Abortion and Self-Defense

From guest blogger, Tim.

We discussed in class the argument from Thomson regarding abortion in cases where the mother’s life is in danger. The “expanding baby” case is supposed to show us that it is morally permissible to kill innocent persons in self-defense. I agree with this general principle, but I believe we face complications in applying it to abortion. Recall that Thomson grants the assumption that fetuses are persons just like infants, children, and adults are. Given this assumption, it appears that the fetus would have the same rights as any other person, including the right to self-defense. Self-defense can be “outsourced” – if your life is endanger, someone else can protect it for you (such as a police officer or another citizen).

Let’s apply this to an abortion case where the mother’s life is endangered. If the mother has the abortion, she will survive, but the baby will not. If she does not have the abortion, the baby will survive, but she will not. One person will die. Both the mother and the baby are innocent persons. If the mother has the right to kill the innocent baby, then it appears the baby should have the same right as well (even though the baby cannot act on it).

To me, it doesn’t seem like there is one definitive answer here. If a physician gives a woman an abortion, he saves the woman but kills the baby. If he denies an abortion (and the woman doesn’t get one elsewhere), he saves the baby but not the mother. Either way, an innocent life is saved. While I don’t think that an abortion is morally wrong in self-defense (someone is going to die either way), it also seems then that refusing to provide abortions would be morally permissible because it would also be saving a life.

I can’t think of a great principle with which we can determine which innocent life is “best” to save. Do we save the fetus who theoretically has a “better future”, or do we save the mother? I don’t think there is a morally correct answer here. Consequently, those who want to argue that this situation is not ambiguous – the abortion is always the moral decision, and a physician refusing to provide the abortion would be doing something wrong – appear that they have to abandon the premise that a fetus is an equal person. It might still be a person, but if it is an equal person, it is not clear why the mother should be prioritized over the fetus.

Forced Abortion Policy

From guest blogger, Jane.

In 1979 China implemented the family planning policy where urban married couples were to have only one child and ethnic minority couples were excluded from the law. The population explosion had taken a toll on resources and the government decided on the implementation of one child per family.

The government could not foresee or was so shortsighted that the family planning policy would eventually lead to forced abortion. People are not puppets that they follow instructions set out by the law and not deviate.

To date, the one-child policy has helped prevent at least 300 million births in China and aided the country's rapid economic development.

China is one of the countries that allows abortion. To comply with the law of one child per family, married couples would resort to abortion, otherwise they would have to pay heavy fines for violating the law of the country.

Normally, abortion is made voluntarily by the consenting mother whereas in China, the government sometimes forces the mother to physically abort the fetus. At other times, the father, parents or boyfriend may have a say in the decision of abortion.

In October 2015, the Chinese government renounced the one child policy and allowed the second child per family.

Assessment on Warren’s Abortion

From guest blogger, Brian.

In class, we talk about Warren rejected the classic argument of abortion because it is invalid due to the different concept of persons in premises.  Hence, Warren approached five traits to definite a person including consciousness ability, reasoning skills, self-motivated, communication skills, and self-awareness.  Those five features give support for a being to be classified as a person, therefore allowing them to have moral rights in our society. Warren concludes by claiming that a fetus has none of these five traits, and therefore a fetus is not a person, neither a morally human being.

I have two concerns about the way she defines a person. First of all, she does not concern about any stage of abortion.  For example, a two-month fetus verse a nine-month fetus. It is to me that killing a nine-months fetus is going to cause much more pain physically and mentally than a two-months fetus for both the gravida and the fetus.

Additionally, assuming the theory is true to determine a person, I believe that these criteria are too hard to achieve because it sets very high standards. For instance, the two traits claim that a person needs to have reasoning skill and self-motivated activity; however, those are traits we might only find from adults. A newborn and even a young child still does not have the ability to question things and perform self motivated activities, therefore the two premises are doubtful to me. 

Thomson's People Seed Case

From guest blogger, Alex.

In class, we discussed the "People Seed" scenario. This struck particular interest to me, because I disagreed with the root of the argument. In this claim, it was said that since it is your house, you have the right to do whatever with the seed you choose. Correct, it is your house. However, the way the seed got to the carpet is where I see the fault. First, it was your choice to live next to the tree. No one forced you to live here, in this situation. If someone did i.e. rape, I have a different opinion which I will not discuss in this post. However, this circumstance says you chose to live there. That means you are open to the fact that a people seed may land on your carpet. If you accept this, you accept the fact that there's a chance a human life will land in your house. Next, the window. You can live next to the tree, and close your window. If you get the correctly protected window, a seed will not have access into your house. With maximum use of protection, by whatever means necessary, the seed will not have access into your house. Given these two statements, I firmly believe that it is on you if a seed falls on your carpet, and you must face the consequences. Without bringing religion into this, humans are put on this earth to help each other. If you don't accept this, imagine a world in which everyone only worried about themselves and had no concern for any other life on this planet. It wouldn't function.

