Friday, February 3, 2012

Friday Paradox:

This one is from a great paper by Saul Kripke (see page 392 for a fuller description):

Pierre is from France and so speaks French. He sees pictures and postcards of a city called, ‘Londres.’ When asked in French whether he finds that city pretty, Pierre whole-heartedly and enthusiastically assents. He earnestly says things like, “Londres est jolie” (“London is pretty” in French). As a consequence, it seems correct to say that Pierre believes that London is pretty. After some time, Pierre moves to a town he knows by the name ‘London’—but he is not aware that it is the same town that he and other Frenchmen call ‘Londres.’ In addition, Pierre was unfortunate enough to have moved into a rather shoddy and rundown neighborhood, and so finds the town that he understands to be ‘London’ to be an extremely ugly place. Having learned quite a bit of English since his move, he adamantly assents to the English sentence, “London is not pretty.” As a result, it seems natural to say that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. Moreover, since he has not learned that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are names for the same city, he remains willing to assent to the sentence “Londres est jolie.” He clearly thinks that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ name two different places.

On the basis of his French utterances it would appear natural to say that Pierre believes that London is pretty. At the same time, on the basis of his English utterances, it also seems fair to say that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. It might appear, then, that Pierre has contradictory beliefs. He seemingly both has the belief that London is pretty and has the belief that London is not pretty. The paradox, or so Kripke suggests, is that Pierre does not seem guilty of any logical error. In this scenario, it would be rather perverse to accuse Pierre of logical inconsistency. After all, he is simply not aware that ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ name the same city. In regard to Pierre’s lamentable circumstance, we are faced with an intriguing philosophical question—namely: What exactly does Pierre believe about the attractiveness of London?

Taking Risks and Enduring the Consequences

We discussed the issue of whether abortions are morally permissible in my Philosophy and Public Issues class. A number of my students echoed a line of argument you've probably heard before. It's usually stated in the form a single sentence: "She knew the risks of having sex." The point seems to be that a woman should not have an abortion because a pregnancy is a consequence of "risky behavior." One that engages in risky behavior is often saddled with undesirable consequences. (I'm here assuming that since we're talking about abortion that the pregnancy is not desired.) But, so the argument goes, if one is aware of those possible consequences, then one is "on the moral hook," as it were, for those consequences.

Here's another way to put this:

(1) A woman knows that a possible consequence of having sex is getting pregnant and eventually giving birth to a baby.
(2) If a person knows about a potential consequence of a given action and she performs that action in the face of this risk, then she must endure the consequences.
(3) Therefore, a woman who has sex and gets pregnant must endure the consequences and have the baby--and so shouldn't abort the fetus.

The key here is the phrase "must endure the consequences." What does this mean exactly? It has to mean something like that she is morally obligated to suffer through those negative consequences.

I used an example in class that I think shows that this kind of argument is unsound. Consider the various risks we take and the various undesirable consequences that might come about as a result of taking those risks. Are we morally obligated to "endure the consequences"? Consider my driving to work. I risk getting into an accident that damages my car. Suppose I take this risk and get into an accident. It's perfectly morally acceptable to repair my car. I may have to endure consequences like having to call my insurance company, take my car to the shop, etc. But I certainly am not morally required to refrain from repairing my car. This example seems to show that although certain consequences of a risk might have to be endured, others can be avoided. And it's not immoral to avoid those consequences. Indeed, it's perfectly rational to diminish the undesirable consequences of a "risky" action.

If this is correct, then it would seem that a woman does not have to "endure the consequences" of having sex if this means that she must carry an unwanted fetus to full term. She may have to endure various other consequences--consequences that are more difficult to avoid. She might feel guilty, wonder what "could have been," suffer physical discomfort, etc. These potential consequences are harder to avoid than a potential consequence like having a baby. Having a baby can be avoided, of course, by getting an abortion.

I want to make it clear that I'm not here arguing that abortions are morally permissible. (I do think that some abortions are permissible, but this is beside my point here.) All that I'm trying to show is that a very common sort of argument leveled against the moral permissibility of abortions is misguided. Indeed, I think this kind of argument is entirely unconvincing. The fact that a woman engages in "risky behavior" by having sex seems irrelevant to the issue of whether it's morally permissible for her to have an abortion.

Of course, we might think a great deal less of someone if she engages in very risky behavior and is, for example, surprised by the undesirable consequences that ensue. A friend of mine climbs mountains without ropes. It would be rather perverse for her to be in utter disbelief when she suffers a non-lethal, but terrible fall. This is because she knowingly takes a risk. So I do understand that we might judge people for the risks they take and that we have certain expectations of them. But my point remains. It's morally acceptable for her to seek medical care for those wounds, regardless of how foolish we might think she is for rock climbing without the adequate safety equipment. She may be unwise, rash, etc., but it's perfectly morally acceptable for her to do what she can to reduce the negative consequences of her risky behavior.

Comments are most welcome...

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Do we have a duty to help those in dire need?

