Has Philosophy Lost It's Way?

An interesting article in the New York Times. (Thanks to David Agronin for the pointer).

The Problem of Evil and the Free Will Defense

From guest blogger, Ezekial. 

When considering the problem of evil, a common answer is that the granting humans the free will and moral agency to make moral choices is necessary to bringing about the greatest good or perfection, and that makes evil a logical necessity of granting humans this freedom. In this view, it must be the case that it is at least possible that the amount of freedom god gives us is just the right amount.

Being in the “sweet spot” might mean that we lack the freedom (of will or action) for gratuitous evil or capacity to cause suffering, but we have enough freedom to do enough damage to make our morally good actions significant.

Consider a world in which god gave us more freedom and power, such that we can cause more pain and suffering than we do now. Perhaps we have the abilities of super-rape, murder, or the power to harm people more so than we do now. It could just be that people are more apt or willing to use the powers to do moral evils than they do in the current world. Certainly we can imagine a world in which there is more suffering as a result of human conduct, and that should be reason enough to believe that god did not give us too much freedom.

Now consider a world in which we have less freedom, such that we either don’t have the capacity for raping, murdering, and other tier 1 moral sins, or we are just predisposed against those actions so much so that it is very unlikely for a person to be moved to such actions. In this world there would be less or little suffering compared to reality, but the argument could be made that lacking the freedom to commit these evils makes the good less meaningful. God allows people into heaven because they are good, more or less. So if people don’t really have to make choices between good and evil because they are always good and have to very much against their nature to commit evil, it doesn’t make sense for god to arbitrate people to heaven or hell, because people lack the sufficient moral agency to be worthy of such a judgement. It would be like God making everyone without the capacity for evil and then rewarding them for not being evil.

There are many other arguments regarding the evil in the world that can be leveled against god, but it should at least seem plausible that god gave humans the right amount of freedom because we can think of possible worlds that are worse as a result of having more or less freedom than our world. 

Verifiability and Arguments for God's Existence

From guest blogger, Casey.

Many of the arguments we have gone over for the existence of god, whether a priori or a posteriori do not seem verifiable. For instance, Anselm’s argument that god is the greatest being thought of, to exist is greater than to not exist, and therefore god must exist, doesn’t seem falsifiable. It could be the case it would for some reason be greater not to exist, or it just might be a false string of logic. The cosmological arguments also seem improvable. We have not yet observed an unmoved mover, a completely necessary being, or anything that can be considered perfect, in the universe (we have observed remnants of a first cause [i.e., the Big Bang] but what caused that?). The teleological argument stems from observing nature, but it is still inductive and cannot be observed directly. No one has ever seen god constructing things out in nature (one might argue Adam and Eve had, but I am not going to go into biblical arguments). So what is the big deal? Plenty of folks are strict rationalists?

I am not really sure if this necessarily will lead to a serious problem, but the fact is that we will never be able to test these theories, or at least not without some sort of miracle in science. I am questioning if some sort of justification that will never lead to knowledge can be used to fully justify a belief. Since there is always a slim chance things might be different, one cannot be 100% sure of his/her belief. This does not mean one is not justified in believing a certain proposition based on unverifiable justification. I just question if one can be fully certain. Maybe this is why so many religions put so much emphasis on faith.

Some Thoughts About the Cosmological Argument

From guest blogger, Shao.

I think the biggest controversy about the cosmological argument is: Do we have to have an explanation for everything that exists? This question can lead to many small questions, such as do we need an independent being to create all the dependent beings? Or, can all the dependent beings just exist as a group without an independent being? First of all, I think there is nothing wrong to assume that all the things that we know (water bottle, cars, planets and stars.etc) came to existence by the cause of some other things (which I think we can scientifically prove how the water bottle, cars, planets and stars came into existence). I think the problem here is not the causal relationship, but our lack of ability to conceive something that is infinite. Sure, we understand that when we say something is infinite, it means such thing (pi for instance) will go on forever. Then the point is, what is forever? Since we already have proven scientifically that the universe had a beginning and it was the big bang. Then the problem is: what's before the big bang? Is big bang the start? And if it is, then it means the universe has a beginning and thus it is not infinite. So although we can easily understand that every physical thing around us is dependent, which it does not create itself, we cannot perceive that such casual relationship goes on infinitely. I therefore disagree with the argument that "if we've explained the existence of every member of a collection we've explained the existence of the collection-there's nothing left over to be explained." In other words, I think the problem with this argument is that it assumes that all dependent beings can exist as a collection without a first cause. Well, first, we only know that dependent things do not exist in a loop, which means that the grandson does not cause the existence of the grandfather. Therefore, it seems that we can never use logic to find an explanation for the series because this series goes on infinitely. Furthermore, even if things do miraculously cause each other's existence in a loop, do they also require a spark to start the loop? And even if such a loop does not need a start,then is this loop itself an independent being? It seems that our logic does not work perfectly once we arrive at the problem of the first cause, which I think we always need to make exceptions to our premises. Whether we think there is an independent being or not, we just can't make a valid argument. 

Why Kids Should Learn Philosophy

Here's an interesting article in the Washington Post.

Kant's Reply to Anselm's Ontological Argument

I'm teaching a philosophy of religion course this term and we're beginning with a discussion of Anselm's ontological argument. The IEP entry has a pretty clear statement of this argument:

1. It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak, true by definition) that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible being that can be imagined).
2. God exists as an idea in the mind.
3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.
4. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (that is, a greatest possible being that does exist).
5. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)
6. Therefore, God exists.