Another situation was if a burglar moved into your house for six months because he needed your house for food, and living conditions. I see this as a faulted situation. There is one big difference between someone needing your house and food and abortion. The baby needs YOU to survive, and it needs your physical body. Not anyone else, just the body that it is in. The burglar needs your food, it needs external belongings. It doesn't need your physical body to survive. There are many other identical forms of food, or housing that will provide identical benefits. As hard as it is to get the burglar out of your house or get him food, it can be done. This is impossible with the baby. It needs you.

The Mother as Many?

**This is from guest blogger Eric B.**

In all honesty, much of this paper confuses me. Perhaps it is the sometimes slim difference between what we intend to do and what we foresee happening after certain actions (Direct vs. Oblique). Perhaps it is the simple volume of hypothetical situations that Foot presents in this paper. Most of all, I feel that the main issue is that the conclusion regarding abortion seems unresolved. To be specific, I am focusing on the third case provided by Foot, in which an abortion can be performed that would kill the fetus and save the mother, or the mother could be let to die, while the fetus is safely delivered.

Foot uses positive and negative actions to help us determine the moral obligations we have to certain situations. A positive duty is one in which we provide aid to another individual, whereas a negative duty is one in which we agree to avoid injuring them. The abortion of a baby is akin to providing aid to the mother while violating our duty not to injure the baby. It seems, that the violation of the negative duty outweighs the positive duty, namely the benefit gained by providing aid to the mother. Therefore it would follow that aborting the baby is the wrong action to take. This situation becomes even clearer if we treat change the situation to one in which a toddler may result in the death of the mother. In this case we would surely agree that it would be wrong to kill the already born child to aid the mother.

What Foot then proposes is quite strange and rather unintuitive. She suggests that people have a different conception of the scenario if we suggest that a group of individuals is harmed (P.588). In this, she submits that we treat the mother as if she was a group of people and the fetus as only a single person. It follows that we must protect the group by willingly sacrificing the single individual, no matter how difficult this may be. I find this conclusion rather bizarre, in that we must treat a single woman as a group, when in fact we know that she is a single person (and presumably has the same rights as the child). Here I would like to involve you, the reader, to help me understand exactly what is meant by this “mother-as-a-group” analogy that Foot uses. I look forward to hearing the varied responses that you all can provide.

Foot and the Doctrine of Double Effect

**This is from guest blogger, Kyle.**

In reading the title of Foot's article and admittedly not having much familiarity with the doctrine it refers to, I was disappointed to find how little this article actually pertains to abortion specifically. Instead, Foot uses abortion as a springboard into a discussion of killing versus letting die and how the doctrine of the double effect often conflicts with our intuitions regarding what actions are right and wrong when two agents (a mother and her unborn child) have tethered fates. While the conclusions she ultimately draws are ones I would likely make myself if I had the mental fortitude to devise the arguments which beget them, I think her work here would benefit greatly from some manner of argument which didn't rely as heavily on her readers' intuitions as it does in its current state.

Many of the intuitions Foot appeals to are those I personally hold, such as the morality in killing a fetus to save its mother's life should not abstaining from action entail the death of both, despite their contradicting the doctrine of the double effect (which is to be expected as I share Foot's reservations about the doctrine itself). The problem, however, is that I'm not sure the examples she provides are quite as persuasive to those who don't hold those intuitions as she may hope. What seems absurd to those of mine and Foot's camp may not to those who hold that the ending of one's life being a primary intent fueling another agent's ending of that life is never permissible. This is particularly true in the third example Foot brings up in which refraining from intervening during a birth will result in the death of the mother but the survival of the child (whereas before, abstention resulted in the death of both parties) while intentionally killing the child will leave the mother alive. Foot remains ambiguous as to what intuitions she holds on this case, and instead uses it to show that while advocates for the doctrine often will invoke it here to defend letting the mother die, she feels their justification is actually misguided, that they should be appealing to a distinction between “avoiding injury and bringing aid” rather than “direct and oblique intention” as the doctrine originally states. This is the main conclusion she reaches with her paper, though it as well relies on a possibly contestable intuition: a distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid.

