown, he gets down on his knee and prays.  He has done a ton for his community and his religious faith. By most accounts, Tebow is the epitome of a “good” player, yet he is considered one of the worst players to start at quarterback. So either God doesn’t care about football/sports in general, or God doesn’t exist.

You may argue, God has bigger concerns to worry about, such as children starving in Africa. As an omnipotent and omniscient god, should he not have the power to influence both situations? Maybe then he wishes for us to have the free will to push ourselves harder to win. What then is the point of praying before a game, or thanking God after a touchdown? It comes down to the players believing God is rewarding them for being good, while the people watching at home want to believe they contributed to their team winning, with their prayers.

Saturday, March 5, 2016

Does God’s Omnibenevolence Contradict His Omnipotence?

From guest blogger, TJ.

If God cannot do certain things because he is “all-good” than it seems that he is not all-powerful.  There are a certain number of things that it seems God cannot do.  God cannot sin therefore he is not all-powerful. 

One might argue, God is all powerful therefore he can do all “doable” things.  God is also all-good therefore bad things are not “doable.”  Thus, God’s omnibenevolence does not contradict his omnipotence. 

However, one could now argue that the fact that God cannot do bad things takes away from his free will.  And it seems that a being with free will is somewhat “more good” than a being without free will.  For example, as we discussed a person with a switch in their head that keeps them from doing bad doesn’t seem as good as a person that has no switch but chooses do good over bad.  Why?  Because the person with the choice seems to have more power.  He can do bad things as well as good things (he can do more).  Also, he has the choice and chooses to good.  That seems “more good” than the person that can only do good.

I would argue that God does have free will, and that he is omnibenevolent and omnipotent.  He is capable of doing good things as well bad things therefore God does have free will and he is omnipotent.  And the fact that God chooses to do good things over bad things makes him “more good.”  However, God does sometimes choose to do evil.  This does not make him any less good because these evils are necessary for there to be good.  They are morally justified.  In order fot there to be good there must be bad.  There is always a purpose.  

Friday, March 4, 2016

God's Omnipotence and A Worry in Considering Possible Worlds

From guest blogger, Lindsey.

There are several ways that one can go about trying to prove God’s omnipotence, but with each argument in favor of it, there seems to be a counter-argument as well. In Concerning the Preservation of God’s Omnipotence, Steinberg states that,
The doctrine of God’s omnipotence would appear to imply that God is able to do anything. Numerous attempts to refute this doctrine have been made by offering purported examples of things that God cannot do…
1.      God cannot do what is logically impossible
2.      God cannot do things that are incompatible with being essentially omnipotent
3.      God cannot do things that are incompatible with being essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent” (Steinberg 2007).

One may argue with the third point on a definitional basis. By saying that God cannot do things that are incompatible with these “omni-X” characteristics, it is implying that there is something that God cannot do. This is in tension with the initial statement that God’s omnipotence makes Him able to do anything. If being omnibenevolent means that He cannot sin, it would seem that He cannot be both omnibenevolent and omnipotent.

God does not sin in this world but does this mean that He does not or He cannot? Those wishing to argue the point say that they cannot imagine a possible world where God would, for example, commit a murder—something that could be said to be a sin across the board. They would argue that there is no possible world in which God would do this act because it is so bad that it would always constitute a sin. Again, if God were to sin He would not be considered omnibenevolent which is thought to be a necessary characteristic of His. Because there is no possible world that one can imagine, the argument says that He must not be able to sin.


I argue that this ‘possible worlds’ scenario can get out of hand. By saying “I can imagine a possible world where X” or “I cannot imagine a possible world where X” one lets their imagination—which is seemingly limitless—do all the work rather than actual logic. Does it not seem possible that one imagines a possible world where our logic does not apply and 2+2 could equal 7? It does not make sense in our world but a world where this is so could feasibly be imagined. Similarly, perhaps we can imagine a possible world where God commits a murder but it is not a sin. I think that rather than trying to imagine possible worlds where something may or may not happen we ought to look to this world to form arguments for God’s existence. We are not attempting to prove His existence in another world but in this one. By getting caught up in thinking about what could be the case in possible worlds and using these conceptions (often without any grounding in reality) the usage of logic and experiences to prove the existence of God falls by the wayside. The possible worlds objection may be helpful in some cases, but one ought not get carried away with using it because there is always a possible world that could be imagined to disprove an argument—but does it really do any work if such a world does not exist anywhere but in one’s imagination? 

Thursday, March 3, 2016

The Value of Evil Forces

From guest blogger, Daniel.

The obvious question and objection to Satan and his cohorts being the cause of evil in the world, as brought up in Alvin Platinga’s paper "Satan," is why an omnipotent, all-good deity would allow evil forces to exist in the world from the onset. It is even stated that a creature who has more power, even if it is used for evil purposes, is more valuable to their world than a creature who is less powerful but uses its freedom and what power it does have for the good. The term “valuable” is an interesting one with regards to this topic. If a being has more control over the occurrences in their world, for better or for worse, then they are indeed more valuable in that respect. However, we must look at the world valuable as adding value to the whole rather than prescribing it independently based on a creature’s power and freedom first and then gauging how it contributes and uses that power second. Looking at the word valuable from this angle the argument can be made that even the smallest creature with the smallest amount of freedom and power, if used for good, is more valuable than any creature with a greater amount of power and freedom that works against God’s values.