Kant famously objected to premise (3) and claimed that existence is not a "real or defining predicate." On his view, the concept of God cannot include existence. The upshot here seems to be that existence is not a "great-making property" because it's not really a property at all. According to Kant, what we do when we say something like "God exists" is to simply affirm that the entity described by the various properties belonging to the concept (omnipotence, moral perfection, creator of the universe, etc.) is actual or real. It's not as if we're ascribing to God some further property--i.e., the property of existence--on Kant's view.

Here's how Kant's main point is spelled out in the IEP entry:

"The idea here is that existence is very different from, say, the property of lovingness. A being that is loving is, other things being equal, better or greater than a being that is not. But it seems very strange to think that a loving being that exists is, other things being equal, better or greater than a loving being that doesn't exist. But to the extent that existence doesn't add to the greatness of a thing, the classic version of the ontological argument fails."

But is it true that existence doesn't add to the greatness of a thing? Consider two possible loving beings, one exists and the other does not. The real loving being could express its love and bring about various positive things in the world whereas the non-existent loving being is not able to do such things. It could be argued that the former is better--in some sense--than the latter precisely because it can do such things and this is due to the fact that it exists. It might then seem that existence is a great-making property after all.

I can think of a few objections to this move. Perhaps Kant might reply that it's not the property of existence which makes the former better, but rather it's the fact that the being engages in certain activities and that these activities have certain results. So it's not as if the former (qua loving being) is better than the latter (qua loving being). They're both the same on the "loving-being-front."

But I don't find this reply persuasive. With respect to lovingness we might say that the two beings are on par--they're both loving. But it still seems that when we compare the two beings and all of their properties taken together, the one which is actual is, in some sense, better than the one who isn't. I'd rather have the former as a friend. Imaginary friends, however loving, aren't as good to have as real, loving friends.

Of course, there's a lot to say about what we might mean by "better" here, but I'll save that for another day. For now, I wonder what you think about whether (a) existence is a property and (b) whether it's the sort of property which "adds to the greatness" of a thing or is a "great-making property."

Culture and Morality

From guest blogger, Zach.

In today’s society, culture and customs vary immensely worldwide. These customs span from dress, to religious beliefs, to gender roles. Food and its ingredients are a major difference among cultures. Delicacies such as the cheeseburger are mouthwatering to most Americans, while utterly offensive to most in India, where cows are sacred. While we keep dogs as pets in America, some are horrified to find out that dog meat is common in places such as China. This shows how hard it would be to set baseline moral principles regarding eating meat from certain animals, because animals are valued differently worldwide. 

Personally, I believe that all customs should be respected and honored. However some practices, such as shark fin soup, target animals who are becoming endangered. I believe that we have a moral obligation to protect animals who are endangered, and that this moral principle trumps cultural tradition. Meat can be substituted or supplemented easily. While this may not hold the same exact meaning as before, cultures can shift. Besides, if a culture’s culinary practices rely on an endangered animal, the practice would have to be shifted once the animal inevitably becomes extinct. Therefore, byproactively altering custom, a culture arrives at the same result they otherwise would have, all the while saving an animal species from extreme endangerment or extinction.

More On Norcross

From guest blogger, Zach.

In his article “Puppies, Pig, and People” Norcross discusses ignorance, and when it is okay to use it as an excuse for perpetrating the suffering of animals. Norcross explains that there are two types of ignorance: forgivable and unforgivable. Forgivable ignorance is an instance in which an individual has no knowledge of the suffering that they are buying into, and no means of accessing this information, such as a child. Unforgivable ignorance is when an individual may not be informed about the choices that they’re making, but have the resources and capability to be.

I agree with Norcross on this principle. I think that children exhibit forgivable ignorance, and quite frankly shouldn’t be held accountable for worrying about what they’re eating. This is not to say that they cannot make a difference, however. Parents directly control what their children eat, so if a parent knowingly feeds their child factory farmed meat, they are making the decision to perpetuate torture for them and their child.

The concept of unforgivable ignorance, I believe, is more controversial. In today’s society, with the internet and comprehensive food labeling, “not knowing” where your food is coming from is not possible unless by choice. Individuals often assume that being educated about what they eat is a choice they aren’t willing to make. Wrong, it is a choice we make not to seek out the origins of our food, not the other way around.

Under this philosophy, most of us are unforgivably ignorant to most of the food that we eat.

Fred's Basement and Norcross's Argument Against Meat-eating

From guest blogger, Zach.

In Norcross’s paper “Puppies, Pigs, and People," he argues that it’s wrong to cause a great deal of suffering purely for gustatory pleasure. I strongly agree with his argument, and think that gustatory pleasure is not a justifiable excuse for factory farming. 

Norcross uses the analogy of torturing puppies for chocolate consumption. He explains that “Fred” tortures puppies so he can eat chocolate. When arrested, Norcross claims that what Fred did was no different from individuals eating factory farmed meat.

To Norcross, enjoying the products of suffering is just as immoral even if you didn’t cause the suffering directly. This can be applied to most modern-day food consumers, who buy meat at grocery stores and restaurants. There aren’t any clear indications of suffering in the meat these people buy, but a great deal of suffering has most likely occurred. These consumers, in Norcross’ eyes, are morally in the wrong.

One of the two major arguments against Norcross’s piece is the disanalogy between what Fred did and us as humans, eating meat. I disagree, I think that what Fred did translates perfectly to us eating meat. Torturing animals and raising them in terrible conditions just so we can have gustatory pleasure (i.e., eating chocolate) is wrong. The second major argument against this principle is to simply deny it, stating that your taste trumps suffering. There isn’t really much of a possible rebuttal against a statement as apathetic as this, except to point out that if the situation were reversed, you would want someone to vouch for your interest not to suffer, as well.