I want to take one more stab at identifying and individuating disembodied minds. There are a variety of experiences which one mind may experience simultaneously as Steinberg and Steinberg show. Even seemingly incompatible thoughts may be experienced in the same mind simultaneously, like a desire to eat and not eat ice cream. Minds are complex, and a simple self-examination may suffice to show this happens fairly often. So we cannot individuate minds when there are conscious experiences that are seemingly incompatible. To put this in somewhat technical terms, a variety of token experiences of seemingly incompatible types may be occurring simultaneously in the same mind. It may even be possible for two token experiences of the same experience to be occurring simultaneously. We can imagine two sets of eyes looking at green walls. There are two tokens of the ‘green visual experience’ type occurring simultaneously in the mind. However, as I pointed out in class, if we conceive of experiencing the ‘aha! I think, therefore I am’ moment of understanding Descartes’ cogito as a type of experience, then it seems to me like this might be a type of experience for which any mind can only have one token experience occurring at one time. What would it be for a mind to be having two token experiences of ‘Aha! I exist because I think!’ simultaneously? Perhaps this is possible, but unlike the other seemingly incompatible experiences the Steinbergs consider, I cannot imagine myself having this experience twice simultaneously in my mind. If it is true that a mind can only experience one token of this type at a time, then if at time t1 there are multiple token conscious experiences of this type, then we may have grounds for individuating disembodied minds. I hate creating arguments against conclusions I like, so please help show me what is wrong with my argument.