We discuss Peter Singer's work in many of my classes. He's been arguing for decades that affluent people are morally obligated to help those that are destitute and suffering from famine and lack of resources (including things like clean water, medical resources, and education). What Singer is ultimately arguing for is an alteration of our conception of what counts as charity. According to him, we should view helping those in dire need as a duty, not something that would simply be nice for us to do. In other words, he thinks we have a moral obligation to do what we can to help those in dire need.

I'm curious what you think about Singer's arguments. His famous "pond example" is convincing to some people, yet others find it entirely unpersuasive. What do you think and, more importantly, why?

Monday, January 30, 2012

Why don't people act morally?

This is a piece written by Peter Singer (an author we'll see quite a bit of in my Philosophy and Public Issues course this term). One of the central questions addressed is:

Why are some people prepared to risk their lives to help a stranger when others won’t even stop to dial an emergency number?

I'm curious what readers of this blog think about the connection between biology and morality/moral behavior. How much can folks thinking about ethics learn from the sorts of experiments described in the article?

Friday, January 27, 2012

Graduate School Workshop on 1/28

I'll be leading a workshop with Nicole Amrhein ('08 grad/currently an attorney) on applying to graduate school. This will take place tomorrow at 11:00 in Swarts 111. This is part of the annual "Backpack to Briefcase" event at UPB.

Friday Paradox:

Zeno put forward a number of paradoxes. The upshot of many of them is that motion is impossible. This is a pretty startling conclusion, but his reasons seem fairly plausible.

Suppose I want to go out to eat and I decide to walk to the restaurant. Let A be my house and B be the restaurant. In order for me to get from A to B, I must cover half the distance between them. So I must get to point C. But in order for me to get from A to C, I must cover half of that distance. So I must get to point D. But in order for me to get from A to D, I must cover half of that distance. So I must get to point E... you get the idea. The issue is that there are an infinite number of "halves" that I have to traverse and so I'll never be able to get the full distance. How can one ever traverse an infinite number of points? So I can never actually get to the restaurant. Of course, we can generalize this and so it looks like all movement is impossible. So, contrary to the way things appear, nothing is really moving!

This wonderful clip explains another of Zeno's paradoxes (sometimes called "Achilles and the Tortoise") quite well. It has quite a bit in common with the one I describe above and the visual representation of the issue might be helpful.

Now, of course, most of think motion is possible. So the trick is identifying where Zeno's argument went awry.

Good luck and enjoy the weekend!

David Lewis, the Philosophical Conservative

Steve Pyke is a photographer that took a number of philosophers' pictures. He asked many of them to provide a few sentences about their approach to philosophy. David Lewis was one of them. He remarked:

"I am philosophically conservative: I think philosophy cannot credibly challenge either the positive convictions of common sense or the established theses of the natural sciences and mathematics."

In a famous book of his called Counterfactuals, Lewis writes:

"I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are. I believe that things could have been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been.’ I prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’" (page 84).

We discussed Lewis' ideas about possibility in my Metaphysics and Epistemology class. His view was that possible worlds are real and that they're just as real as the actual world. Here and here are more information about this view (now called modal realism).

Is Lewis' view philosophically conservative? Does he depart from the "positive convictions of common sense"? It doesn't seem conservative/like common sense to me. Of course, this doesn't show that his view is false. It's just not something that someone like my mother would propose as an explanation of possibility.

We only briefly touched on this in class, but a possible paper topic can be found here. I wonder what your thoughts are regarding modal realism and whether you think some alternative theory about possibility is more plausible. (This would likely have to be the long paper due at the end of the term, since it requires so much stage-setting and exposition.)

Here's one of the pictures that Pyke took of Lewis:

Thursday, January 26, 2012

Did Socrates' death cause his wife to be a widow?

I'm teaching a class celled Metaphysics and Epistemology this semester. One of the books for the class is by John Carroll and Ned Markosian and it's entitled An Introduction to Metaphysics. A number of students found the example of the passage below perplexing (this appears on page 29):

"When Socrates drank the hemlock and died in the Athenian prison, his wife, Xanthippe, became a widow. Did Socrates' death cause Xanthippe to become a widow?... Many philosophers find this conclusion unacceptable. The worry is that any relation holding between these two events is bound not to be of the tangible/physical sort one normally expects causation to be. The connection seems to be too much a conceptual matter. To drive home this point, sometimes it is argued that, since Xanthippe was not in the prison with Socrates, his death could not have caused her to become a widow. She became a widow the instant he died. Since there is no instantaneous causal action at a distance in a world like ours where no signals travel faster than light, his death didn't cause her widowhood."

If I were taking the class, I'd be tempted to write one of my papers on something related to this example. There are some fascinating questions that are raised in this short passage. Can there be instantaneous causation at a distance? Does causation require a "tangible/physical" bond between two events? If she became a widow the instant he died, then what (if not his death) caused this effect?

I'm hoping readers will make some suggest some answers to these questions and shed some light on these issues.

Enlightened Brazilians

Brazil has required high school students to take philosophy courses since 2008 because it is "necessary for the exercise of citizenship." Here's a recent article from a Boston newspaper on the program.

What I find especially interesting about the article is the discussion toward the end about perceptions of justice.

(Thanks to Brian Leiter for posting the link on his blog.)