How should we approach religion?

By guest blogger, Natalie.

We have viewed many different views on religion in the course.  Dawkins made it clear that he believes that faith is the greatest vice, so I suppose he would advocate that religion be abandoned altogether.  Gould offered his solution of non-overlapping magisteria, which I believe a person can respect as an approach without respecting religion at all.  Still, others take any seemingly contradictory claims and explain them away as being apparently contradictory, but not contradictory in reality because of some, often long and complicated, explanation. 

It’s clear that many people are convinced that religion is ridiculous and has no place in a rational world.  As the course ends, what we have covered this semester shows that many religious claims seem unreasonable.  However, at the same time, proving that they are all logically impossible seems as difficult as proving that they are true. 

The question I would like to pose here is:  What is the solution?  How should we approach religion?  I think most answers will build on one of these options: 

1.      Do away with religion.

2.      Reconcile religion with logic/reason/science (though not necessarily accepting religion as true, but only as possible since it has yet to be proven false)

3.      Say some religious concepts are “sui generous”, meaning beyond our understanding, and admit that logic may not be applicable.

Option 1 seems unlikely given the persistence of religion through history.  Option 2 is what Gould attempted to do with NOMA, but this has been met with opposition.  Option 3 may be a copout, and when it is made people pose the “what can we know then?” objection (I’m not yet convinced that it should be discounted so easily.  This slippery slope claim appears to be fearful posturing because people find option 3 incredibly unsatisfying.  Option 3 is not a conclusive answer to the question, but rather, it is an admission that people don’t have the capacity to answer the question.)  Are there 4^th, 5^th, 6^th, and/or more options on which an answer can be built that I haven’t thought of?  What is your answer?  How should we approach religion? 

Are Religious People Happier?

From guest blogger, Andrea. I found this short article on Huffington Post about religion and happiness. The author analyses the claims “Religious people are happier people” and “Religion protects people from depression”. But a 2003 meta  analysis doesn’t find a strong correlation between happy people and those belonging to a religion vs those that do not. When comparing religious people of different countries, in the US it was found more religious people are slightly happier, and in the Netherlands and Denmark there was no association between religiousness and happiness. Why is that? A possible explanation is “Feeling part of the mainstream may be comforting whereas being in the minority is potentially stressful” Another study in 2010 showed that the least religious countries were actually the happiest. The study found it was more because of government security and secure standard of living. The principal source of European happiness is also the main reason for their unprecedented level of atheism. As detailed in an earlier post, when countries become more affluent, and their people acquire greater material security, their religious temperature nose dives. What do you guys think about this? Or happiness and religion altogether? Should a religion focus on making followers happy and less stressed? If that’s the case then, is it a benefit or detriment for preachers to preach down from the pulpit about all the sin in the world, and death, and eternal suffering of unrepentant sinners and how God unleashes fury against the world, etc?

The Existence of Souls and Evolution

From guest blogger, Caitlin.

I have a lot of difficulty understanding how souls could exist. I read an excerpt from a book while working on my paper that critiqued a few arguments against the existence of souls and then went on to explain why these arguments don’t work. They eventually claimed that the existence of souls is “logically possible” but they do not believe that they exist. I understand how if you believe in God or some kind of higher being you could believe in souls, but if you don’t I find it incredibly difficult to support the existence of souls. I am using the definition of souls as nonphysical entities that are not locatable, which are capable of consciousness.  If you don’t believe in God or anything along the lines of heaven what happens to your soul when you die? Once you die your soul can’t just leave your body and float away because by definition souls are immaterial and unlocatable. If you believe in a higher power you can escape many problems with souls by saying simply “it just is” or “God just made it that way” and be done with it. But that isn’t good enough for me.    

 

I’ve been trying to figure out if souls could be a result from natural evolution. Perhaps we evolved to have souls for survival. If this is a possibility then it also could be a possibility that souls are inherited, but I find a lot of problems with this too. If our essence is somehow inscribed in our genes then how could we ever be responsible for our actions? We can’t change our genetics, I can’t will myself to grow a few inches so it doesn’t make sense that I could will my soul to be good if it is bad. This inherently seems wrong. People should be held responsible for their actions, we are capable of reason and figuring out what is morally right and acting accordingly, but if our essence is genetic then we can’t possibly be held responsible for our actions just like how we can’t be blamed for our history of heart disease or freckles.

The more I think about the concept of souls the more I find that I really don’t agree with the claim that souls are “logically possible”, especially when you take a higher power out of the equation.  

Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology and Religious Exclusivism

From guest blogger, Zach.

It seems to me that Plantinga's “Reformed Epistemology,” especially when combined with his views on exclusivity, leaves something to be desired.  Admittedly, the papers we read in class should be taken as a broad painting of Plantinga's picture.  But, I believe (ha!) a more specific discussion must be had before we can consider Plantiga's view to be plausible.  Namely, we need a definition or explanation of what counts as a “religious experience” that one might use to to ground a properly basic belief.

