From guest blogger, Aviva
I’d like to elaborate my position on a discussion we had in class. Many of us had very visceral objections to Clifford’s argument that it is immoral to hold beliefs without sufficient evidence. When we began discussing his stance in the lens of skepticism, people became more sure of their distaste for his position. Someone asked how it is possible to function within skepticism in the actual world. The answer to this seems obvious to me; to reference the example we used in class, I do not need to be 100% beyond a shadow of a doubt sure that my water bottle is next to me in order to satisfy my thirst with it. In this superficial circumstance, it seems silly not to allow skepticism as a valid worldview. However, the gravity of this idea greatens when considered in the realm of religion.
It is well acknowledged that religion, though basically intended to be (or appears to have been intended to be) a morally sound belief set, is quickly abused and harmful when enacted too literally/fundamentally. Though one could easily argue that it is silly to be entirely sure that one’s water bottle exist, that person is much harder pressed to compellingly argue that one ought to be entirely sure one’s religion is correct or the truest.
With this understanding, it seems entirely rational to me that if the harm caused by an extreme is great enough, than the rule ought to be applied even to lesser outcomes. I.e., the harms caused by believing my water bottle is absolutely beyond a shadow of a doubt real vs. the harms caused by not being entirely sure my water bottle is real is insignificant. However, when viewed on the other end of the significance spectrum, skepticism holds much greater value. For me to be absolutely beyond a shadow of a doubt sure that my religion is “correct” however, holds far more dangers (hatred, violence, marginalization, etc.) than to be unsure.
Taken in this simple understanding, I wonder how the opposition argues my opinion.
3 comments:
I share your thought that external-world skepticism isn't necessarily silly or absurd, but I'm struggling to understand its connection to skepticism about God's existence (or other religious truth). It seems possible that one could be an external-world skeptic ("argue that it is silly to be entirely sure that one's water bottle exist[s]") and, for completely different reasons, hold traditional Christian (or Jewish, Muslim, etc.) beliefs about the existence of God (among other things). If so, wouldn't that person also believe that they have a compelling argument for his or her religion, and that they do not have a compelling argument for external-world realism (or have an argument against external-world realism)?
Also, there seems to be an implicit sort of consequentialism in your idea of the justification of beliefs, namely that one ought to believe the belief that causes the greatest happiness or utility (to put it in utilitarian terms) or the belief that causes the least harm, regardless of what's "true." Though I'm interested in this idea, I'm sure some folks would argue against it, arguing that the truth should be the basis of belief/justification rather than the consequences of the belief.
I agree with Zach that there seems to be some consequentialism in this idea. I was actually discussing a topic similar to this with a friend this afternoon and I’ve always thought that your conscious intent is the most important assessor of one’s morality. But during this conversation we got into talking more about politics and less about philosophy and I found myself saying that a certain bill was implying certain things about a specific demographic (I’ll try and keep this about philosophy and not mention the political details of the conversation). My friend was playing devils advocate and was defending the politician that supports this bill and bills like these. But right after I just stated that intension was all that matters my friend pointed out that these bills intent is not to do X to the people but to do Y. And I said something like “I don’t care if this is not what they are intending to do, but it’s what they are doing!” I realized that consequentialism is right on a lot of topics so I would have to say that as long as the results of your beliefs are just or true then maybe it doesn’t always matter why someone has a belief of something.
I agree with Zach that there seems to be some consequentialism in this idea. I was actually discussing a topic similar to this with a friend this afternoon and I’ve always thought that your conscious intent is the most important assessor of one’s morality. But during this conversation we got into talking more about politics and less about philosophy and I found myself saying that a certain bill was implying certain things about a specific demographic (I’ll try and keep this about philosophy and not mention the political details of the conversation). My friend was playing devils advocate and was defending the politician that supports this bill and bills like these. But right after I just stated that intension was all that matters my friend pointed out that these bills intent is not to do X to the people but to do Y. And I said something like “I don’t care if this is not what they are intending to do, but it’s what they are doing!” I realized that consequentialism is right on a lot of topics so I would have to say that as long as the results of your beliefs are just or true then maybe it doesn’t always matter why someone has a belief of something.
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