While again, my intuitions are actually in-line with Foot's on this point, it should be noted that there are those who don't acknowledge a distinction. For a very Philosophy 101 example, there's Peter Singer's work on the immorality of miserliness in the face of suffering, in which a strong variant of his argument could state that not supplying whatever aid one can muster to those in need is indeed immoral. Though I don't think Singer himself posited this view, it seems possible to me that one may hold that such miserliness is of a similar caliber of heinousness as directly ensuring the wantonness of the needy. Such an intuition doesn't seem to bear much weight on Foot's first two examples, but it would seem to nullify the dilemma present in the third. Furthermore, if this irregular intuition was something that one held, Foot's distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid as the principle factor in determining the morality of the actions available in the third example would be nonsensical. While her critique of using “direct and oblique intention” as the determining factor would still be apt, for those with this irregular intuition, it seems the alternative she provides wouldn't be satisfactory. Then again, perhaps this isn't an intuition many feel the need to appeal to considering how unappealing it is to me to explain how one might possibly begin to justify the view that withholding aid from and directly harming others are morally equivalent. There is also the floodgate of arguments to consider that could have been opened had Foot contested or at least made contestable the moral consideration given to fetuses being equivalent to that given to mothers, but in the interest of brevity and directness, she was probably wise not to.

Biology, "Legitimate" Rape, and the Morality of Abortion

As you've probably heard, the GOP has officially taken a strong stance against the moral permissibility of abortion.  The party's position is that a woman should not be able to abort a fetus, even if the fetus is the product of rape or incest. 

Representative Akin's comments have received quite a bit of attention recently.  In discussing pregnancy resulting from rape, he remarked: “It seems to me, from what I understand from doctors, that’s really rare. If it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down.”  

The majority of the controversy over Akin's comments revolve around: (a) biology and whether a raped woman is more or less likely to get pregnant than a woman that engages in "normal" intercourse; and (b) his use of the phrase 'legitimate'.  I don't think either of these is where oppenents should really direct their ire.

Regarding (a), it appears that Akin is incorrect about his biological claim.  A number of professional medical associations have disputed his remarks.  But, even if he's right, I don't see why this is relevant to the discussion.  Suppose that it is extremely unlikely that a woman becomes pregnant after rape.  Imagine that merely 1% of cases of rape result in pregnancy and the chances of getting pregnant from "normal" intercourse is significantly greater than this.  What's the argument that gets one from this (dubious) biological point to the conclusion that it is wrong for a woman to abort a fetus after being raped?  I don't see why the probabilities matter here.  

Regarding (b), I can certainly see why people think that Akin is implying that some (many?) cases of purported rape are not legitimate (where this is read:  actual cases of rape).  If this is Akin's position, there may be cause to be upset.  And we can have a very interesting discussion about what counts as rape and what exactly it is to give consent.  But, again, I don't see anything in what Akin says that has anything to do with whether women that have been raped and become pregnant ought to be allowed to have abortions.  And that's the issue at hand.  That's a major part of the official platform of the GOP.   A quick look at the GOP website and interviews with the major players in the Republican Party yields little by way of actual arguments for this controversial position. 

We need to engage in a debate about the issue and this requires wrestling with premises that are actually relevant.  Unfortunately, it seems the bulk of politicians (on both sides of the aisle) and members of the media (liberal and conservative alike) are guilty of failing to do this. This, I think, is deserving of our ire.  

Taking Risks and Enduring the Consequences

We discussed the issue of whether abortions are morally permissible in my Philosophy and Public Issues class. A number of my students echoed a line of argument you've probably heard before. It's usually stated in the form a single sentence: "She knew the risks of having sex." The point seems to be that a woman should not have an abortion because a pregnancy is a consequence of "risky behavior." One that engages in risky behavior is often saddled with undesirable consequences. (I'm here assuming that since we're talking about abortion that the pregnancy is not desired.) But, so the argument goes, if one is aware of those possible consequences, then one is "on the moral hook," as it were, for those consequences.

Here's another way to put this:

(1) A woman knows that a possible consequence of having sex is getting pregnant and eventually giving birth to a baby.
(2) If a person knows about a potential consequence of a given action and she performs that action in the face of this risk, then she must endure the consequences.
(3) Therefore, a woman who has sex and gets pregnant must endure the consequences and have the baby--and so shouldn't abort the fetus.

The key here is the phrase "must endure the consequences." What does this mean exactly? It has to mean something like that she is morally obligated to suffer through those negative consequences.

