Thursday, March 14, 2013

Mill, Hedonism, and so-called Higher Pleasures

**This is from guest blogger, Nathan V.**

In "Utiliarianism," Mill argues that some pleasures are more valuable than others. He says this relationship can be determined by people who are "equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both." He further argues that pleasures that make use of one's higher faculties are more valuable than those that make use of one's more base faculties. Mill says that someone who makes use of their higher faculties is in a better position than someone who doesn't to make qualitative judgments about various pleasures. This is because he is able to experience higher pleasures as well as more base pleasures whereas someone who doesn't make use of their higher faculties is only able to experience base pleasures and is therefore not in a position to make such judgments.

One issue with his view seems to be that only those who subscribe to the idea that pleasures obtained through the use of one's higher faculties are better and more worth pursuing than those obtained through the use of one's more base faculties are said to be capable of making such judgments. What is to be made of those who after tasting the higher pleasures choose instead to pursue the more base pleasures? An example of this that I thought of while reading Mill is the episode of the Simpsons where Homer gets the crayon that has been lodged in his brain since childhood removed. After the crayon is removed Homer becomes a genius, but by the end of the episode he has it placed back into his brain as he has decided that he was happier when he was stupid. In this case, it seems that the pleasure Homer experiences from not accessing his higher faculties is more valuable than the pleasure he experienced when he was accessing them. While Mills would first seem to directly oppose this idea saying, "no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool," he later says that if someone did consent to be a fool, it would occur "only in cases of unhappiness so extreme that, to escape from it, they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes." In this case, the choice to be a fool would seem to lead more pleasure and therefore be more valuable than remaining intelligent.

Mill’s way out of this seeming contradiction is to define a being of higher faculties as someone who could never lower themselves to a more base existence out of a sense of dignity. Mill says, somewhat circularly, that dignity is an essential part of happiness to people who have a strong sense of dignity. While he then goes on to describe ways in which a being of higher faculties may pursue more base pleasures to the exclusion of higher pleasures due to things like temptation, habit, and "infirmity of character," he rejects the idea that these should be considered valid judgments of what type of pleasure is more valuable. Mill seems to believe that the only people capable of judging the qualitative value of various pleasures are those who judge the pleasures that result from one's higher faculties as being better than those that result from one's more base faculties.argues that some pleasures are more valuable than others. He says this relationship can be determined by people who are "equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both." He further argues that pleasures that make use of one's higher faculties are more valuable than those that make use of one's more base faculties. Mill says that someone who makes use of their higher faculties is in a better position than someone who doesn't to make qualitative judgments about various pleasures. This is because he is able to experience higher pleasures as well as more base pleasures whereas someone who doesn't make use of their higher faculties is only able to experience base pleasures and is therefore not in a position to make such judgments.

3 comments:

T. Stoehr said...

Nathan, I think you make a really good point by bringing up the Simpsons episode; it really does show that ignorance is bliss. I myself know that, at times, I wish I could revert to being a child when all I had to worry about was who I was going to play with at recess, or what outfit to wear on picture day. Now, as I've matured, I've become more conscious of the various responsibilities I have to myself and others, which, at times, can be overwhelming. That being said, there are many affordances of being an intellectual, higher thinking human being that I'm not sure are worth losing for the simplicity of childhood. What a dilemma!

Heirron said...

Very interesting post, and for the sake of argument, I will try to defend Mill. It seems that Mill thinks he stating a kind of truism when he says that people would not willingly sacrifice their higher faculties except under the most dire circumstances. Then, his examples of people who opt for more base pleasures are supposed to be explained away as instances in which people are not really free to exercise their higher faculties, or have not learned to do so. As for the portion about dignity, I am not convinced that Mill is being circular. It does not seem circular to say that one's house is a central part of being sheltered for those with good houses, so in the same way, it is not circular to say that dignity is a central part of pleasure for those with a strong sense of dignity. The point is that when dignity is available, pleasure is built upon it, not that dignity allows for pleasure which allows for dignity. Finally, even though Mill has assumed that people will choose to exercise their higher faculties, given the option, he does also give us a test. He says, "What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both?" I take this to mean that if most people think it is better, i.e. more pleasurable, to have one's higher faculties, then we must admit that they are right. Conversely, if most people preferred not having their higher faculties, and they were making a free choice, and were well acquainted with those faculties, then base pleasures would be better. I think the important point is that this allows for a few people to genuinely prefer base pleasures. So long as most people prefer exercising their higher faculties, Mill is in the clear.

Switching now to critical mode, I wonder if those who regularly exercise their higher faculties really know what it is like, for instance, to be a fool. Considering the example in class today, about the person who liked really low-brow humor versus the person who like high-brow humor, it seems wrong to say that the person who likes high-brow humor is in a position to compare the two since she does not really appreciate low-brow humor. If this is the case, then I agree that those who exercise their higher faculties are not in a position to judge between kind of pleasure.

J. P. H. Stephens said...

I'd like to respond to what Heirron has said, first with a question about the house-shelter-house argument, and then building upon the low-brow/high-brow example from class.

Wouldn't the dignity pleasure circularity translate more directly into "one's mansion is a key component to providing shelter for those who own mansions"? On the one hand I am inclined to say that the mansion is not required...merely the roof. On the other, someone with a mansion relies upon it, and to suggest that they should tear down all but the garage would be silly.

Now, to the example from class. I immediately equated the gentleman in favor of "That's what she said!" jokes with Michael Scott. After a bit of deliberation, I decided that the woman was a bit like David Wallace...serious, non favoring nonsense. At one point, Wallace became quite non-sensical...until the military bought his invention for tons of money. At this point, he gladly returned to his former (non-depressed) self. This might suggest that he does, in fact, favor high class atmosphere when he has the option of enjoying it. At the same time, Michael Scott is clearly the happiest person in the room, most of the time. Perhaps it is because he is oblivious to certain realities, but I think the viewer could argue that he is a protagonist, nonetheless. Unfortunately, I'm not sure that using the office as a medium for comparison is really useful in dissecting Mill, because it is, in turn, just a thought experiment. These characters are made up, and there is no guarantee that their actions would 100% accurately reflect any actual human being.