Mill, Hedonism, and so-called Higher Pleasures

**This is from guest blogger, Nathan V.**

In "Utiliarianism," Mill argues that some pleasures are more valuable than others. He says this relationship can be determined by people who are "equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both." He further argues that pleasures that make use of one's higher faculties are more valuable than those that make use of one's more base faculties. Mill says that someone who makes use of their higher faculties is in a better position than someone who doesn't to make qualitative judgments about various pleasures. This is because he is able to experience higher pleasures as well as more base pleasures whereas someone who doesn't make use of their higher faculties is only able to experience base pleasures and is therefore not in a position to make such judgments.

One issue with his view seems to be that only those who subscribe to the idea that pleasures obtained through the use of one's higher faculties are better and more worth pursuing than those obtained through the use of one's more base faculties are said to be capable of making such judgments. What is to be made of those who after tasting the higher pleasures choose instead to pursue the more base pleasures? An example of this that I thought of while reading Mill is the episode of the Simpsons where Homer gets the crayon that has been lodged in his brain since childhood removed. After the crayon is removed Homer becomes a genius, but by the end of the episode he has it placed back into his brain as he has decided that he was happier when he was stupid. In this case, it seems that the pleasure Homer experiences from not accessing his higher faculties is more valuable than the pleasure he experienced when he was accessing them. While Mills would first seem to directly oppose this idea saying, "no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool," he later says that if someone did consent to be a fool, it would occur "only in cases of unhappiness so extreme that, to escape from it, they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes." In this case, the choice to be a fool would seem to lead more pleasure and therefore be more valuable than remaining intelligent.

Mill’s way out of this seeming contradiction is to define a being of higher faculties as someone who could never lower themselves to a more base existence out of a sense of dignity. Mill says, somewhat circularly, that dignity is an essential part of happiness to people who have a strong sense of dignity. While he then goes on to describe ways in which a being of higher faculties may pursue more base pleasures to the exclusion of higher pleasures due to things like temptation, habit, and "infirmity of character," he rejects the idea that these should be considered valid judgments of what type of pleasure is more valuable. Mill seems to believe that the only people capable of judging the qualitative value of various pleasures are those who judge the pleasures that result from one's higher faculties as being better than those that result from one's more base faculties.argues that some pleasures are more valuable than others. He says this relationship can be determined by people who are "equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both." He further argues that pleasures that make use of one's higher faculties are more valuable than those that make use of one's more base faculties. Mill says that someone who makes use of their higher faculties is in a better position than someone who doesn't to make qualitative judgments about various pleasures. This is because he is able to experience higher pleasures as well as more base pleasures whereas someone who doesn't make use of their higher faculties is only able to experience base pleasures and is therefore not in a position to make such judgments.