The analogy used to explain the suffering caused to the people of the twentieth century Soviet Union to achieve a Marxist utopia can also be scaled to explain ‘natural evils.’ These maladies, natural disasters, disease etc., cannot be attributed to human action. Perhaps it is likely that God created Satan and his cohorts to do what he cannot, namely the evil acts that must sometimes be inflicted as a means to an end that is only known to God. Take the great flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah or any of the other ‘bad’ natural things that happened in the bible that humans would not know were for the greater good unless God had told us so; the cause for God’s allowing of these events could not possibly be known to humans and as such we perceive unexplained natural disasters as bad things. There is, at least some likelihood, that God created and allows these creatures to operate for reasons we are simply not able to comprehend.



Wednesday, March 2, 2016

Incompatibility of Omnipotence and Omnibenevolence

From guest blogger, Timothy.

Since our discussion in lecture last Thursday, I’ve been considering how one might reconcile traditional theology with the potential incompatibility between God’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence. No answer I can think of succeeds in making these two concepts compatible. The problem stems from God being all powerful, and thus having the capacity to do evil things, and God being all good, and not ever actually doing anything evil. If we take these two attributes to necessary to God being God, then we run into the modal issues we discussed.

We might say that God is able to do evil, he simply never chooses the evil action. But if God is free to choose the evil action, there must be some possible world where God does take the evil action. However, if God’s omnibenevolence is a necessary property, it must be the case that God never does anything evil in all possible worlds. This creates a contradiction suggests that it cannot be the case that both omnipotence and omnibenevolence are necessary properties of God. Either God is all powerful and can perform evil actions, or God is all good and lacks the capacity to perform evil actions.

Another move that was suggested in lecture was to adopt a Divine Command Theory of morality. I’m not as familiar with modern conceptions of Divine Command Theory, but the basic theory runs into problems of moral arbitrariness, which is what allows it to potentially reconcile the problem of omnipotence and omnibenevolence. However, I feel most religious believers would want to resist a claim that morality is arbitrary. Again, we can either accept that whatever God does in any possible world is what is morally right and there is no necessary moral truths, or we accept that omnipotence and omnibenevolence is not compatible.

One final move we might take is to say that God is not the type of being that can perform evil actions. This seems to be in line with the view of omnipotence that says a being can do anything that is in its power to do. This doesn’t seem to diminish God’s power with regard to any other being. Consider the heavy stone or, as I prefer, a more absurd example: can God cook a chili so spicy that He can’t eat it? It’s relatively uncontroversial that God isn’t the type of being that eats chili. And I think creating a universe makes God a more powerful being than one that cooks chili or lifts heavy stones. However, the problem here is it already seems to remove omnibenevolence as a property of God. If we say God is not the type of being that performs evil actions, it seems we would also be saying that God is not the type of being that performs moral actions. Thus, God we cannot say that God always performs good actions, just as we could not say God never performs evil actions. In this case, God’s actions would be morally neutral. Here we avoid the problem by accepting a conclusion that is not compatible with traditional theology.

Monday, February 29, 2016

The Problem of Evil and the Free Will Defense

From guest blogger, Ezekial. 

When considering the problem of evil, a common answer is that the granting humans the free will and moral agency to make moral choices is necessary to bringing about the greatest good or perfection, and that makes evil a logical necessity of granting humans this freedom. In this view, it must be the case that it is at least possible that the amount of freedom god gives us is just the right amount.

Being in the “sweet spot” might mean that we lack the freedom (of will or action) for gratuitous evil or capacity to cause suffering, but we have enough freedom to do enough damage to make our morally good actions significant.

Consider a world in which god gave us more freedom and power, such that we can cause more pain and suffering than we do now. Perhaps we have the abilities of super-rape, murder, or the power to harm people more so than we do now. It could just be that people are more apt or willing to use the powers to do moral evils than they do in the current world. Certainly we can imagine a world in which there is more suffering as a result of human conduct, and that should be reason enough to believe that god did not give us too much freedom.

Now consider a world in which we have less freedom, such that we either don’t have the capacity for raping, murdering, and other tier 1 moral sins, or we are just predisposed against those actions so much so that it is very unlikely for a person to be moved to such actions. In this world there would be less or little suffering compared to reality, but the argument could be made that lacking the freedom to commit these evils makes the good less meaningful. God allows people into heaven because they are good, more or less. So if people don’t really have to make choices between good and evil because they are always good and have to very much against their nature to commit evil, it doesn’t make sense for god to arbitrate people to heaven or hell, because people lack the sufficient moral agency to be worthy of such a judgement. It would be like God making everyone without the capacity for evil and then rewarding them for not being evil.


There are many other arguments regarding the evil in the world that can be leveled against god, but it should at least seem plausible that god gave humans the right amount of freedom because we can think of possible worlds that are worse as a result of having more or less freedom than our world. 

Thursday, April 19, 2012

God and Neuroscience

This is from the blog Think: Just Do It! It's fascinating issue...


"Research shows that people can be made to have a "religious experience"--or "God experience"--by stimulating their brain using transcranial magnetic stimulation.




One might think that this research goes against arguments for the existence of God that appeal to religious experience. In other words, one could argue as follows:
  1. Religious experience counts as strong evidence for the existence of God only if the sensed-presence experience cannot be produced on demand.
  2. The sensed-presence experience can be produced on demand.
  3. Therefore, religious experience is not strong evidence for the existence of God.
What do you make of this argument? Is it sound?"