I think the discussion of religious exclusivity highlights this need quite clearly.  Without a concrete notion of what might constitute a religious experience worth of causing a properly basic belief, it seems  that many sorts of potential experiences could cause basic beliefs that are mutually exclusive.  For example, if the personal happiness gained from performing traditional religious practices (e.g. attending church, prayer, meditation, recitation of religious doctrine, etc.) can count as a sort of religious experience, many different, contradictory views seem to be justified (on Plantinga's account of justification); and if these views are justified, it seems folks holding any of the views should be (or could be) exclusivists about those differing, contradictory views.  For example, a basic Christian belief and a basic Jewish belief about whether or not Jesus is the son of God would be mutually exclusive, but could both be justified and held by religious exclusivists.  In this scenario, the believers on both sides see themselves as right, and the others as wrong,.  This doesn't help us understand anything, really, other than the fact that the believers on each side believe their respective beliefs.

My main problem, stated broadly, is that an epistemology that allows for many contradictory views to be justified seems to water down the term “justification,” and seems to drastically separate the ideas of knowledge (or, in this case, justified belief) and truth (i.e. the “fact of the matter,” if there is one).  This separation seems to be the opposite of what we generally want to approach in an epistemological theory, and seems like something we should avoid.

It seems plausible that with a specific definition of “religious experience,” we might be able to restrict the sorts of properly basic beliefs formed from such experiences, which might, in turn, eliminate the sorts of beliefs that might be mutually exclusive.

I know that my worry seems very broad, but, like Plantinga, I just wanted to point out a sort of general worry.  What do you guys think?  Do we need a definition of religious experience?  What would a definition of religious experience look like?  Would such a definition eliminate this general worry?

Pojman and Perceptual Beliefs

From guest blogger, Rashad.

I wanted to revisit Pojman’s argument about belief. I have been trying to wrap my mind around it for a while, but cannot quite understand his definition of belief when considering Clifford’s Ethics of Belief. Pojman defines belief as “an involuntary assenting of the mind to a certain proposition.” He basically says that beliefs are forced upon us by the world. He provides two examples of perceptual beliefs: he sees the white paper he is writing on (1), and he hears music after someone has played it (2). Yes, I agree that these two cannot be denied, that yes they are forced and involuntary. However, what makes them forced and involuntary is the fact that they involve the senses of sight and sound.

What happens when a person sees something and believes it is one thing. Undoubtedly, the person is forced to believe something is there because he or she SEES it. What Pojman seems to disregard here is exactly what it is the person believes he or she is seeing given the context. My example to illustrate this will be from the Hindu story “Snake Mistaken for a Rope”: A man once walked down a road. Freezing in his tracks, he saw an object in the middle of the road that was long. Because the object was long, the man took the object to be a snake. In this situation, this man was forced to believe he saw something because of his sense of sight to SEE and the fact that an object was physically there. No one forced him to believe WHAT it is that he saw. This man chose to believe he saw a snake; the proposition of there being an object was forced while the proposition of that object being a snake was not forced. Here, we see Clifford’s ethics of belief in action. This man chose to believe given
insufficient evidence without “further investigation.” Because an objects looks like something, or has a quality of something you are familiar with does mean it is what you think it is. So why would you believe it is that thing without concrete evidence?! Overall, this man voluntarily believed the object was a snake.

Pojman does not consider such cases in his claim. To this extent, belief is volitional. Given my argument, how would others agree or disagree. Help me better understand Pojman given Clifford’s account and the example provided.

God As Infinite

From guest blogger, Alexander.

While we haven't recently discussed God's properties in class, this post is related to a claim that has always puzzled me and will also probably be featured in my R&R paper. I have never understood how God can be infinite in existence and yet the world and everything else can also exist. These two ideas seem inconsistent to me, and yet I think infinite existence is supported in Judeo-Christian religious tradition. 

If something is infinite in its own kind, then it must include all things of its type. If something of its type were to exist independent of the set contained in infinite, then this would limit infinity and instead make it finite. Therefore, any other thing existing outside the infinite existence of God would seem to limit God's infinite existence. The world and its inhabitants are clearly imperfect and don't have many of the same qualities as God, so they must be different from God. But if the world exists and is independent of God, then it limits God's infinite existence.

Does anybody know if there is any justification for the religious claim? Am I misinterpreting infinity or the way religion considers existence? Are there two types of existence being referred to, and does this get religion out of the contradiction?

Clifford and the Morality of Certain Beliefs

From guest blogger, Aviva

I’d like to elaborate my position on a discussion we had in class. Many of us had very visceral objections to Clifford’s argument that it is immoral to hold beliefs without sufficient evidence. When we began discussing his stance in the lens of skepticism, people became more sure of their distaste for his position. Someone asked how it is possible to function within skepticism in the actual world. The answer to this seems obvious to me; to reference the example we used in class, I do not need to be 100% beyond a shadow of a doubt sure that my water bottle is next to me in order to satisfy my thirst with it. In this superficial circumstance, it seems silly not to allow skepticism as a valid worldview. However, the gravity of this idea greatens when considered in the realm of religion.

