Steinberg uses the definition of disembodied mind as follows.
X is a soul = 1. X is a substance; 2. X is unlocated; 3. X is capable of consciousness
It is also pointed out that the disembodied mind exists outside of space, since it is unlocated, while still existing in time. This means that the substance in question would still have temporal properties and would be able to be identified over time. This sense of identity is the heart and soul of the paper. You may remember that Jesse’s dad, Alan Steinberg, claimed that once you agree with this premise of identity, then they had “got you”. This is because their argument against the soul rejects first that disembodied minds can be distinguished from one another, and secondly, that a disembodied mind can even exist outside of space while still existing in time. So, if you agree to the above premises, you will inevitably run into the same contradictions or inabilities to identify the disembodied minds.
I think this line of argument confuses the notion of the soul. So, I would like to present an alternative view or even a more practical view of the soul. First I would like to address certain criteria for this view. In order for x to be a soul it must: be able to exist alone outside of the universe or as the only thing in the universe, exist eternally/timelessly, and be able to interact with beings/bodies other than itself. The last criteria is in place of consciousness or self awareness because if a soul were self aware or conscious it would be able to ask the question of "what am I" in the same way our physical bodies would act, which would not make sense for the following reasons. The soul, under this criterion, is a principle of one's being or rather the state of being from which one's body acts. This means that the soul is not conscious in the way humans are conscious. They are the principles that constitute our being. For example, the rules of a certain game could be seen as the principles or soul of a game. These rules constitute the way the players or bodies interact with each other. Another example would be the principles that a group of people live by such as a culture, nation, community, etc, would be the soul of that community. The soul or actual self, in this view, does not have the same characteristics as human bodies or minds have, even though these very characteristics result from a beings soul. In this view, all beings have souls whether they are "living" or not. For example, everything from cultures, animals, plants, even molecules have souls. So, in the same way it would be inappropriate to say the rules of a game to ask "what am I" it would be inappropriate for a soul to ask that question. I think it is also worth noting that under this view, all souls contain an indefinite amount of souls. This means that all the principles of each soul exists within the containing soul. For example, a flower's soul contains all the souls of each atom, molecule, cell, etc. that constitutes it.
There is much more to be said here but I would like to get initial feedback on what I have proposed as an alternative to the disembodied mind model. I think that this model can show that souls don't fall into the problems with existing in time and not space, and being able to differentiate between souls. I would have gone into this but If what I have proposed so far is either incoherent or filled with too many problems I don't want to waste my time getting the other arguments off the ground.