Steinberg’s thesis, that we either live in the best of all possible worlds or God is not our creator, seems the logical conclusion to his premises regarding the impossibility of God’s creating a surpassable world and the difficulty we have in believing he did not create any world. The difficulty in reconciling his not creating any world lies with his perfect nature and the idea that creation is better than non-creation. It seems to me, then, that we must throw out the second part of this conclusion if we are to give any weight to the traditional conception of a perfect God. Thus, it must follow that God did create our world and that it is the best of all possible worlds.
In defense of our world being the best of all possible worlds by necessity of its creation at God’s hands, I would like to take a look at the Howard-Snyders’ example of Jove and Thor and provide an alternative theory of what would take place if Thor was truly omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. The main flaw I find in the Howard-Snyders’ example is that they attribute the quality of infinity to the number of possible worlds but not to the power of selection or knowledge of their would-be Gods (Thor and Jove). Why does it not follow that Thor can take a non-random minimum value, then randomly select a higher value, and continue that method an infinite amount of times to create a world as infinitely positive as he is powerful? This is the problem that I have with deeming a morally insurpassable being a chimera, because it basically rejects the Anselmian view of God on the basis of a thought experiment wherein infinite power was denied to the agent in the first place.
Other possibilities for our world being the best of all possible worlds could include either that it is constantly improving or that our human world is not the best of all possible worlds, but part of the best possible universe. In the first case, we could conceive of a world in which God was constantly improving our world by an exponentially increasing degree (wherein the exponent is infinite). If we wanted to get real freaky with it we could even say that at each point t there corresponds a point l is later than point t. And at every l, we view t as being equally good to l because our world has improved so much that our view of the past is always positive and we have no reference of a worse world to mitigate the improvements made by point l. Thus we have no negative feelings toward the past corresponding to our improved state at l. This is an extreme example, and we can still conceive of a constantly improving world wherein we are unaware of the improvement simply due to our relative positioning inside of the improving world. A final possibility is that our world is not the best possible world, but a piece inside of the best possible universe including a salvation occurring after death. It is possible, consistent with Gods nature, and fairly unoriginal, to suppose that we live in a flawed world full of challenges that ultimately lead to appropriated salvation wherein everyone meets the final end they deserve.