tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3133078502277941061.post2126475639055365185..comments2023-07-18T08:00:22.009-05:00Comments on Steinblog: Clifford and the Morality of Certain BeliefsUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3133078502277941061.post-86551752202096449942013-12-08T17:04:49.041-06:002013-12-08T17:04:49.041-06:00I agree with Zach that there seems to be some cons...I agree with Zach that there seems to be some consequentialism in this idea. I was actually discussing a topic similar to this with a friend this afternoon and I’ve always thought that your conscious intent is the most important assessor of one’s morality. But during this conversation we got into talking more about politics and less about philosophy and I found myself saying that a certain bill was implying certain things about a specific demographic (I’ll try and keep this about philosophy and not mention the political details of the conversation). My friend was playing devils advocate and was defending the politician that supports this bill and bills like these. But right after I just stated that intension was all that matters my friend pointed out that these bills intent is not to do X to the people but to do Y. And I said something like “I don’t care if this is not what they are intending to do, but it’s what they are doing!” I realized that consequentialism is right on a lot of topics so I would have to say that as long as the results of your beliefs are just or true then maybe it doesn’t always matter why someone has a belief of something.Caitlin Cnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3133078502277941061.post-78028126022391168552013-12-08T17:04:28.523-06:002013-12-08T17:04:28.523-06:00I agree with Zach that there seems to be some cons...I agree with Zach that there seems to be some consequentialism in this idea. I was actually discussing a topic similar to this with a friend this afternoon and I’ve always thought that your conscious intent is the most important assessor of one’s morality. But during this conversation we got into talking more about politics and less about philosophy and I found myself saying that a certain bill was implying certain things about a specific demographic (I’ll try and keep this about philosophy and not mention the political details of the conversation). My friend was playing devils advocate and was defending the politician that supports this bill and bills like these. But right after I just stated that intension was all that matters my friend pointed out that these bills intent is not to do X to the people but to do Y. And I said something like “I don’t care if this is not what they are intending to do, but it’s what they are doing!” I realized that consequentialism is right on a lot of topics so I would have to say that as long as the results of your beliefs are just or true then maybe it doesn’t always matter why someone has a belief of something.Caitlin Cnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3133078502277941061.post-53055659417563355522013-12-02T23:25:38.273-06:002013-12-02T23:25:38.273-06:00I share your thought that external-world skepticis...I share your thought that external-world skepticism isn't necessarily silly or absurd, but I'm struggling to understand its connection to skepticism about God's existence (or other religious truth). It seems possible that one could be an external-world skeptic ("argue that it is silly to be entirely sure that one's water bottle exist[s]") and, for completely different reasons, hold traditional Christian (or Jewish, Muslim, etc.) beliefs about the existence of God (among other things). If so, wouldn't that person also believe that they have a compelling argument for his or her religion, and that they do not have a compelling argument for external-world realism (or have an argument against external-world realism)?<br /><br />Also, there seems to be an implicit sort of consequentialism in your idea of the justification of beliefs, namely that one ought to believe the belief that causes the greatest happiness or utility (to put it in utilitarian terms) or the belief that causes the least harm, regardless of what's "true." Though I'm interested in this idea, I'm sure some folks would argue against it, arguing that the truth should be the basis of belief/justification rather than the consequences of the belief. Zach Wrublewskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02653985715207538215noreply@blogger.com