I used an example in class that I think shows that this kind of argument is unsound. Consider the various risks we take and the various undesirable consequences that might come about as a result of taking those risks. Are we morally obligated to "endure the consequences"? Consider my driving to work. I risk getting into an accident that damages my car. Suppose I take this risk and get into an accident. It's perfectly morally acceptable to repair my car. I may have to endure consequences like having to call my insurance company, take my car to the shop, etc. But I certainly am not morally required to refrain from repairing my car. This example seems to show that although certain consequences of a risk might have to be endured, others can be avoided. And it's not immoral to avoid those consequences. Indeed, it's perfectly rational to diminish the undesirable consequences of a "risky" action.

If this is correct, then it would seem that a woman does not have to "endure the consequences" of having sex if this means that she must carry an unwanted fetus to full term. She may have to endure various other consequences--consequences that are more difficult to avoid. She might feel guilty, wonder what "could have been," suffer physical discomfort, etc. These potential consequences are harder to avoid than a potential consequence like having a baby. Having a baby can be avoided, of course, by getting an abortion.

I want to make it clear that I'm not here arguing that abortions are morally permissible. (I do think that some abortions are permissible, but this is beside my point here.) All that I'm trying to show is that a very common sort of argument leveled against the moral permissibility of abortions is misguided. Indeed, I think this kind of argument is entirely unconvincing. The fact that a woman engages in "risky behavior" by having sex seems irrelevant to the issue of whether it's morally permissible for her to have an abortion.

Of course, we might think a great deal less of someone if she engages in very risky behavior and is, for example, surprised by the undesirable consequences that ensue. A friend of mine climbs mountains without ropes. It would be rather perverse for her to be in utter disbelief when she suffers a non-lethal, but terrible fall. This is because she knowingly takes a risk. So I do understand that we might judge people for the risks they take and that we have certain expectations of them. But my point remains. It's morally acceptable for her to seek medical care for those wounds, regardless of how foolish we might think she is for rock climbing without the adequate safety equipment. She may be unwise, rash, etc., but it's perfectly morally acceptable for her to do what she can to reduce the negative consequences of her risky behavior.

Comments are most welcome...

What is a person, anyway?

Many moral debates hinge on the concept of person. Arguments against abortion, for example, often involve the claim that fetuses are people. Here's a common argument for the conclusion that abortions are immoral.

(1) It is wrong to kill an innocent person.
(2) A fetus is an innocent person.
(3) Therefore, it's wrong to kill a fetus.

Assessing the soundness of this argument is difficult. There's much to be said about the first premise and about related issues involving the notion of a right to life. But we can save these issues for another day. What I'm concerned about here is the second premise and how one is to determine what it is to be a person. Mississippians are set to vote on a measure that involves settling on a legal definition of personhood. This vote could have a tremendous impact on various policies, not just those related to the legal status of abortions in that state.

So what are the criteria for personhood exactly? I am a person but my dog is presumably not. What are the relevant properties that morally distinguish us? It better not simply be that I'm a member of the species homo sapiens or that I have a higher IQ than him. This is because species membership and intelligence (like race, religion, gender, or taste in music) are not markers of moral status. These seem to be morally irrelevant properties. I don't care much for Nickelback, but I certainly don't think fans of the band have a lower moral status because of their taste--or lack thereof--in music. What we need to find are morally relevant properties that I have but which my dog lacks. These would be the properties relevant to personhood. Once we discover what these properties are exactly, we can then see if fetuses have them. And this is what we need to do if we are to answer the question of whether fetuses are people (in the moral sense of the term where this means that fetuses have a right to life or are deserving of deep moral consideration).

I'm curious what you find to be the morally relevant properties required for personhood.

UPDATE 11/9/11: The votes from Mississippi are in and Measure 26 did not pass. This indicates that the majority of voters did not feel comfortable with legally defining fetuses as persons. It may be that the rather strong implications of passing the measure are what dissuaded many voters. The measure was likely to effect more than just the practice of abortions in Mississippi. It was likely to have an impact on certain forms of birth control, fertility treatments like in vitro fertilization, etc. It's not clear to me what conclusions one ought to draw from this vote. Polls strongly indicate that the majority of folks in Mississippi are anti-abortionists and think that fetuses are people. But the vote indicates that, despite this position on the status of fetuses, most Mississippians (that voted) are not prepared to enact the policies involved in the measure. This is fascinating.

UPDATE 12/19/11: A preliminary poll on this blog regarding this issue resulted in 31 votes for considering a fetus a person and 46 votes for not.