It is well acknowledged that religion, though basically intended to be (or appears to have been intended to be) a morally sound belief set, is quickly abused and harmful when enacted too literally/fundamentally. Though one could easily argue that it is silly to be entirely sure that one’s water bottle exist, that person is much harder pressed to compellingly argue that one ought to be entirely sure one’s religion is correct or the truest.

With this understanding, it seems entirely rational to me that if the harm caused by an extreme is great enough, than the rule ought to be applied even to lesser outcomes. I.e., the harms caused by believing my water bottle is absolutely beyond a shadow of a doubt real vs. the harms caused by not being entirely sure my water bottle is real is insignificant. However, when viewed on the other end of the significance spectrum, skepticism holds much greater value. For me to be absolutely beyond a shadow of a doubt sure that my religion is “correct” however, holds far more dangers (hatred, violence, marginalization, etc.) than to be unsure.

Taken in this simple understanding, I wonder how the opposition argues my opinion.

Can God be Just?

From guest blogger, Annalee.

I am revising and resubmitting my first paper where I asserted that there does not exist a compelling mechanism for God’s justice whereby God can be construed as just. Given the argument that will proceed my question to you, the bloggers, is:

(1) What criteria do you think would be required in order to define a mechanism for God’s justice as compelling?

(2) What examples might exist of a compelling mechanism of God’s justice?

The quality of justice within God is crucial to clarify the incompatibility of his omnibenevolent and omnipotent nature. An instance where God has wronged humans, God has the ability to make the wrong right. However, given the possible mechanisms whereby God can make wrongs right, there does not appear to be a compelling mechanism whereby he can make wrongs right, and so God is not just. In making this argument I have been working off of three primary assumptions:

(1)    When referring to a wrongdoing, this does not necessarily refer to an action that is evil or bad. Any action by God that cannot be construed as good would be sufficient to defy God’s omnibenevolent. Therefore, a wrongdoing, for the sake of this argument, is a not good action. It will also be assumed that humans have the ability to distinguish good from not good and their interpretation of good and not good in regards to God’s actions is not subjective.

(2)   If God is necessarily omnibenevolent, then his actions towards all humans must necessarily be good or just for all individual humans.

(3)    When referring to a compelling mechanism (I am still working on this part), any knowledge or interpretation required for a human to perceive an action as good as opposed to not good must necessarily be possessed or accessible to the human affected by said action

In determining whether there does exist a compelling mechanism for God’s justice, I have considered 1) Intervening miracles, 2) Divine Gratitude, 3) Afterlife and rejected these three mechanisms for the following reasons:

  

Based on assumptions 1, 2 and 3, intervening miracles could not be a compelling mechanism for God’s justice because they are rare by definition. In being rare, they, in a statistical sense, do not have the ability to justify the amount of not good actions in this world. Additionally, as they are rare an individual would lack the ability to distinguish them from other natural phenomenon and would not be able to acquire the knowledge or interpretation required to recognize a wrong being made right by God and perceiving the previously not good action as currently good. As wrongdoing still exist and past wrongdoings have still been not made right, this mechanism does not appear to be effective.

Based on assumptions 1, 2, and 3, Divine Gratitude relies on an individual’s ability to recognize Jesus’ burning on the cross as a sacrifice for the individual’s sins in order to feel joy from God’s love. As this mechanism, by definition, requires that an individual have access to a certain perception and interpretation of experience, this becomes problematic. Many individuals are not religious, do not believe in God, and do not have access to this kind of knowledge and interpretation. As wrongdoing still exist and past wrongdoings have still been not made right, this mechanism does not appear to be effective.

Based on assumptions 1, 2, and 3, afterlife relies on an individuals’ ability to have access to knowledge about heaven. As many individuals are not religious, will not be admitted to heaven as stated by theological texts, and heaven is unlocated, all individuals to do not have access to this knowledge.

So, to reiterate to you, bloggers:

(1)    What criteria do you think would be required in order to define a mechanism for God’s justice as compelling?

(2)    What examples might exist of a compelling mechanism of God’s justice?

Notre Dame Phil Religion Fellowship 2014-15

The Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame announces up to five residential fellowships for the 2014 – 2015 academic year: the Alvin Plantinga Fellowship ($60,000), awarded to a distinguished senior scholar; up to two Research Fellowships ($40,000 - $50,000, depending on rank and circumstances); the Frederick J. Crosson Fellowship ($45,000) reserved for foreign scholars and those outside the field of philosophy; and one Visiting Graduate Fellowship ($20,000) awarded to a graduate student in philosophy with research interests in the philosophy of religion and who would profit from spending a year at the Center. For the Visiting Graduate Fellowship, we give preference to students who are at the dissertation writing stage. The committee looks for applicants working on philosophy of religion either in or in addition to the applicant’s dissertation. NOTE: you may apply for more than one fellowship for which you are eligible.

All application materials must be submitted via AcademicJobsOnline. To apply, please visit the following link:   https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/fellowships/2843.